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The Valuation Digital Solutions group within Kroll, LLC (“Kroll”), strives to empower companies and finance professionals with high-quality valuation data that enables them to make sound business decisions. We share similar beliefs with CFA Institute Research Foundation in that a focus on education, research, and dissemination of data on financial markets benefits the overall investment profession. Personally, as a CFA charterholder, it is an honor to have Kroll collaborate with CFA Institute Research Foundation in this endeavor.

Carla S. Nunes, CFA
Managing Director
Valuation Digital Solutions at Kroll
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Aaron Low, PhD, CFA
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CFA Institute Research Foundation
About the Kroll “Cost of Capital Navigator”

Kroll has transitioned its U.S. and international (i) cost of capital data resources and (ii) industry-level statistics data resources to a new online platform, the “Cost of Capital Navigator.” The Cost of Capital Navigator is an interactive, web-based platform that guides finance and investment professionals through the process of estimating cost of capital, globally. The Cost of Capital Navigator includes two modules:

▶ U.S. Cost of Capital Module

The U.S. Cost of Capital Inputs dataset provides size premia, risk premia, equity risk premia, risk-free rates, betas and industry risk premia that can be used to estimate U.S. cost of capital, with data going back to 1999. Our tool guides users step-by-step through the process of estimating U.S. cost of capital, allowing either Kroll's data or custom inputs to be incorporated into the analyses.

The U.S. Industry Benchmarking dataset provides U.S. industry-level inputs needed to estimate cost of capital and industry-level benchmarks that can be used to augment and support custom analyses. Comprehensive industry-level data and statistics are presented in a concise, consistent, and clear format for approximately 170 U.S. industries, with quarterly data going back to 2014.

The U.S. Company-Level Betas dataset and tool provide users with the ability to identify and select their own peer group of individual companies within a subject industry for which a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) beta is needed. The dataset provides levered, unlevered, and relevered betas for those individual companies, with data going back to 2014. Users can select multiple companies using Kroll’s company look-up tool to calculate five different beta estimates and perform sensitivity analysis using different currencies, stock return frequencies, lookback periods, and market indices.

▶ International Cost of Capital Module

The International Cost of Capital Inputs dataset provides country risk premia, relative volatility factors, risk-free rates, equity risk premia, and more that can be used to estimate cost of capital globally, with data going back to 2014. Our tool guides users step-by-step through the process of estimating cost of capital internationally, allowing either Kroll's data or custom inputs to be incorporated into the analyses.

The International Industry Benchmarking dataset provides global industry-level inputs needed to estimate cost of capital and industry-level benchmarks that can be used to augment and support custom analyses. Comprehensive global industry-level statistics presented in a concise, consistent, and clear format for over 200 industries in four global regions, with data going back to 2015.
The International Company-Level Betas dataset and tool provide users with the ability to identify and select their own peer group of individual companies within a subject industry for which a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) beta is needed. The dataset provides levered, unlevered, and relevered betas for those individual companies, with data going back to 2014. Users can select multiple companies using Kroll’s company look-up tool to calculate five different beta estimates and perform sensitivity analysis using different currencies, stock return frequencies, lookback periods, and market indices.

To learn more, visit www.kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator.

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James is co-author of the (previously published) Duff & Phelps “Valuation Handbook” series with colleagues Carla S. Nunes and Roger J. Grabowski. The Valuation Handbooks were published as hard covered books starting in 2014; as of 2020 the information and data previously published in the Valuation Handbooks has been transitioned to the Kroll Cost of Capital Navigator. The Cost of Capital Navigator (www.kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator) is an interactive, web-based platform that guides analysts through the process of estimating cost of capital, globally.

James is a co-author of the Kroll’s “ESG and Global Investor Returns Study” (2023) which examined the relationship between historical returns of over 13,000 publicly traded companies across a variety of geographies and industries and their ESG ratings to determine the correlation of ESG ratings to company performance.

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In 2011, Carla completed a one-year rotation in Duff & Phelps’ (now Kroll) London office, where she promoted the firm’s IFRS education efforts and marketing initiatives, as well dealing with IFRS implementation issues.

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Carla has conducted numerous business and asset valuations for a variety of purposes, including purchase price allocations, goodwill impairment testing, M&A, fairness opinions, corporate tax restructuring and debt analyses. She has been involved in multiple valuation assignments for a wide range of industries, including pharma & biotech, healthcare, vitamin retail, specialty chemicals, industrial manufacturing and gaming & hospitality. Carla has substantial experience with cross-border valuations, working with multinational corporations to address complex tax, international cost of capital and foreign exchange issues.

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Carla is a co-author of the Kroll’s “ESG and Global Investor Returns Study” (2023) which examined the relationship between historical returns of over 13,000 publicly traded companies across a variety of geographies and industries and their ESG ratings to determine the correlation of ESG ratings to company performance.


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Foreword

CFA Institute Research Foundation is honored to present the latest edition of the Valuation Handbook: International Guide to Cost of Capital 2023 – Summary Edition (IGCC), produced in collaboration with Kroll. This important publication examines the distinct differences in investment risk across various countries, establishing itself as an essential component of the Research Foundation's Investment Data Alliance (IDA). The IDA offers a wealth of data and resources aimed at enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of professionals within the investment sector. While the Research Foundation graciously provides this publication at no cost to our community, it is imperative to acknowledge the significant contributions of Kroll, along with co-authors Jim Harrington, Carla Nunes, Anas Aboulamer, and Roger Grabowski. Their dedication to creating this invaluable research, supported by Kevin Madden, Kevin Latz, Molly Jennerman, Zach Rodheim, and Aaron Russo of Kroll, was pivotal in its realization. The Research Foundation partnership with Kroll for the annual release of the IGCC, meets our common aspiration to be the cornerstone in the continuous enrichment of your investment knowledge base. The methodology underpinning the IGCC is derived from the CFA Institute Research Foundation's 1998 monograph, "Country Risk in Global Finance Management," by Claude Erb, CFA, Cam Harvey, and Tadas Viskanta. We extend our deepest gratitude to the original authors for their foundational work and for authoring the Preface of this publication.

