The average active equity mutual fund underperforms its benchmark.
This statement sparks little controversy and can be applied to active equity hedge funds as well.
The story gets worse when the results are AUM-weighted. Collectively, active equity delivers no value to its investors and, in fact, extracts value from them.
In our highly competitive markets, what industry can survive if it fails to deliver value to its customers? The consequences of these competitive forces are clear as money flows out of active and into passive equity funds. Passive investing is being touted as the superior alternative, and who can argue?
As an active equity industry, we have to ask ourselves how we descended into such a sorry state. The conventional explanation is that portfolio managers and their investment teams lack stock-picking skill. But as is often the case, the answer is not so simple.
A more careful analysis indicates that investment teams, buy-side analysts in particular, are not the problem. Instead, the fund distribution system is what's at fault.
So rather than loudly denouncing the lack of stock-picking skills, those in the distribution system have some soul searching to do. As Pogo used to say: "We have met the enemy and he is us."
Buy-side analysts are superior stock pickers.
There is considerable research showing that buy-side analysts are superior stock pickers. I conducted a study that supports this conclusion.
Active Equity Fund Best Ideas: Top 20 Relative-Weight Stocks*
* Based on single variable, subsequent gross fund alpha regressions estimated using a data set of 44 million stock-month US active equity mutual fund holdings from January 2001 to September 2014. Source: Lipper and Morningstar
The top 20 relative-weight holdings generate fund alpha, while the low-ranked holdings destroy it. So any restriction imposed on a fund that mandates holding anything other than the best idea stocks negatively affects a fund’s alpha. If enough mandates are added, a potential positive alpha is transformed into an actual negative alpha.
The fund distribution system is full of such restrictions: Fund managers are required to hold many stocks for diversification purposes, manage to low volatility and drawdown, avoid tracking error and style drift, grow large, and impose sector-weighting constraints.
In essence, the distribution system is a closet indexer manufacturing juggernaut.
To be clear, we are talking about those who run the distribution system, both inside and outside the fund. The internal sales and marketing teams work hand in glove with the external platforms — broker-dealers, registered investment advisers (RIAs), and institutional investors — imposing value-destroying restrictions on investment teams.
The “pot of gold” generated by an analyst’s investment decisions — somewhere around a 4% average alpha based on several studies — is eaten up by fund fees and the external restrictions placed on the fund.
In the end, the fund itself captures the entire potential alpha and then some by growing too large, ultimately turning itself into a closet indexer. None of the alpha is delivered outside the fund, and worse, additional value is extracted from investors.
Fixing a Broken Investment Management Model
A system that encourages closet indexing while delivering negative value to investors is clearly broken. So what is to be done?
Investment teams, particularly buy-side analysts, need to be elevated to a starring role since they deliver the most value to investors. Funds need to be rewarded for consistently pursuing a narrowly defined strategy, taking only high-conviction positions.
Participants in the distribution system need to avoid imposing restrictions that impede the successful pursuit of an equity strategy. More specifically, asset bloat, benchmark tracking, and over-diversification need to be discouraged. Why? Because these are the precursors to closet indexing.
To resurrect the industry, an important first step is to move away from the discredited 1970s modern portfolio theory (MPT). Not only is the evidence overwhelmingly against this model, but MPT provides the theoretical justification for many of the value-destroying restrictions foisted upon funds.
The new market paradigm will most likely arise from behavioral finance. The discipline is already transforming the advisory business. Major players — Merrill Lynch and Morningstar, among others — have established behavioral finance units and are disseminating the resulting research throughout the adviser community.
This is an important value add in the competition with robo-advisers. The mechanical solution offers little help in steering investors away from value-destroying emotional errors. Studies reveal that focusing on minimizing emotional investing can enhance returns by 2%–4%.
Some financial advisers now think of themselves as behavioral advisers. A recent sign of this industry trend: the Behavioral Financial Advisor certification and designation.
Can a "Behavioral Financial Analyst" be far behind? Behaviorally based objective measures will begin to replace the metrics currently used to analyze investments. Several of these measures — asset bloat, benchmark tracking, and over-diversification — are more predictive of fund underperformance. That is, objective behavioral measures are predictive, while the traditional measures targeting past performance are not.
