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22 March 2017 Enterprising Investor Blog

The Active Equity Renaissance: Understanding the Cult of Emotion

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“I know you are afraid and you should be afraid. I will invest you in products that will not stir up your fears."

This sentiment is applied over and over again in the investment industry in one form or another.

It is the mantra of what my co-author Jason Voss, CFA, and I call the “Cult of Emotion.” The Cult is so pervasive, investment professionals are hardly aware how it affects virtually every investment decision we make. It has been institutionalized through regulation, platforms, gatekeepers, advisers, analysts, consultants, and even modern portfolio theory (MPT), the underlying paradigm of the investment industry.

Two Choices: Cater to or Mitigate Emotions

Investors experience powerful emotions as portfolios decline in value and then reverse course and head back up. Drawdowns are especially gut-wrenching, as hard-earned money disappears before a client's eyes.

Investors are prone to a host of cognitive errors when in thrall to these emotions. The two most prominent are myopic loss aversion and social validation. Myopic loss aversion research demonstrates that people experience the negative feelings associated with losses almost twice as acutely as the pleasure of gains. Social validation, on the other hand, is our innate desire to follow and be a part of the herd.

As investment professionals, we can do little to turn off these emotions. But we can decide how we respond to our clients when they experience them in the growth portion of their portfolios.

There are two choices: We either cater to clients' emotions, or we strive to mitigate the damage inflicted by investment decisions made based on those emotions. Investors left to their own devices will let their feelings drive their investment choices. And that will end up costing them hundreds of thousands — if not millions — of dollars in long-term wealth. By helping to short-circuit these cognitive errors, advisers and analysts can add value for their clients.

To be clear, investors are fearful and their fears need to be addressed by their investment advisers. And the truth is some investors can't be talked out of their fears. But we need to do all we can to help clients avoid these expensive mistakes.

Catering to Emotions

Sadly, the industry encourages us to cater to — to humor — rather than mitigate client emotions. For example, current practice is to diversify across multiple asset classes regardless of the expected return. The result is a trade-off between short-term emotional comfort and long-horizon wealth. The Cult of Emotion sanctions this practice, so we tend not to recognize the damage it inflicts on client growth portfolios.

A considerable swath of the industry is influenced by the suitability standard. Clients are required to complete a “risk assessment” and are then categorized as conservative, moderate, or aggressive. The growth portion of a portfolio is then constructed to fit this classification.

But suitability is an emotional assessment of clients — and a poor one, at that — not a risk assessment of their portfolios. This is an absolutely critical distinction. Suitability legitimizes the construction of low-return portfolios for temporary peace of mind and consequently denies clients substantial long-horizon wealth.

The Cult views tracking error as risk. It's not. It is an emotional trigger for investors. Because of myopic loss aversion, short-term underperformance serves as a signal to sell a fund and invest in another with better recent performance. So the industry requires low tracking error. But truly active funds can't be successful without tracking error. Accommodating the feelings evoked by tracking error costs investors dearly.

Parenthetically, this discussion brings up another problem with tracking error that is covered in “Alpha Wounds: Bad Adjunct Methodologies.” It is an active investment manager’s job to outperform the benchmark and by a wide margin. Tracking error presupposes a successful asset allocation strategy put into place by an independent third party, for which there is actually very little evidence of success.

Cult Enforcers

Cult Enforcers dominate the investment industry. But just who are they? Advisers who construct the entire client portfolio based on the suitability standard, rather than specific needs. Analyst gatekeepers who use annual volatility, Sharpe ratio, tracking error, and the like to determine long-horizon investments.

There are three forces that shape the Enforcer's mentality:

  1. The widespread use of MPT tools — volatility as risk and efficient frontiers — strongly encourages a trade-off between temporary emotional comfort and long-term wealth.
  2. The business risk funds face when investors make emotional investing decisions based on short-term performance encourages internal sales and marketing to work hand in hand with the external gatekeepers to enforce the Cult's dogma.
  3. The many regulations imposed on the industry to reduce emotional triggers limit the investment choices available to investors. And, of course, the trial lawyers are not far behind, enforcing the prudent man rule and other regulations, thus stirring up concern if not outright fear among industry professionals.

Leaving the Cult

To pave the way for the active equity renaissance, the Cult of Emotion must be left behind. The Cult is ubiquitous, so this won't be an easy task. But it is essential. The Cult makes successful active management nearly impossible.

Each of us can begin this transition on our own. The hope is that the industry eventually sheds the Cult and returns its focus to delivering client value.

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All posts are the opinion of the author. As such, they should not be construed as investment advice, nor do the opinions expressed necessarily reflect the views of CFA Institute or the author's employer.

Image credit: ©Getty Images/Jim Zuckerman

28 Comments

BC
Brad Case, PhD, CFA, CAIA (not verified)
31st March 2017 | 1:25pm

Hi Tom,
The empirical research that I was thinking about is from "The Divergence of High- and Low-Frequency Estimation: Implications for Performance Measurement," published in Journal of Portfolio Management 41(3):14-21, Spring 2015. Here's the relevant passage:
"We hypothesize that high-frequency variability arises from changes in discount rates, whereas low-frequency variability is caused by differences in cash flows. Changes in discount rates occur relatively often because a constant flow of new information causes investors to reassess the riskiness of a stream of cash flows, which therefore leads to high-frequency variability. In addition, the value of a portfolio or strategy may gradually appreciate or erode over a long horizon, because the drift of cash flows shifts upward or downward as fundamentals change. This process introduces low-frequency variability."

