notices - See details
Notices
Enterprising Investor Default Hero Image
7 December 2016 Enterprising Investor Blog

Where Markets Fail: An Imperfect Discounting Mechanism

Enterprising Investor Blogs logo thumbnail

I am an avid fan of capitalism as well as a critic.

While I agree that markets are generally better at discounting the future than individuals, there are inherent flaws in the markets that are difficult, if not impossible, to overcome. I point out these weaknesses because, just like with any mental model and organizing principle, knowing the weaknesses is the first step in avoiding or discounting them.

Imperfect Discounting Mechanisms

Many capitalists believe the markets are sacrosanct and, in their blind devotion, prove why "pure" is the root of puritanical. They cite aphorisms like “the wisdom of the crowd” or the improved predictions that come from crowdsourcing. I accept, acknowledge, and even revere the truth in these observations. After all, markets derive prices by aggregating differing expectations of the future.

But even the agglomeration of crowd opinion cannot overcome an inconvenient fact: time. That is, time marches in only one direction — forward. Effects follow causes. To the degree that causes are repeated, probable effects can be charted.

But the future is capricious. That is why we turn to markets in the first place. Were the future predictable, there would be no reason to aggregate differing views of supply and demand for goods and establish market clearing prices. Only The Price Preeminent would exist — an omniscient price that represents the market clearing price not just for current supply and demand, but for all time.

For example, if we knew in the late 1800s what we now know about the effect of hydrocarbons on the environment, they would have been priced higher. Alternatively, what if we could peer into the future and see the complete trajectory of human existence? And suppose, in that perfectly transparent timeline, we could see that potable water would eventually become scarce enough to result in the end of people? Obviously the signal from this All-Knowing Market would be very different.

But people are not seers. Yes, markets adjust to new information to balance supply and demand, but given our inability to predict the future, many goods and services are currently mispriced — perhaps dangerously so.

There are plenty of examples of markets doing a poor job of discounting.

A number of Samsung’s infamous Galaxy Note 7 phones spontaneously burst into flames causing much mayhem. You could argue that this is not a failure of the markets. But it is. After all, there was a market for these phones. Samsung eagerly supplied them and buyers eagerly purchased them. Once the fire hazard became known and the replacements failed to rectify the problem, the market disappeared. This illustrates both the power of markets and their primary weakness. Yes, the phones are no longer for sale since the entire market for them vanished, but signatories to the market for the Galaxy Note 7, both supplier and demander, failed to see far enough into the future to prevent catastrophe.

Another example is the side effects of prescription drugs that are not fully appreciated until many years into the drugs' use. This despite the extreme level of scrutiny on the front-end of drug development.

Possible Remedies

  • Perhaps new products could be evaluated by their closeness to the natural world. For example, timber directly effects nature, consulting not so much. A proximity-to-nature continuum could also serve as a resiliency-monitoring tool. The closer to nature, the greater the need for systems thinking, scenario planning, and caution. This is not an argument for stifling regulation or for you to run out and hug a tree. I am saying that even when armed with market-cleared prices, people can screw things up. This means that any new product directly affecting the environment ought to be overpriced initially. This margin of safety could be put into a profit escrow account, assuming that the market still clears at the new price.
  • Alternatively, as products are designed, they should have a built-in plan for the lifecycle of their components as well as contingency programs for how any potentially deleterious effects may be unwound. That is, what is the estate planning for a new product? How do you “put it to bed?”
  • Perhaps a new product checklist should be developed, all the components of which must be addressed before a license to market is granted. A variation of the US Bureau of Consumer Protection could be the adjudicating body.

This article is the first in the five-part Where Markets Fail series. Subsequent entries will consider how markets:

  • assume a context;
  • assume fungibility;
  • are not systemic; and,
  • have "visible hands."

If you liked this post, don't forget to subscribe to the Enterprising Investor.


All posts are the opinion of the author. As such, they should not be construed as investment advice, nor do the opinions expressed necessarily reflect the views of CFA Institute or the author's employer.

Image credit: ©Getty Images/erhui1979

25 Comments

BC
Brad Case, PhD, CFA, CAIA (not verified)
7th December 2016 | 9:25am

Jason, please pardon my directness, but this post is weird.
Individual people cannot infallibly predict the future, as you point out. But (1) you seem to blame that on markets rather than on people, and (2) you seem to think the failure of people to predict the future correctly can be corrected by designating a few of them to control the others according to their own equally fallible predictions of the future.
If we could correctly predict that potable water will become scarce, then its current price would be higher--and, conversely, if we could correctly predict that it would become even more abundant, then its current price would be lower. The thing is, the current price (of everything traded in efficient markets) is based on the BEST currently available information about future conditions. The fact that water is priced on the basis of the BEST currently available information (in an efficient market) is what makes water correctly priced. As we get better information (in the future) the "correct" (market) price will adjust accordingly.
Oh my goodness, you actually think replacing the collective judgment of many fallible people (the market) with a tiny number of fallible people (a new variant on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) would improve on that?
One more thing: "discounting" means "attaching less value." We discount future costs and benefits because they are uncertain and will happen in an uncertain future, whereas what happens today is known. "Discounting" is not a synonym for "predicting" or "avoiding."

JV
Jason Voss, CFA (not verified)
7th December 2016 | 10:25am

Thank you for your answer Professor Case!

I love direct. Also love that you found the post weird. Let me do my best to respond to your thoughtful comment. Though, in no particular order...

First, I understand the concept of discounting. Thanks for ensuring that everyone else does. I guess I am guilty of assuming limited resources, and therefore of assuming cost of capital should always be positive, and therefore, that the future should always be discounted. Were you imagining a different world?