A Robust Debate
Future posts in this series will provide suggestions on how the system might be fixed. The goal is not to present final solutions, but to spark a robust debate around the many challenges facing a broken industry.
Imagine a world in which only the lowest-cost index funds along with truly active, alpha-generating funds exist, without a closet indexer in sight.
Together let’s launch the active equity renaissance!
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38 Comments
I am not so sure about the relevance of the conclusion that any restriction imposed on a fund that mandates holding anything other than the best idea stocks negatively affects a fund’s alpha. Restrictions regarding TE and active sector weights could in theory constrain the PM to include active bets outside the top 20. But the article does not show that it actually does. It is as plausible that the PMs simply have too many low conviction active bets instead of concentrating on what they know most about. There are other methods of neutralizing unwanted factor exposures than forcing low conviction bets into the portfolio.
Thanks for your comment Uwe.
The bottom line is investing in other than the top 20 relative weight stocks hurts performance regardless of why other low conviction stocks are held. There is considerable research supporting this point, as we reference in the post.
The indices are appropriate for pension funds and other unlimited life investors, but less so for individuals. In a market that has declined by 50% twice within the last 20 years, risk is as important a variable. Or, as I tell my clients, will you feel your portfolio is a success if you beat the indices, but end up eating dog food?
Since the math of gains & losses works against investors. managing risk is the name of the game.
Thanks for your comment Frederic.
InI our next post we will discuss the Cult of Emotion and its pervasive impact on the investment industry. Your comments are straight from the cult handbook: " I know you are afraid and you should be afraid and I will not invest you in anything that stires up your fears."
Long term holding of stocks has generated the best returns available even including the drawdowns you mention. As advisors we need to press this message with our clients to the greatest extent possible in order to generate the greatest long horizon wealth.
It is the difference between catering to client emotions and mitigating them.
Hello Frederic,
Thank you for your comment. Also in a future post, Part 4, we discuss different ways of evaluating risk than the standard methods prescribed by Modern Portfolio Theory.
Yours, in service,
Jason
Why insist on the notion that the system is broken when the managers themselves are the ones at fault?
I believe the real problem out there is the severe lack of talent.
In my experience, imposed restrictions are generally more flexible than the way you view them. Managers may communicate their ideas to their clients and obtain consent to make some exceptions, relax some rules, etc. But only the best managers actually do that. It takes talent, confidence and loyalty. Sadly, around 80% of active managers generate negative alpha like they don't care.
RIP Ab Nicholas thank you for your never-ending determination.
Thanks for the comment Ahmed.
There is much evidence that buy-side analysts are superior stock pickers which we reference in the article. There is also considerable evidence that the constraints imposed on funds are the root cause of underperformance.
Not sure what else to say.
Constraints never get in the way of a truly capable manager. That's what I've always known. Significant active decisions that bypass constraints are not uncommon. To my mind, this flexibility (that is part of the nature of active management) is not reflected in your article. You view the system as a non-compromising dictator with a harmful regime.
Hello Ahmed,
Thank you for taking the time to share your thoughts. I disagree with you that managers themselves are solely at fault. The industry has changed over the past 50 years and many participants have shaped those changes. Yes, the active management community has played its part. See my Enterprising Investor series entitled, Alpha Wounds, for some of my criticism for the active management community. Other participants include asset owners and consultants, too.
Regardless of where the fault lies, the point is that our end clients are not getting ideal results. To the degree that these issues are not issues of talent, but are issues of incorrect structures, we should strive to fix them. Tom's research, along with that of others, suggests that research analysts and portfolio managers are actually good at security selection, but that portfolio-level decisions serve as a drag on returns. These constraints have been put in place in a tug of war between the asset managers, consultants, and asset owners.
Last, is there any evidence that consultants who want very constrained strategies so that they can properly execute their asset allocation strategies are adding alpha for the client, and that clients over time are achieving their goals? I think there is poor to no evidence that this additional layer adds value for end clients. This is an area of research that needs to be undertaken, in my opinion.
Yours, in service,
Jason
In my experience, consultants and asset owners don't seem to mind our very large active weights so long as the results are good. We fulfill our promise to create the win-win and collect our performance bonuses and cute trophies and the system never shows the slightest signs of being broken.
Active managers are the centerpiece of this design and they bear most (if not all) of the responsibility. In case of failure, I would blame them and no one else.