“I know you are afraid and you should be afraid. I will invest you in products that will not stir up your fears."
This sentiment is applied over and over again in the investment industry in one form or another.
It is the mantra of what my co-author Jason Voss, CFA, and I call the “Cult of Emotion.” The Cult is so pervasive, investment professionals are hardly aware how it affects virtually every investment decision we make. It has been institutionalized through regulation, platforms, gatekeepers, advisers, analysts, consultants, and even modern portfolio theory (MPT), the underlying paradigm of the investment industry.
Two Choices: Cater to or Mitigate Emotions
Investors experience powerful emotions as portfolios decline in value and then reverse course and head back up. Drawdowns are especially gut-wrenching, as hard-earned money disappears before a client's eyes.
Investors are prone to a host of cognitive errors when in thrall to these emotions. The two most prominent are myopic loss aversion and social validation. Myopic loss aversion research demonstrates that people experience the negative feelings associated with losses almost twice as acutely as the pleasure of gains. Social validation, on the other hand, is our innate desire to follow and be a part of the herd.
As investment professionals, we can do little to turn off these emotions. But we can decide how we respond to our clients when they experience them in the growth portion of their portfolios.
There are two choices: We either cater to clients' emotions, or we strive to mitigate the damage inflicted by investment decisions made based on those emotions. Investors left to their own devices will let their feelings drive their investment choices. And that will end up costing them hundreds of thousands — if not millions — of dollars in long-term wealth. By helping to short-circuit these cognitive errors, advisers and analysts can add value for their clients.
To be clear, investors are fearful and their fears need to be addressed by their investment advisers. And the truth is some investors can't be talked out of their fears. But we need to do all we can to help clients avoid these expensive mistakes.
Catering to Emotions
Sadly, the industry encourages us to cater to — to humor — rather than mitigate client emotions. For example, current practice is to diversify across multiple asset classes regardless of the expected return. The result is a trade-off between short-term emotional comfort and long-horizon wealth. The Cult of Emotion sanctions this practice, so we tend not to recognize the damage it inflicts on client growth portfolios.
A considerable swath of the industry is influenced by the suitability standard. Clients are required to complete a “risk assessment” and are then categorized as conservative, moderate, or aggressive. The growth portion of a portfolio is then constructed to fit this classification.
But suitability is an emotional assessment of clients — and a poor one, at that — not a risk assessment of their portfolios. This is an absolutely critical distinction. Suitability legitimizes the construction of low-return portfolios for temporary peace of mind and consequently denies clients substantial long-horizon wealth.
The Cult views tracking error as risk. It's not. It is an emotional trigger for investors. Because of myopic loss aversion, short-term underperformance serves as a signal to sell a fund and invest in another with better recent performance. So the industry requires low tracking error. But truly active funds can't be successful without tracking error. Accommodating the feelings evoked by tracking error costs investors dearly.
Parenthetically, this discussion brings up another problem with tracking error that is covered in “Alpha Wounds: Bad Adjunct Methodologies.” It is an active investment manager’s job to outperform the benchmark and by a wide margin. Tracking error presupposes a successful asset allocation strategy put into place by an independent third party, for which there is actually very little evidence of success.
Cult Enforcers
Cult Enforcers dominate the investment industry. But just who are they? Advisers who construct the entire client portfolio based on the suitability standard, rather than specific needs. Analyst gatekeepers who use annual volatility, Sharpe ratio, tracking error, and the like to determine long-horizon investments.
There are three forces that shape the Enforcer's mentality:
- The widespread use of MPT tools — volatility as risk and efficient frontiers — strongly encourages a trade-off between temporary emotional comfort and long-term wealth.
- The business risk funds face when investors make emotional investing decisions based on short-term performance encourages internal sales and marketing to work hand in hand with the external gatekeepers to enforce the Cult's dogma.
- The many regulations imposed on the industry to reduce emotional triggers limit the investment choices available to investors. And, of course, the trial lawyers are not far behind, enforcing the prudent man rule and other regulations, thus stirring up concern if not outright fear among industry professionals.
