It is not uncommon for the word “absurd” or its derivatives to accompany discussions of negative nominal interest rates. A healthy proportion of financial opinion makers describe the phenomenon as a fundamental violation of the first principles of finance. Not that a financial background is required to conclude as much. Explaining the concept to the layperson produces a raised eyebrow and crinkled forehead: It just does not feel right.
Nevertheless, this author does not think it precisely right to say that negative rates are absurd. In and of themselves, upside-down rates — almost exclusively restricted to the sovereign bonds space — do make sense. They reveal the high cost of staying solvent — a cost borne by the financial institutions that purchase these securities.
The modern monetary system operates on credit. But after the financial peripeteia of 2007–2008, extending credit on an unsecured basis became inconceivable. Therefore, the post-2008 monetary order funds the global machinery of international commerce and investment almost exclusively on a collateralized basis. Secured funding only.
No-Collateral Damage
But here is the problem: There is not enough collateral. So financial institutions will pay “anything” for it, including “guaranteed” losses on sovereign debt, assuming the government obligation is held to maturity, which it is not. These negative-yielding bonds are not investments but balance-sheet management tools.
Think of the Phillips-head screwdriver in your toolbox. You do not keep it for its intrinsic value in steel, nickel, and chromium. In the same way, financial institutions do not own negative-yielding nominal bonds for the future cash flows. The bonds, like the screwdriver, are held for what they can do. The bond serves as collateral for a short-term loan to tide over the bank because, by the very nature of the business, there is a timing mismatch between liabilities (e.g., short-term cash withdrawals) and assets (e.g., long-term mortgages).
'Tis just having been the season, the example of It's a Wonderful Life should lend itself to your analyst's mind. George and Mary Bailey sacrificed their honeymoon savings on an unsecured basis to keep Bailey Bros. Building & Loan Association solvent until the bank run panic ended. But outside of their town of Bedford Falls and after 2008, banks need to put up collateral to access honeymoon savings — or any other kind of short-term funding. They do so to meet obligations and regulatory requirements without being forced to sell their long-term investments.
Thus, the hamartia is exposed. A global monetary order, organized over the course of five decades around access to unsecured, interbank short-term funding, is now obliged to secure its funding. At the same time, the expectations of politicians, monetary technocrats, and the public are unchanged. The whole creaking locomotive is all supposed to puff along as it always has.
It is an open question as to whether there was enough collateral for the world economy to function at the exalted levels it had achieved on a collateralized basis before 2008. But it's clear in early 2020 that the gap has only widened.
It’s been a dozen years of one form of collateral after another being demonetized (mortgage-backed securities in 2007–2008), nearly repudiated (sovereign bonds of Europe's Mediterranean-rim countries in 2011–2012), or heavily discounted (emerging market bonds and currencies in 2014–2016). As the Financial Times reported:
“According to research by Oxford Economics, the resultant global shortage of these safe assets is going to get worse. The consultancy calculates that the supply of these assets will grow by $1.7tn annually over the coming five years — with a $1.2tn issuance of bonds to fund the US budget deficit the largest driver. But demand for these assets is estimated to grow more rapidly, creating a $400bn annual shortfall . . . ‘The largest buyers are relatively price-insensitive and will continue to accept low returns in exchange for safety,’ said Michiel Tukker, global macro strategist at Oxford Economics.”
And, of course, all of this was financialization and not the “real” thing. True collateral is created from economic progress, rule of law, human advancement, and national development in the present and expectations of it in the future. These beautiful concepts are hard to come by during an economic depression.
What Depression?
The one we're living through right now. Mervyn King, the former governor of the Bank of England, said as much in his 2019 Per Jacobsson Lecture at the International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s annual meeting. Though he avoided the "D word.” Here is how he put it in a column for Bloomberg:
“The International Monetary Fund just lowered its estimate of world growth both this year and next. Every data release seems to bring gloomy news. If the problem before the crisis was too much borrowing and too much spending, then the problem today is too much borrowing and too little spending. The world economy is stuck in a low-growth trap.”