TH
Tom Howard (not verified)
31st March 2017 | 4:16pm

Thanks Brad. Will take a look at this article. Always interested in good empirical stock market research.

BC
Brad Case, PhD, CFA, CAIA (not verified)
31st March 2017 | 1:28pm

Kinlaw, Kritzman & Turkington [2015] continues:
"We test this hypothesis by analyzing the returns of 10 U.S. sectors from December 1978 through December 2013. Each month, we regress the cross-section of monthly, three-year, and ten-year sector returns on the cross-section of changes in earnings during the same periods. We also regress the cross-section of monthly, three-year, and ten-year sector returns on...a proxy for sector discount rates." The empirical results "reveal rather starkly that high-frequency returns are more strongly related to changes in discount rates than to changes in earnings, whereas the opposite is true for relatively lower-frequency returns."

BC
Brad Case, PhD, CFA, CAIA (not verified)
31st March 2017 | 1:45pm

Hi Jason,
I think I failed to express my point clearly. I certainly don't believe that the discounted cash flow model is a description of the actual process that investors--whether primarily passive or primarily active--go through in terms of collecting data, predicting future cash flows, predicting future discount rates, and calculating the present-discounted value. It's a model. It's a mathematical simplification that reflects the salient features about how real-world information is translated into asset values through transactions in markets. A map is not a city: it is a model, a simplification that reflects the salient features of the city. The fact that investors don't "roll up their sleeves and put on their green eye shades" does not mean that the discounted cash flow model is not an accurate way of describing the relationship between information and asset values.
Similarly, I have never said that emotion plays no part in making investment decisions, and I would never say so: witness the stupendous amounts of money that are wasted in private equity and hedge fund investments because investors (most of them supposedly sophisticated) are trying to avoid the emotions triggered by perfectly rational changes in asset values!
Rather, my point was to caution you (and Tom) against the mistake of dismissing changes in asset values as "merely" the product of emotional decisions. The fact is that discount rates do change, throughout every day, and because that DOES happen, asset values DO change accordingly. When you mention "how people feel about 'the Market' right now," you are describing their discount rates, not "mere" emotion.
One last thing, Jason: you seem fixated on the idea that I believe markets "are perfect and deserving of unquestioning devotion." I don't believe I have ever said or written anything that should have led you to that conclusion, so please let it go. Thanks,
--Brad

JV
Jason Voss, CFA (not verified)
27th March 2017 | 9:41am

Hello Krishna,

Very interesting ideas. My own belief is that volatility is not risk; see our forthcoming part four of this series. Volatility of security price is capturing short-term emotions on the part of investors and price adjustments to new information.

However, if advisers seem wedded to wanting to truly understand the emotional profile of their clients then there are solutions just waiting to be developed using off-the-shelf brain monitors, such as that offered by Muse. This headband could be adapted using an application that puts people in scenarios where their assets fluctuate wildly, or where they read about events that commonly affect portfolio value.

The approach you suggest is also valid, and interesting. Search here on The Enterprising Investor for Essentia Analytics and/or Claire Flynn-Levy. Her company examines past trading data for behavioral bias and errors and creates alerts in real time for investors. Note: this would work for advisers, prop traders, investment company traders, and others, too.

We are just at the very beginnings of meaningful conversations about emotions, volatility, and actual risk. Let's keep the conversation happening!

Yours, in service,

Jason

KK
Krishna Kumar, CFA (not verified)
26th March 2017 | 10:59pm

Excellent Piece of Article.
I do agree that time has come to include behavioral finance insight with MPT while constructing clients’s portfolio. The biggest culprits is creation of Clients’s optimal portfolio (risk free Asset + Market Portfolio) considering Investor’s indiffernce curve. However – Investor’s indifference curve is derived out of risk assessment profile – which is faulty (as author has highlighted). Only Behavioral finance can provide insight why a risk averse client – who buys insurance to protect his wealth as well buys a lottery .
My recommendation will be to get rid of risk questionnaire (which is based on template – blame it upon laziness of Institutional approach – one size fits all) and gain insight based on Investor’s past financial decision. It could have been difficult in past – but with recent technology trends / data science fundamentals – It will not be difficult to derive a subjective client specific view based on his past trading decisions (fo obvious reasons, One need to separate his current repetitive decisions, trading decisions, checking / balance accounts, use of mortgages / debts , 401 or IRA account decisions and other factors). This is expected to rationalize true risk assessment of client .
Once again – this was an excellent read and thanks for this insight.

HL
HENRY LESTER (not verified)
30th March 2017 | 5:26pm

There are two problems with the argument that short-term volatility or downside risk should be, in effect, ignored, if emotions are managed. First, the implicit assumption of time diversification or that stocks will come back after a decline. There have been numerous articles in the FAJ, which I believe show, that you can't insure this will be the case. And, of course, in some countries and periods of time the market never came back (i.e. Europe). Secondly, the amount of time until the market comes back (for example, the post 1929 crash) could be beyond the duration (in the bond sense) of many investor's retirement funding liability.

TH
Tom Howard (not verified)
31st March 2017 | 4:08pm

Henry-

Thanks for your comment.

We agree with you that these are true risks faced by investors. Our contention is that short-term volatility and draw downs do not capture these risks but instead are driven by the short-term collective emotions of investors.

In an upcoming post, we will discuss what we believe are superior measures of real risk that are not based on volatility or prices, which are both dominated by short-term emotions.