About the IGCC

Understanding and evaluating the cost of capital is crucial in investment and financing decision making, risk and performance measurement, and strategic planning including diversification. The Valuation Handbook: International Guide to Cost of Capital 2023 – Summary Edition provides a vigorous array of international data pertinent to global investment professionals. As an abridged edition, it offers a glimpse into the vast research and data accessible through the Cost of Capital Navigator. We encourage those in pursuit of further research in this domain to explore the designated section on Kroll's website: www.kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator.

Special Thanks

The CFA Institute Research Foundation extends heartfelt appreciation to Ted Aronson, CFA, our past chair, for his unwavering dedication to CFA Institute and the Research Foundation, including his significant financial contributions to the Investment Data Alliance. We also express our gratitude to members of the Research Foundation Board of Trustees. The invaluable efforts of Bud Haslett and our Research Directors Larry Siegel and Luis Garcia-Feijoo, CFA, alongside our Associate Director of Data Science Francesco Fabozzi, are acknowledged with great appreciation. The operational support and funding provided by CFA Institute is critical for this project so we would like to specially thank Margaret Franklin, CFA, Paul Andrews, Rhodri Preece, CFA, and Allison Adams. We also thank the numerous donors to CFA Institute Research Foundation, whose contributions have been instrumental in supporting this project and the publication of our content. Our aim with this publication, and the broader Investment Data Alliance, is to elevate the global investment community's understanding and application of quantitative investment strategies by supplying necessary data and analytical tools to CFA Institute members and the wider investment profession.
We hope this research proves invaluable to your professional endeavours and career development. We welcome your feedback and suggestions on this and all Research Foundation publications.

Aaron Low, PhD, CFA
Chairman, Board of Trustees
CFA Institute Research Foundation
Preface

It has been 26 years since the publication of our *Country Risk in Global Financial Management*. It seems appropriate to reflect on our research and assess the progress to date.

In the early 1990s, there was a surge of interest in international investment, initially with institutional investors and later individual investors. While some investors had diversified across developed markets, all of these markets were highly correlated, especially during periods of market and/or economic stress, limiting their diversification potential. However, in the early 1990s the International Finance Corporation released new indices on emerging market equity returns. MSCI followed with their own versions. These markets offered volatile returns but relatively low correlations with developed markets.

One challenge was how to assess the “risk” of investing in international markets. An approach informed by modern portfolio theory was to figure out the “beta” either against the U.S. market or a world portfolio (dominated by the U.S. and other developed markets). However, for many emerging markets, the betas were indistinguishable from zero – or even negative. It did not seem right to us that the risk of investing in a volatile emerging market was on par with investing in a U.S. Treasury bill.

The capital asset pricing model applied to emerging markets is, and was, problematic. First, a crucial assumption in its application was perfect market integration (meaning the same risk project, say a factory in a particular industry, should have the same expected return in integrated markets). Given all of the barriers to investing in emerging markets, this assumption surely failed. The model also imposed distributional assumptions on the asset returns that seemed unrealistic given the skewed and fat-tailed nature of emerging market returns.

We were not alone in being skeptical of the standard-bearer model in finance. Practitioners evaluating projects in emerging markets found that a country with a negative beta produced a discount rate less than the U.S. T-bill – and delivered preposterous results when applied to the calculation of a net present value. The first models augmented the capital asset pricing model by adding a “country risk premium” – which was the yield spread typically between a 10-year sovereign bond issued in U.S. dollars and the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond.

The addition of the sovereign spread seemed intuitive; indeed this is how these bonds are quoted among market participants, but was also problematic. First, adding the sovereign spread to a discount rate less than the U.S. Treasury bill often produced a discount rate that was still unrealistically small. Second, the spread is derived from bonds and given that bonds are less risky than equity, there was an apples and oranges problem (adding a bond spread to equity). Third, there was no empirical evidence to show that this model worked.

We began exploring for other measures of risk. Our first stop was country risk ratings. These rating originated from sources including: Standard and Poor’s, Euromoney, Institutional Investor and Political Risk Services’ *International Country Risk Guide*. Country risk ratings were forward looking (beta is backward looking) and dynamically evolved through time as perceptions of risk changed. These were desirable characteristics for any risk model.

While the country risk ratings seemed a logical measure, we were interested in verifying there was a relation between risk ratings and expected returns. To do this, we looked at the link between various measures of risk and future equity returns. We first showed there was no significant relation between
market beta and future returns for emerging markets. While this model works adequately for developed markets, it fails in emerging markets in that higher risk is not associated with higher expected returns.

Most of our empirical work focused on Institutional Investors’ Country Credit Ratings. In contrast to sources like Standard and Poor’s, Institutional Investor offered coverage (at the time) of 135 countries. We found a highly significant relation between the current credit rating and future average returns. This means that the lowest rated countries (highest risk countries given the scale goes from 0-100) had the highest expected return. Indeed, the explanatory power was strikingly similar to the explanatory power that the capital asset pricing model has when applied within the U.S. to industries.

While this model seemed to do well for emerging markets, we were curious as to whether it would also fit developed market returns. To our surprise, the country credit risk model fit (applied only to developed markets) was nearly identical when applied to only emerging markets.