It is no wonder then that those who have access to the most liquid, fluid, and important collateral are hoarding it like the past holiday season's most popular children's toy. Except that in this sempiternal season, “It is always winter, never Christmas,” to quote C. S. Lewis.
It is a self-reinforcing cycle: no trust, not enough new collateral, hoarding of existing collateral, impeding economic potential, further reducing trust, further dimming economic potential, etc. Negative interest rates are a “logical” consequence of the larger, absurd picture: an unacknowledged, silent depression.
Weltschmerz-suffering readers are encouraged to follow this author's lead and drown your sorrows in leftover seasonal mulled wine. Perhaps in this more contemplative state, you will notice that by rearranging the letters of “depression,” a solution to the problem is revealed: “I pressed on.”
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15 Comments
Thank you Alexis. Perhaps it has to do with leverage. Whereas cash (well, really deposits at the bank) is not readily useful for multiplying one could put up X in German Bunds and receive X + Y in deposit credits. Also, if one was so inclined, you could relend the same piece of collateral a few times and earn some extra profit off of one security.
It’s all rather murky but sometimes collateral is more valuable than cash itself. I believe the best real-world example of that are repurchase agreement failures to deliver and receive. Both the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation and New York Federal Reserve produce a report on this. My interpretation of the data suggests that during periods of illiquidity banks refuse to hand over the collateral they promised they would. They are so in need of it that they would rather pay a penalty rate than hand the security back over. They rather hold the security then receive cash.
Thank you Emil for interesting article and everyone for a good discussion.
Although I really like the unconventional approach to the problem leading to nontrivial conclusions, I have an impression that the whole problem was "overengineered", (for a lack of better word). Negative yielding collateral is a result of negative yielding cash held with central banks. One could rightly point out to advantages of risk-free asset collateral over cash (I'd primarily relate to interest rate risk; I'm not too familiar with leveraged repos or collateral repledging), but this extra utility doesn't suffice to enforce negative yields. In my perhaps simplistic view yields on sovereign bonds are negative as a consequence of introduction of negative rates which commerical banks have to pay to central banks for holding cash on their balance sheets. Am I missing something?
Amyn and Sophia were discussing the difference between the price of a product and its worth.
Sophia mentioned she had bought a new dress in a charity shop, but thought it was worth a lot
more than she had paid. Amyn said that the price Sophia had paid was the result of market forces.
He explained the effects of competition between charity shops on the prices of their products.
Sophia produced a table showing the demand by her friends for dresses from charity shops.
Hi, Emil, thanks for your response to my comment. Good arguments, but I want to push back on one because it is so important.
Jim Grant is wrong about negative rates being a novel policy. Sovereigns have imposed negative interest rates on money at least since the first Roman emperor debased his coinage. My favorite negative rate story comes from my wife's grandfather. During WW1 in Hungary he watched the Emperor's troops ride into town, collect everyone's cash, stamp half, and confiscate the rest. And, of course, our own Franklin Roosevelt abolished gold clauses in contracts and made the holding of bullion illegal.
Negative interest rates may be a bad policy. They certainly are not first- or even second-best. But they are a policy tool with a long history and are sure to be used whenever the sovereign so chooses.
Emil,
Here’s another comment that’s not on the spectrum between “backhanded compliment” and “ransom demand.” I think your essay is a very thoughtful one.
In holding securities with negative interest rates, banks are following the logic of their own circumstances. As you say, they view these not as investments but as collateral that enables them to lend. If they didn’t think they were assured of being bailed out, they might think differently.
You and I no doubt agree with Jim Grant that it’s a warped state of affairs when homo economicus is willing to accept less in the future in return for putting capital at risk today. It’s not natural and won’t last.
By the way, I’m still in suspense about Comment #6 above. Do we know what happened to Amyn and Sophia? Were they able to reconcile their differences over price theory and find happiness?