Let's start with what the data actually says (with the article's claims in parenthesis)

(1) 1963-1981 ("some evidence of a value premium, although not in large caps")
FF LG Index = +6.7%
FF LV Index = +13.0% (premium: +6.3%)
FF SG Index = +10.4%
FF SV Index = +18.0% (premium: +7.6%)

(2) 1926-1962 ("no proof of a significant value effect")
FF LG Index = +9.1%
FF LV Index = +11.1% (premium: +2.0%)
FF SG Index = +9.0%
FF SV Index = +12.6% (premium: +3.6%)

(3) 1982-2016 ("only a small cap value effect")
FF LG Index = +11.6%
FF LV Index = +12.6% (premium: +1.0%)
FF SG Index = +7.1%
FF SV Index = +15.7% (premium: +8.6%)

...so there's been a value effect in large and small stocks in each sub-period the article casts doubt on. And in some cases (specifically small stocks), the premium runs 7-8% a year (more than the value premium).

Finally, let's tackle this canard: "The ugly truth is that many value funds apply dime-a-dozen strategies built on formulaic accounting ratios. Investors are better off looking for managers who deploy more comprehensive analysis to determine the intrinsic value of the underlying securities."

Let's use DFA's P/B-based value funds as proxies for the "dime-a-dozen" value strategies, and the universe of surviving (because more than 50% didn't) active value managers as proxies for those doing more "comprehensive" analysis. In the last 15 years, here's the % of active managers who have outperformed the associated DFA value fund:

US large value = 6%
US small value = 11%
Int'l large value = 8%
Int'l small value = 1%
EM value = 7%

So, it's not so much a "dime-a-dozen" result as it is a "dime-a-hundred," right? Let's call a spade a spade: active value investing has been an outright disaster.