We also recognized that a linear model was not appropriate. If a country had the lowest possible rating, no one would want to invest there (think of an active war). Hence, we focused on the logarithm of the country credit rating.

At the time of writing our monograph, we had no idea that practitioners evaluating both investments and capital projects in international markets would find this model useful. Indeed, a country did not even need a stock market (or sovereign bond market) to get a cost of equity capital from our approach – all that was required was the country risk rating. Our model with its two coefficients delivered the cost of capital based on the country risk rating.

We were also interested in active management. In the early 1990s, active management focused on turning proprietary research into value-added performance for clients for a fee. Some active and quantitative asset managers saw an opportunity to enhance portfolio return through country selection. These efforts usually focused on using proprietary research and information.

This proprietary research is a known unknown. That is, it is known to the proprietor but unknown to others. We focused on the known known – because country credit ratings were widely and often, freely available. The known known connections amongst stock and bonds markets around the world could be shared with others.

Our research established robust links between the forward-looking ratings and the cross-sectional of expected equity premia as well as bond premia. We dug even deeper by decomposing country risk into three components: political risk, economic risk and financial risk. Our CFA Institute Research Foundation monograph explored how each of these measures impacts both the cross-section of equity and bond expected returns.

We are proud that twenty years later our country credit rating model is one of the standard models for determining the international cost of capital and has been implemented by the world’s premier company specializing in cost of capital research, Kroll, LLC.

Claude B. Erb
Campbell R. Harvey
Tadas E. Viskanta
January 2024
Chapter 1
International Cost of Capital Overview

Practitioners typically are confronted with this situation: “I know how to value company in the United States, but this one is in Country X, a developing economy. What should I use for a discount rate?”

– Shannon P. Pratt and Roger J. Grabowski, co-authors of Cost of Capital, 5th edition.¹

Measuring the impact of country risk is one of the most vexing issues in finance, particularly in emerging markets, where political and other country-specific risks can significantly change the dynamics of the project. It is absolutely essential to incorporate these risks into either the expected cash flows or the discount rate. While this point is not controversial, the key is using a reliable method to quantify these extra country risks.

– Campbell R. Harvey, Professor of Finance at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University; Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, Massachusetts; President of the American Finance Association in 2016.

Cost of Capital Defined

The cost of capital is the expected rate of return that the market requires in order to attract funds to a particular investment.²

The cost of capital is an opportunity cost and is one of the most important concepts in finance. For example, if you are a chief finance officer contemplating a possible capital expenditure, you need to know what return you should look to earn from that investment. If you are an investor who needs to plan for future expenditures, you need to ask what return you can expect to earn on your portfolio.³ The opportunity cost of capital is equal to the return that could have been earned on alternative investments at a similar level of risk and liquidity.⁴

² Ibid.
³ Richard Brealey, London Business School, as quoted in the Cost of Capital Navigator. To learn more, please visit kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator.
⁴ Roger Ibbotson, Yale University, as quoted in the Cost of Capital Navigator. To learn more, please visit kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator.
The cost of capital may be described in simple terms as the expected return appropriate for the expected level of risk. The cost of capital is also commonly called the discount rate, the expected return, or the required return.

There are three broad valuation approaches: (i) the income approach, (ii) the market approach, and (iii) the cost or asset-based approach. The country risk premia (CRPs), equity risk premia (ERPs), and relative volatility (RVs) presented in the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module at kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator can be used to develop cost of capital estimates for use in income approach-based valuation methods. Of the three aforementioned approaches to estimating value, only the income approach typically requires cost of capital estimates.

The cost of capital is a critical input used in income approaches to equate the future economic benefits (typically measured by projected cash flows) of a business, business ownership interest, security, or intangible asset to present value. The income approach is most often applied through a discounted cash flow (DCF) model.

A basic insight of capital market theory, that expected return is a function of risk, still holds when dealing with cost of equity capital in a global environment. Estimating a proper cost of capital (i.e., a discount rate) in developed countries, where a relative abundance of market data and comparable companies exist, requires a high degree of expertise. Estimating cost of capital in less-developed (i.e., “emerging”) economies can present an even greater challenge, primarily due to lack of data (or poor data quality) and the potential for magnified financial, economic, and political risks. A good understanding of cost of capital concepts is, therefore, essential for executives making global investment decisions.

Are Country Risks Real?

Why should there be any incremental challenges when developing cost of capital estimates for a business, business ownership interest, security, or intangible asset based outside a mature, developed market like the United States? If investors are alike everywhere and markets are integrated, then there is no extra problem. However, if markets are (entirely or partially) isolated (i.e., segmented) from world markets, then we need to address the perceived (and real) risk differences between markets.

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5 Modern portfolio theory and related asset pricing models assume that investors are risk-averse. This means that investors try to maximize expected returns for a given amount of risk, or minimize risk for a given amount of expected returns.

6 When a business uses a given cost of capital to evaluate a commitment of capital to an investment or project, it often refers to that cost of capital as the “hurdle rate”. The hurdle rate is the minimum expected rate of return that the business would be willing to accept to justify making the investment.

7 Some common variations of the DCF model include the constant growth dividend discount model (sometimes referred to as Gordon Growth model) and various multi-stage models.

8 The online Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module focuses on (i) providing useable risk premia for estimating cost of capital on a global scale, and (ii) providing guidance for properly using such data. For more information, visit kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator.
“Segmentation” in this context refers to markets (i.e., economies) that are not fully integrated into world markets (i.e., are to some degree isolated from world markets). Markets may be segmented due to a host of issues, such as regulation that restricts foreign investment, taxation differences, legal factors, information, trading costs, and physical barriers, among others. Experts do not agree on the extent or effects of market segmentation, although there can be no doubt that some markets are at least partially segmented.