Leaving the Cult
To pave the way for the active equity renaissance, the Cult of Emotion must be left behind. The Cult is ubiquitous, so this won't be an easy task. But it is essential. The Cult makes successful active management nearly impossible.
Each of us can begin this transition on our own. The hope is that the industry eventually sheds the Cult and returns its focus to delivering client value.
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All posts are the opinion of the author. As such, they should not be construed as investment advice, nor do the opinions expressed necessarily reflect the views of CFA Institute or the author's employer.
Image credit: ©Getty Images/Jim Zuckerman
28 Comments
Excellent Piece of Article.
i do agree that time has come to include behavioral finance insight with MPT while constructing clients's portfolio. The biggest culprits is creation of Clients's optimal portfolio (risk free Asset + Market Portfolio) considering Investor's indiffernce curve. However - Investor's indifference curve is derived out of risk assessment profile - which is faulty (as author has highlighted). Only Behavioral finance can provide insight why a risk averse client - who buys insurance to protect his wealth as well buys a lottery .
My recommendation will be to get rid of risk questionnaire (which is based on template - blame it upon laziness of Institutional approach - one size fits all) and gain insight based on Investor's past financial decision. It could have been difficult in past - but with recent technology trends / data science fundamentals - It will not be difficult to derive a subjective client specific view based on his past trading decisions (fo obvious reasons, One need to separate his current repetitive decisions, trading decisions, checking / balance accounts, use of mortgages / debts , 401 or IRA account decisions and other factors). This is expected to rationalize true risk assessment of client .
Once again - this was an excellent read and thanks for this insight.
Krishna-
Thanks for your comment and a very interesting approach to dealing with client emotions.
An important step for advisors is to implement a needs based planning framework. This allows for funding a specific need (liquidity, income, growth) with a specific portfolio. Volatility is avoided completely in the liquidity portfolio. Volatility plays a small role in the income portfolio as the focus in on growing income to offset inflation.
It is in the growth portfolio, where we need to get clients comfortable with the emotions generated by volatility, where your suggested approach would yield the greatest benefit in terms of building long horizon wealth.
Tom, I'm not sure I understand the points you're making about volatility. Could you elaborate? Thanks.
Hi Brad,
I don't want to speak for Tom. But in our conversations, his and mine, we believe that volatility in security price reflects, yes, adjustments to new information, but mostly the short-term emotions of market participants. Real risk is something that jeopardizes a security issuer's ability to deliver on the value proposition of the security. This opens up the number of risks to be evaluated, and not all of them are necessarily captured in a single number, or even quantifiable for that matter.
Further, since equities, in the aggregate, over long periods of time deliver price appreciation in excess of inflation and relative to other securities, Tom believes volatility should be ignored when choosing securities. He and I will be discussing this more in the fourth piece in this series.
Hope that helps!
Jason
That's helpful, Jason. I believe I agree with your second point, and I believe that's the important one. Most investors--supposedly "sophisticated" institutional investors at least as much as supposedly "unsophisticated" retail investors--seem to be inordinately afraid of volatility even when they claim to be long-term investors, which would imply that they can tolerate short-term volatility and earn a significant long-term reward for doing so. For example, Robert Arnott (http://www.iijournals.com/doi/pdf/10.3905/jor.2013.1.2.013 and others) has pointed out that most of the uncertainty associated with long-term investments in volatile asset classes is UPSIDE uncertainty: that is, how much richer we'll become if we take the higher returns that are compensation for higher volatility.
I disagree with your first point, which I regard as less important; I'll write a separate response to it.
Hi Jason,
You (and Tom) distinguish between "adjustments to new information" and "short-term emotions." I don't think they're different, and I think it's a cognitive mistake to dismiss volatility as merely the result of short-term emotions.
The value of any asset can be modeled as the present-discounted value of the future stream of cash flows generated by that asset. Of course nobody can know the future, so the value of any asset is determined by each market participants current expectations regarding both the future stream of cash flows that will be produced by that asset (under that market participant's ownership, if the cash flows are owner-dependent) and the future stream of discount rates that will apply to that owner. Market participants are constantly re-evaluating their current expectations regarding both of those streams of future values. "Emotion" is simply a dismissive way of describing how market participants revise their expectations in response to the arrival of new information. For example, if something increases uncertainty, then market participants will tend to revise downward their expectations regarding future cash flows (because of risk aversion) and similarly will tend to revise upward their expectations regarding future discount rates--resulting in a downward revision of their estimate of the asset's value. Volatility, then, is simply a real-time revelation of the market's process of incorporating new information--not a false signal generated by mere "emotion."
