Following the 2007–09 financial crisis, mainstream finance theory was criticized for failing to forecast the market crash, which resulted in large losses for investors.
In the aftermath of the 2007–09 financial crisis, mainstream finance theory was criticized for having failed to either prevent or forecast the market crash, which resulted in large losses for investors. Worse, the suggestion was made that the crash itself was the result of bad or poorly applied theory. Although markets have since recovered, surpassing precrisis levels as of the end of 2013, the investors enjoying the recovery are not always the same investors as those who suffered the losses. So, in many cases, the crash caused permanent impairment of wealth.
This crash is particularly interesting in that finance theory, not simply the practices of the financial services industry, has been directly blamed. This book explores current critiques of mainstream theory and discusses implications for the curricula of finance programs at business schools and universities. It is based on conversations with academics and practitioners in the industry and a review of the literature.
Has mainstream finance theory—which many consider an idealization that does not take into account market reality—failed investors? Do we need to reconsider the theory and how it is taught?