The most common adjustments made by practitioners aimed at this segmentation problem are addressed by adding ad hoc country-specific risk premia to cost of capital estimates.

However, that does not answer the question of whether there should be an additional risk premium incorporated into the discount rate applied when valuing investments in those segmented markets in the first place. In theory, the only risks that are relevant for purposes of estimating the cost of equity are those that cannot be “diversified away”. In a nutshell, the argument is that if there is low correlation across markets, much of the country risk may be considered specific risk that can be diversified away by global investors investing across all markets.

In an increasingly globalized (i.e., integrated) world economy, some researchers argue that country-specific risks have been reduced, and may not be as important as they once might have been. Other researchers argue that policy makers have to consider the trade-off between this increase in the level of financial integration and global financial stability. In times of stress, locally funded (i.e. segmented) financial institutions appear less vulnerable to a global financial crisis, which means they can continue to lend to local businesses and consumers, ultimately benefitting the local economy. The authors argue that some degree of segmentation may contribute to a more resilient financial system.9

It is true that after the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, many emerging markets saw their stock markets collapse, in tandem with more developed markets. Global financial markets were under major liquidity constraints for a short period, until major central banks intervened to inject liquidity into the system. Similarly, the outbreak of COVID-19, a respiratory illness that was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization on March 11, 2020, led to significant turbulence in global financial markets and caused concerns about system-wide liquidity.10 To preserve the stability and the integrity of the global financial system during the COVID-19 crisis, and learning from its experience in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, the U.S. central bank

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10 The virus that caused the coronavirus disease or COVID-19 was identified as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). On December 31, 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) was informed of an outbreak of “pneumonia of unknown cause” detected in Wuhan, a large city in the Hubei Province, China. The spread of the virus moved quickly from China (Mainland) to neighboring countries/markets. On January 30, 2020 the WHO declared the current outbreak as a “public health emergency of international concern”. On March 11, 2020 the WHO announced that it was changing its classification of COVID-19 to a “pandemic” which meant the disease was spreading rapidly to different parts of the world. For a more detailed timeline on COVID-19, visit: https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/interactive-timeline#1.
Reserve” or the “Fed”) entered into new U.S. dollar liquidity arrangements with an additional nine central banks, including (for the first time) some located in emerging markets.\textsuperscript{11}

We agree in part that the inherent differences in risk between, say, “developed” countries and “emerging” economies, have likely diminished in most recent decades due to the trend toward globalization. However, it would probably be far too ambitious (and possibly ill advised) to make decisions without considering the very real (albeit likely diminished) differences that continue to exist between countries. Or, as Bekaert and Harvey (2014) succinctly state:

“Given the dramatic globalization over the past twenty years, does it make sense to segregate global equities into ‘developed’ and ‘emerging’ market buckets? We argue that the answer is still yes…emerging market assets still have higher risk than most developed markets — and as a result, continue to command higher expected returns”.\textsuperscript{12}

There are, of course, a range of opinions on this point. For example, some argue that the cost of capital for emerging markets may be lower if investing across countries is taken into account. The argument is that the low correlation between the risks of individual countries may provide a degree of diversification benefit to an investor who holds a portfolio of assets across many different countries.\textsuperscript{13} Correlation can be a measure of potential “diversification benefits” in financial markets.\textsuperscript{14} Assets that are highly correlated offer less potential diversification benefit; assets that are less correlated offer more potential diversification benefits. Diversification in assets that are less correlated may provide a dampening of overall portfolio risk.

While it is true that the imperfect correlation between say, developed countries’ and emerging countries’ equity market returns implies a degree of risk mitigation due to potential diversification

\textsuperscript{11}The Fed uses its regional bank in New York to execute transactions in accordance with the Fed’s monetary policy. Following the COVID-19 crisis, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York entered into temporary U.S. dollar liquidity arrangements (i.e. swap lines) with the following central banks: Reserve Bank of Australia, Banco Central do Brasil, Danmarks Nationalbank (Denmark), Bank of Korea, Banco de Mexico, the Norges Bank (Norway), Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Monetary Authority of Singapore, and Sveriges Riksbank (Sweden). This is in addition to the existing liquidity agreements with the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, and the Swiss National Bank. For more details, visit: https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/international-market-operations/central-bank-swap-arrangements.


\textsuperscript{13}Correlation can vary from −1 to +1, with a correlation of −1 implying a perfectly negative relationship, a correlation of +1 implying a perfectly positive relationship, and a correlation of 0 implying no relationship (i.e., “random”). If two variables generally move together (i.e., they both move up at the same time, or they both move down at the same time), they are positively correlated; if the two variables move opposite of each other (i.e., when one moves up, the other moves down), they are negatively correlated; if the two variables move randomly in relation to each other, they have no correlation, either positive or negative.

\textsuperscript{14}Theoretically, markets are perfectly integrated if financial assets with the same risk profile have identical expected returns irrespective of the market in which they are traded. In other words, the premise of financial market integration is the “law of one price”. See for example, Chen, Z., and P. J. Knez, 1995, “Measurement of Market Integration and Arbitrage”, Review of Financial Studies 8, pp. 287–325. However, academics have not come to an agreement on the best measure(s) to capture the degree of market integration in practice. Focusing specifically on equity markets, some researchers argue that the co-movement between markets does not necessarily mean that they are integrated. In other words, they argue that when there are multiple global sources of variability in returns, assets of individual countries do not necessarily have similar exposures to all these sources, and yet, these countries can still be perfectly integrated. For a survey of academic literature covering market integration and associated measures, review Akbari, Amir, and Lilian Ng. “International Market Integration: A Survey,” Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies 49, no. 2 (2020): 161-185.
benefits, the correlation of world markets does appear to have significantly increased in the most recent decades.