Brad-
That is certainly the theory: investors carefully discount future cash flows and price changes are the result of this evaluation process. But empirical tests of this proposition are unable to identify a link between changes in fundamentals and price changes.
The best known is the research stream launched by Shiller in 1981 which concludes that almost all market volatility is noise. This implies one can safely ignore all current economic and market news when making investment decisions.
Noise is even more pervasive when considering individual stocks.
Brad, we will have to agree to disagree on this issue.
Hi Brad,
Your comments inspire several responses.
First, most all of the money invested in almost all assets is from passive strategies. Surely, they are not engaged in an estimate of future cash flows and valuation. Instead, as they receive new monies they simply purchase a proportionate share of them in whatever index they are tracking. The end investor, usually retail, also surely is not engaged in any form of discounting. Most retail investors, a) do not have the time in their lives to evaluate investments in the classical way you describe, b) do not have the skill set to do it. I think it is a pretty safe conclusion that much of passive investment money is a reflection of how people feel about 'the Market' now.
Second, if what I wrote above is true, that most passive money is neutral, ranging to emotional in response to news, then prices, which are set at the margin, are being set by active investors. However, there is not better news there, in my opinion. In a world of 100%+ average turnover among active managers can you really count on investors rolling up their sleeves, putting on their green eye shades and cooly, rationally valuing the future prospects of businesses? There is pretty strong evidence (e.g. in turnover ratios) that most investors are basing their decisions more on momentum or growth factors that valuation.
Third, Tom and I acknowledged that some volatility is adjusting to new information that hits the market. However, I think much of it is emotional, not rational responses to news.
Fourth, you may appreciate the work of Denise Shull of ReThink Group (whom I have featured on EI before). She tracks developments in neuroscience around decision-making. In short, neuroscience demonstrates that all decisions are emotional decisions. Yes, facts weigh in on and affect decisions, but the "to do, or not to do" always involves the emotional portions of the brain. How can we simultaneously grant the power of bias, as enumerated by the behavioral finance community, along with the neuroscience, and then say that volatility predominately is a reflection of differing rational views about the price of an asset?
In summary, I think it is a classic fiction of markets that they are objective. In theory, yes, they are objective, even if the individual participants are subjective. I too have read and understood Adam Smith. Markets are better than trusting a central authority, granted. But that does not mean they are perfect and deserving of unquestioning devotion. As a final point: Adam Smith was not a mathematician, nor a scientist, but a natural philosopher.
Yours, in service,
Jason
Hi Tom,
Yes, I'm aware of Shiller's extremely important empirical work on this topic. (He was my dissertation advisor.) But Shiller's work related asset price changes to changes in future fundamentals, not to changes in discount rates. Meanwhile, other research (which I can't find at the moment) has suggested that longer-term volatility is related to changes in cash flows (i.e., fundamentals) whereas short-term volatility is more closely related to changes in discount rates.
Basically what I'm saying is that there are two competing ways of explaining short-term volatility: one that says it reflects the arrival of new information--regarding the future course of discount rates as well as the future course of cash flows--and another that says it reflects thoughtlessness on the part of market participants. Let's not conclude too quickly that investors are stupid.
p.s. Also, let's not "agree to disagree" too quickly. The whole point of a blog is to sharpen our thinking by trading ideas. If we "agree to disagree," then basically we're agreeing not to examine our own arguments and learn from others' arguments. For me, that back-and-forth is basically the whole value of Enterprising Investor and other blogs like it. Thanks.
Brad-
I as well as others have taken a close look at this issue and found little to hang our hat on. I included interest rates in my analysis and found a weak relationship with stock prices.
So while there is some evidence, it is not enough to dissuade me that volatility is mostly noise. This is at the market level, at the individual stock level there is even less evidence.
I am open to additional empirical evidence on this topic.