Second, the very point I am making is that markets are clusters of people, and therefore they have inherent flaws. Yet, many ascribe a deity like quality to their functioning that flies in the face of their many mispricings, especially over long periods of time. What I am arguing is that for certain 'goods' they are actually 'bads.' In the examples that I gave I referenced things that may permanently alter the environment to the detriment of all. I was arguing for caution. Which leads me to my next response...

Third, point taken about people not being good prognosticators and then turning it over to another group of them. How do you go about correcting for possibly poor assessments of value? Margin of safety? I note the CAIA after your name, is it legit to include a margin of safety in your vol estimate?

Yours, in service,

Jason

BC
Brad Case (not verified)
7th December 2016 | 2:00pm

Hi Jason,
That's cool: I think I was just a little confused by the contexts in which you were talking about "discounting." And no, I would never suggest a negative discount rate.
Maybe my main difficulty is with the concept of "mispricing," so here's how I think of it. The "value" of any asset is the present-discounted value of its future stream of net cash flows. Many assets will have a different future stream of net cash flows depending on their owner: think, for example, of any stock (or bond) held by an activist shareholder, or any management-intensive asset such as a sole proprietorship or an income-producing building. The future stream of discount rates will also differ by owner, too, based on borrowing costs, other investment opportunities, etc. That means any asset has an owner-specific "value" in the hands of each potential owner. The "market value" of the asset is bracketed by the two potential owners with the highest and second-highest owner-specific values. In an efficient market those will collapse to a single market value, which is the transaction price, while in an inefficient market there may be a large range of transaction prices within those two owner-specific values.
My point is that each potential owner takes into account all available information regarding future net cash flows and future discount rates in determining her/his owner-specific "value," and therefore the market value will reflect all such information. Any market participant may do a poor job of forming expectations regarding future net cash flows and future discount rates. If the future turns out to be worse than expected, then whoever bought the asset will be disappointed--that's where the "winner's curse" comes from. Conversely, if the future turns out to be better than expected, everybody who didn't buy the asset will be disappointed--that's simply a different form of regret.
But it seems to me you're implying that errors in predicting the future are all going to be in one direction--and there's simply no basis for reaching that conclusion. One way to think about it is that there's a "margin of safety" built into the process: each person's owner-specific "value" is, in effect, the expected value of a distribution of possible future scenarios.
Philosophically, your argument reminds me of "Pascal's wager." Pascal said that we should all believe in God because if God exists then our failure to believe in God would have enormous negative consequences, whereas if God doesn't exist then there would be no consequences. The problem with Pascal's wager is that he didn't consider the possibility that we could be sentenced to hell (or something along those lines) for the crime of believing in God. So yes, we could be making big mistakes in the sense that future environmental conditions could be far worse than we realize--or, alternatively, we could be making big mistakes in the sense that future environmental conditions could be far BETTER than we realize.
Thanks.

JV
Jason Voss, CFA (not verified)
7th December 2016 | 4:25pm

Hi Brad,

What an incredibly thoughtful reply. Thank you for authoring it.

I can summarize my response to what you have written with, "Sounds like you are saying markets are imperfect discounting mechanisms." Did I get that right?

Separately, I didn't mention any securities markets specifically in my article. I intentionally mentioned things like oil just after its discovery, because it is at these moments that there is an opportunity to insert some consciousness.

Yours, in service,

Jason

BC
Brad Case (not verified)
7th December 2016 | 4:28pm

Oh, that's absolutely true--but it's equally true to say "but I can see literally no better way." There are some problems in the world that simply cannot be solved, and imperfect knowledge of the future is pretty high on the list.

C
Chuck t (not verified)
7th December 2016 | 11:18am

One lesson we should have learned from this past election. Humans cant estimate, assume, forcast, project, predict, expect, model or calculate the future. Thats why all possible scenarios need to be considered. That makes a good case for diversifying a portfolio.
Good article.

JV
Jason Voss, CFA (not verified)
7th December 2016 | 4:32pm

Hello Chuck t,

Thank you for taking the time to share your thoughts. I really like your examples, and your conclusion. By the way, I see you used the word 'scenario.' That is one of my favorite words, and scenario planning I believe is a very robust way of solving some of these problems with markets that I am attempting to illustrate in this article, and the series. You can see some of the information I crafted with my colleague William C.G. Ortel about scenario planning in our Investment Idea Generation Guide.

Yours, in service,

Jason

JO
Joanne Ott (not verified)
7th December 2016 | 9:40pm

Jason thanks for your blog and stretched me greatly to think differently.

I really liked the 'resiliency-monitoring tool' for resources close to nature. Finance as a tool is evolving, amending methodology where gaps exist. It seems even more essential now to develop sustainable valuation tools.

As to your example of pricing for prescription drugs and side effects - I'd rather see a sort of ROI that is adjusted FOR the side-effects - similar to the Sharp ratio = Expected outcome of the drug / std dev of side effects.

JV
Jason Voss, CFA (not verified)
7th December 2016 | 9:54pm

Hello Joanne,

Thank you for taking the time to share your opinion about the piece. I really like your idea about the adjusted ROI for prescription drugs. Tell me more, please, if you wouldn't mind thinking out loud on it.

Yours, in service,

Jason

J
Joanne (not verified)
7th December 2016 | 10:15pm

I have thought it odd that, in general, the side effects in prescription drugs are not factored into the pricing, or rather the net effect. We have all seen the commercials, often the side effects take up more time than the benefits. Simply thinking the Sharp Ratio as an analogy for normalizing the pricing.