To illustrate (see Exhibit 1.1), the MSCI “World” equity index (which includes 23 developed markets), and the MSCI “Emerging Market” index (which includes 24 emerging markets) had a correlation factor of 0.52 over the 120-month period ending December 1998.\textsuperscript{15,16,17} This correlation increased to 0.80 over the 120-month period ending March 2020, lending support to the notion that the potential diversification benefit to an investor who holds a portfolio of assets across many different countries decreased over the December 1998–March 2020 period, due to an increased correlation of the asset classes across the globe. Researchers investigated the start of this pattern and concluded that the current levels of integration started as recently as 1970.\textsuperscript{18}

This same pattern exists when the correlations of MSCI’s Europe, U.S., and the Far East equity indices are computed against the MSCI Emerging markets equity index.\textsuperscript{19,20}

\textsuperscript{15} MSCI is a leading provider of investment decision support tools to clients worldwide. MSCI provides indices, portfolio risk and performance analytics, and ESG data and research. To learn more about MSCI, visit www.msci.com.

\textsuperscript{16} The MSCI World Index consists of the following 24 developed market indices: Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Hong Kong SAR; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; Singapore; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; the United Kingdom; and the United States.

\textsuperscript{17} As of the data-through date of the analysis in Exhibit 1.1 (March 2020), the MSCI Emerging Market Index consisted of the following 24 emerging market indices: Brazil; Chile; China (Mainland); Colombia; Czech Republic; Egypt; Greece; Hungary; India; Indonesia; South Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; Pakistan; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Qatar; Russia; South Africa; Taiwan; Thailand; Turkey; and United Arab Emirates. As of June 2021, the index has added the following three countries: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Argentina.

\textsuperscript{18} In a comprehensive study that examine returns of different asset classes for a sample 83 countries over almost two centuries, the authors found that integration is not a gradual linear process and the highest level of integration in history is the post-2000 period which started in 1970’s. Zaremba, Adam, George D. Kambouris, and Andreas Karathanasopoulos. “Two centuries of global financial market integration: Equities, government bonds, treasury bills, and currencies.” Economics Letters 182 (2019): 26-29.

\textsuperscript{19} The MSCI Europe Index consists of the following 15 developed market country indices: Austria; Belgium; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Ireland; Italy; Netherlands; Norway; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; and the United Kingdom.

\textsuperscript{20} The MSCI Far East Index consists of the following 3 developed market indices: Hong Kong SAR; Japan; and Singapore.
Exhibit 1.1: 120-month Correlation of the Total Returns of the MSCI World, U.S., Europe, and Far East Indices with the MSCI Emerging Markets Equity Index, as of December 1998 and March 2020

Source of underlying data: Morningstar, Inc. Used with permission. All rights reserved. Series used: MSCI World GR LCL and MSCI EM GR LCL series used for “World Correlation with Emerging Markets” correlation; MSCI USA GR USD and MSCI EM GR USD series used for “U.S. Correlation with Emerging Markets” correlation; MSCI Far East GR LCL and MSCI EM GR LCL series used for “Far East Correlation with Emerging Markets” correlation; MSCI Europe GR (in €EUR) and MSCI EM GR (in €EUR) used for “Europe Correlation with Emerging Markets” correlation. For more information about MSCI indices, visit www.msci.com.

While this analysis supports the notion that the potential diversification benefit of investors based in developed countries investing in emerging countries decreased in recent years, Bekaert and Harvey (2014) caution that “correlations between developed and emerging markets have increased, [but] the process of integration of these markets into world markets is incomplete”. Moreover, financial integration does not necessarily equate to economic integration of those countries into the global economy. In general, academics consider the measurement of economic integration a more challenging task. Akbari, Ng, and Solnik document that economies became more interconnected during the 2008–2009 global crisis period and the ensuing recession. However, they found that while the gap in economic integration between developed and emerging markets is closing, there is still a significant gap in financial integration between these two groups of countries.


23 Akbari, Amir, Lilian K. Ng, and Bruno Solnik. “Emerging markets are catching up: economic or financial integration?”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (2019). Using a global capital asset pricing model (CAPM) framework, these researchers define economic integration as a common cash flow dynamic, and financial integration as a common risk-pricing dynamic. In other words, they decompose stock returns into revisions in cash-flow expectations (economic integration) and revisions in risk
We conclude that in today’s increasingly integrated economy there may be less theoretical justification for country risk premia than may have been warranted even a few decades ago. However, these risks still exist in the real world, and it would likely be unwise to make investment decisions without considering these risks. Furthermore, the ex-ante theoretical expectations that increased global financial market integration would diminish the risk (and therefore, required returns) associated with investing in emerging markets has not fully come to fruition. From a practical perspective, emerging markets are still clearly characterized by substantially more financial, economic, and political turmoil than are mature markets such as the U.S. or Germany. Increased correlation in recent years between developed and emerging markets means that those country-specific risks cannot be completely diversified away and, therefore country risk premia may be priced by investors.

If understood, differences between global economies can be planned for and considered in the structure of an investment well in advance. If not understood, these differences can result in unwise investments being pursued – or turn an otherwise sensible investment into a bad one.

**Risks Typically Associated with International Investment**

The risks associated with international investing can largely be characterized as financial, economic, or political. Many of these are the types of risks associated with investing in general – the possibility of loan default, the possibility of delayed payments of suppliers’ credits, the possibility of inefficiencies brought about by the work of complying with unfamiliar (or burdensome) regulation, unexpected increases in taxes and transaction fees, differences in information availability, and liquidity issues, to name just a few. Some risks, however, are typically associated more with global investing – currency risk, lack of good accounting information, poorly developed legal systems, and even expropriation, government instability, or war.

