Contracts to harvest timber from government land, sold by the U.S. Forest Service, offer non-lumber producers an opportunity to speculate in the timber market. A simulation program applied to data from 185 sales on the Willamette National Forest between 1971 and 1978 gives some idea of the return investors might earn from such contracts.
The results suggest that the profitability of each contract is critically dependent on, and very sensitive to, the estimated ratio of board feet of lumber produced to board feet of timber used (mill overrun). In general, investors will not earn a positive rate of return unless mill overrun exceeds 20 per cent. Small changes in mill overrun have a large impact on investor return.
Additional evidence indicates that sale contract profitability varies directly with sale size and inversely with the degree of competition among potential investors. Sale size appears to be a surrogate for risk; large sales involve greater uncertainty of return to potential investors.