**Financial Risks**

Financial risks typically entail an issue that is specifically money-centric (e.g., loan default, inability to easily repatriate profits to the home country, etc.). Among these types of risks, currency risk is probably the most familiar. Currency risk is the financial risk that exchange rates (the value of one currency versus another) will change unexpectedly.

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*pricing (financial integration). Accordingly, a country’s real economic integration is determined by the proportion of its cash-flow news influenced by world related cash-flow news. Similarly, a country’s degree of financial integration with the global market is measured by the proportion of the country’s risk-pricing revision that is influenced by world risk-pricing revisions. Based on these measures, the authors found that the financial integration gap between developed and emerging markets still remains high, whereas the economic integration gap is closing between the two country groups.*
For example, when a French investor invests in Brazil, he or she must first convert Euros into the local currency, in this case the Brazilian Real (BRL). The returns that the French investor experiences in local currency terms are identical to the returns that a Brazilian investor would experience, but the French investor faces an additional risk in the form of currency risk when the returns are “brought home” and must be converted back to Euros.24

Expected changes in exchange rates can often be hedged. However, even when currency hedging is used, exchange rate risk often remains. To the extent the Euro unexpectedly increases in value versus the Real (i.e., the Euro appreciates against the Real), the French investor is able to purchase fewer Euros for each Real he realized in the Brazilian investment when returns from the investment are repatriated, and his return is thus diminished.25,26

Conversely, to the extent the Euro unexpectedly decreases in value versus the Real (i.e., the Euro depreciates against the Real), the French investor is able to purchase more Euros for each Real he realized in the Brazilian investment when returns from the investment are repatriated, and his return is thus enhanced.

For example, U.S.-based investors investing in U.S. equities realized an approximate return of just 1.0% in 2015, but French investors making a similar investment in the U.S. realized an approximate 13% return when they repatriated their returns and converted them to Euros (see Exhibit 1.2). The reason for this is that the Euro depreciated against the U.S. Dollar in 2015, so the French investors could purchase more euros with their dollars when they repatriated their returns. In a more recent example, Brazil-based investors investing in Brazilian equities realized an approximate return of 15% in 2019, but French investors making a similar investment in Brazil realized an approximate 29% return when they repatriated their returns and converted them to euros (the Euro depreciated against the Brazilian Real in 2019, so the French investors could purchase more euros with their reals when they repatriated their returns).

It is important to note that currency conversion effects can also work to diminish realized returns. For example, in 2015 Argentina equities returned an astonishing 52% return in local terms. Because the Euro appreciated against the Argentine Peso in 2015, French-based investors in Argentina stocks experienced a lower return (11%) when they repatriated their returns and converted them to euros (they could buy fewer euros with their pesos when they repatriated their returns).

24 For this example, we assume that the French and local investor are both subject to the same regulations, taxes, and local risks when investing in the same local asset.

25 We say “unexpectedly” for a reason. If the investor had been able to predict (at the time of investing) the precise exchange rate at which he/she would be repatriating his/her returns, these “expected” changes to the exchange rate would have been reflected in the expected cash flows of the investment at inception.

26 For example, say the French investor had achieved a 10% return in local (Brazilian) terms on his investment in a given year, but the Euro had unexpectedly appreciated by 3% in value relative to the Real over the same period. When the returns are repatriated, the French investor’s overall return is diminished to approximately 6.7% \([(1+10\%)*(1-3\%)-1]\) in Euro terms. Conversely, had the Euro depreciated in value versus the Real by 3%, the repatriated returns would be enhanced to approximately 13.3% \([(1+10\%)*(1+3\%)-1]\) in Euro terms.
Exhibit 1.2: Currency Conversion Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France-based Investor Investing In:</th>
<th>Return in Local Terms</th>
<th>Return to French Investors (EUR)</th>
<th>Currency Conversion Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009 South Africa (ZAR)</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 Japan (JPY)</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 Switzerland (CHF)</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 Brazil (BRL)</td>
<td>-12%</td>
<td>-34%</td>
<td>-22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 Argentina (ARS)</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>-41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 United States (USD)</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016 United Kingdom (GBP)</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>-16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 Brazil (BRL)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source of underlying data: Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Brazil, South Africa, Japan, Switzerland, and Argentina, gross return (GR) equity indices. For more information about MSCI, visit www.msci.com. The S&P 500 Index was used as the proxy for the United States equity market. For more information about S&P indices, visit http://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-500. Underlying data from Morningstar, Inc. Used with permission. All rights reserved. For more information about Morningstar, visit http://corporate.morningstar.com/.

A common misstep we often encounter is companies constructing forward-looking budgets or projection analyses in local currencies, and then converting these projections to the currency of the parent company using the spot rate.

This mistakenly assumes that the exchange rate will not change in the future. Projections, which are inherently forward-looking, need to embody expected currency conversion rates. We are interested in currency risks over the period of the projected net cash flows, not just in the spot market. Even then, these are merely estimates of future currency exchange rates and the actual exchange rate can vary from these estimates.

Does currency risk affect the cost of capital? One team of researchers found that emerging market exchange risks have a significant impact on risk premia and are time varying (for countries in the sample). They found that exchange risks affect risk premia as a separate risk factor and represent more than 50% of total risk premia for investments in emerging market equities. The exchange risk from investments in emerging markets was found to even affect the risk premia for investments in developed market equities.27

While exchange rate volatility appears to be partly systematic, researchers have found that despite not being constant, the currency risk premium is small and seems to fluctuate around zero.28 A relatively recent academic paper set out to study whether corporate managers should include foreign exchange risk premia in cost of equity estimations. The authors empirically estimated the differences between the cost of equity estimates of several risk-return models,

including some models that have an explicit currency risk premia and others that do not. They found that adjusting for currency risk makes little difference, on average, in the cost of equity estimates, even for small firms and for firms with extreme currency exposure estimates. The authors concluded that, at a minimum, these results applied to U.S. companies, but future research would still have to be conducted for other countries.29

Rather than attempting to quantify and add a currency risk premium to the discount rate, using expected or forward exchange rates to translate projected cash flows into the home currency will inherently capture the currency risk, if any, priced by market participants.30

Economic Risks

Global investors may also be exposed to economic risks associated with international investing. These risks may include the volatility of a country’s economy as reflected in the current (and expected) inflation rate, the current account balance as a percentage of goods and services, burdensome regulation, and labor rules, among others.

The impact of these economic risks appears to be more important during periods of crises, when global investors are more risk averse. For instance, let us take an important source of economic risk in the aftermath on the 2008–2009 global financial crisis: government debt as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) of a country. A group of researchers found that the impact of a 1.0% change in government debt-to-GDP level on country risk premium estimates for emerging countries is very different depending on whether global risk appetite is accommodative (i.e. investors are less risk averse). According to these authors, issues related to (i) the deterioration in macroeconomic indicators such as current account balance, international reserves, and fiscal budget balance, or (ii) an increase in foreign-currency denominated debt issued by non-financial corporations are estimated to increase the country risk premium more strongly when global risk appetite slides.31 We have seen the example of Greece during the Euro sovereign debt crisis of 2010–2012: the country needed several rounds of bailouts due to investors’ views that the Greek government had accumulated unsustainable levels of debt. During that period, Greece defaulted on its debt obligations, the country’s economy contracted severely, and measures of country risk

30 This assumes that the valuation is being conducted in the home currency, by discounting projected cash flows denominated in the home currency, with a discount rate also denominated in home currency. Alternatively, the analyst can conduct the entire valuation in foreign currency terms (projected cash flows and discount rate are both in foreign currency terms), in which case the estimated value would be translated into the home currency using a spot exchange rate.
increased dramatically.\textsuperscript{32} A study has found that even rating agencies reconsidered how they assigned their ratings after the Eurozone debt crisis.\textsuperscript{33}

In Exhibit 1.3a, the 20 countries with the overall highest estimated government debt-to-GDP ratios are shown (regardless of the size of their economies), as of calendar year 2022. For example, Italy has a debt-to-GDP ratio of 140\% (i.e., the Italian government’s debt is 40\% larger than Italy’s annual GDP), and Canada has a debt-to-GDP ratio of 105\% (i.e., Canada’s government debt is 5\% larger than Canada’s annual GDP).

In Exhibit 1.3b, the estimated government debt-to-GDP ratios for the 20 countries with the largest economies (as measured by GDP) are shown, also as of calendar year 2022. The rank of GDP size is shown in parentheses after each country’s name. Switzerland (with a ranking of “20”) is the smallest GDP, and the United States (with a ranking of “1”) is the largest GDP in the group.

\textbf{Exhibit 1.3a: 2022 Government Debt-to-GDP (in percent)}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{32} Greece saw a decline in real GDP in every single year from 2008 through 2016, with the exception of 2014 (at a modest growth of 0.7\%). From the end of 2007 till the end of 2016, the Greek economy contracted 26\% in real terms. The largest declines in real GDP growth were observed in 2011 and 2012. Growth in real GDP based on latest estimates at the time of writing. Source: Eurostat. Data retrieved on September 20, 2020 from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database.

\textsuperscript{33} Reusens, Peter, and Christophe Croux. “Sovereign credit rating determinants: A comparison before and after the European debt crisis.” Journal of Banking & Finance 77 (2017): 108-121. The authors of this study investigated the procedures from the three major credit rating agencies in allocating ratings before and after the European debt crisis for a sample of 90 countries for the years of 2002–2015. They found that the importance of fiscal balance, among other things, increased considerably in rating agencies’ assessment after the European debt crisis. Importantly, GDP growth gained significant importance for highly indebted sovereigns and government debt became much more important for countries with a low GDP growth rate.
Exhibit 1.3b: 2022 Government Debt-to-GDP (in percent), 20 countries with largest GDP

Source of underlying data for Exhibit 1.3a and Exhibit 1.3b: World Economic Outlook Database from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For additional information, please visit: www.imf.org/en/Publications/SPROLLS/world-economic-outlook-databases

There are costs that tend to go hand-in-hand with what might be considered unsustainable debt levels by governments. Lenders may demand a higher expected return to compensate them for additional default risk when investing not only in the country’s sovereign debt, but also in businesses operating in those countries.

The outbreak of COVID-19 generated an unprecedented reaction by governments to a pandemic. In addition to massive interventions by major central banks, several governments enacted some of the largest fiscal stimulus packages ever seen in an attempt to mitigate the impact of mandatory lockdown policies implemented by numerous countries. To finance those fiscal packages, governments across the globe had to issue large amounts of debt and, as a result, the ratio of debt-to-GDP is reaching unprecedented levels for several countries. The full impact of these fiscal packages and corresponding debt levels is still unknown and will be felt for years to come.

Governments may decide to increase the money supply in an effort to inflate their way out of debt. Ultimately, some governments may decide on outright currency devaluation or even a repudiation of debt (i.e., defaulting on their debt obligations). These risks are not entirely limited to less developed countries, but less developed countries may be more willing to resort to these extreme measures than developed countries.

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35 The IMF publishes an interactive Fiscal Monitor showing historic, current, and forecasted debt-to-GDP ratios on a country-by-country basis. The IMF estimates that as of September 11, 2020, the global fiscal response to COVID-19 amounted to $11.7 trillion, or 12% of global GDP. Fiscal Monitor data was retrieved on October 16, 2020 and is accessible here: https://data.imf.org/?sk=4BE0C9CB-272A-4667-8892-34B582B21BA6.
Political Risks

Political risks can include government instability, expropriation, bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption, and even war. A relatively recent example of the effects of political risk is Venezuela’s expropriation of various foreign-owned oil, gas, and mining interests. These actions tend to reduce Venezuela’s attractiveness to foreign investors, who will likely demand a significantly higher expected return in exchange for future investment in the country – in effect raising their cost of capital estimates for projects located in Venezuela. Exhibit 1.4 summarizes some of the risks that investors may view as unique or country-specific.

Exhibit 1.4: Reasons Typically Cited for Adding a Country Risk Premium Adjustment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Risks</th>
<th>Financial Risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Expropriation of private investments in total or in part through change in taxation</td>
<td>• Currency volatility plus the inability to convert, hedge, or repatriate profits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Repudiation of contracts by governments</td>
<td>• Loan default or unfavorable loan restructuring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Economic planning failures</td>
<td>• Deferred payment of suppliers’ credits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Political leadership and frequency of change</td>
<td>• Losses from exchange controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• External conflict</td>
<td>• Foreign trade collection experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Corruption in government</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Military in politics</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Organized religion in politics</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Lack of law-and-order tradition</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Racial and national tensions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Civil war</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Poor quality of the bureaucracy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Poorly developed legal system</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Political terrorism</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Risks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Volatility of the economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unexpected changes in inflation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Parallel foreign exchange rate market indicators</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Labor issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Current account balance of the country in which the subject company operates as a percentage of goods and services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Does the Currency Used to Project Cash Flows Impact the Discount Rate?

According to corporate finance theory, the currency of the projections should always be consistent with the currency of the discount rate. In practice, this means that the inputs used to derive a discount rate (the denominator) should be in the same currency used to project cash flows (the numerator). For example, if the projections are denominated in Australian Dollars, then the risk-
free rate and equity risk premium inputs should also be denominated in (local) Australian Dollar terms.

There are two basic methods to address foreign currency cash flows in valuations, assuming the analysis is being conducted in nominal terms:

- Perform the valuation in the local (foreign) currency, discount the projected cash flows with a local (foreign) currency denominated discount rate (i.e., using foreign currency inputs), and convert the resulting value into the home currency (e.g., USD, EUR) at the spot exchange rate.

- Convert cash flows at a forecasted exchange rate into the home currency (e.g., USD, EUR) and discount the projected cash flows with a home country discount rate (using home currency inputs). In this case, the forecasted exchange rate already includes the risk associated with exchange rate fluctuations.

Notwithstanding the two general approaches outlined above, valuation and finance professionals may find themselves in a position where a local currency discount rate is needed and yet there are no reliable cost of capital inputs in the local (foreign) currency. What should you do in such a situation?

One can go back to one of the central ideas in international finance: the so-called “law of one price.” The basic idea is that international investors explore profit arbitrage opportunities across financial markets in different countries, therefore guaranteeing that identical financial assets have similar prices, once adjusted for different currencies. This presumes competitive markets, where market imperfections do not exist.

Five key theoretical economic relationships result from these arbitrage activities:\(^\text{36}\)

- Purchasing Power Parity
- Fisher Effect
- International Fisher Effect
- Interest Rate Parity
- Forward Rates as Unbiased Predictors of Future Spot Rates

It is beyond this publication to discuss these concepts on a detailed level. Several international finance textbooks have been written and published which cover this topic extensively. These

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theoretical relationships are also central to understanding and forecasting foreign exchange rates, as well as prices of other financial assets denominated in foreign currencies.\textsuperscript{37}

The International Fisher Effect is formalized in the following equation:

\[
\text{Interest Rate}_{\text{Local Currency}} = (1 + \text{Interest Rate}_{\text{Home Currency}}) \times \left( \frac{1 + \text{Inflation}_{\text{Local Currency}}}{1 + \text{Inflation}_{\text{Home Currency}}} \right) - 1
\]

The International Fisher Effect suggests that countries with high inflation rates should expect to see higher interest rates relative to countries with lower inflation rates.

This relationship can be extended from interest rates into discount rates, thereby allowing us to translate a home currency cost of capital estimate into a foreign currency indication.

However, it is crucial to understand that the International Fisher Effect relationship holds only in equilibrium. This presumes that (i) there is no government intervention in capital markets; and (ii) capital can flow freely in international financial markets from one currency to another, such that any potential arbitrage opportunity across countries will be quickly eliminated. In reality, market frictions (e.g., transaction costs, regulations, etc.) and government interventions do exist in practice, which means that using the International Fisher Effect to translate the home currency discount rate into a local currency will result in only an approximation.

Applying the International Fisher Effect to translate the rates of return on equity and debt would result in the following relationships:

\[
\text{Cost of Equity}_{\text{Local Currency}} = (1 + \text{Cost of Equity}_{\text{Home Currency}}) \times \left( \frac{1 + \text{Expected Inflation}_{\text{Local Currency}}}{1 + \text{Expected Inflation}_{\text{Home Currency}}} \right) - 1
\]

\[
\text{Cost of Debt}_{\text{Local Currency}} = (1 + \text{Cost of Debt}_{\text{Home Currency}}) \times \left( \frac{1 + \text{Expected Inflation}_{\text{Local Currency}}}{1 + \text{Expected Inflation}_{\text{Home Currency}}} \right) - 1
\]

In practice, these formulas tend to be applied in the context of using a single discount rate to compute the present value of the projected cash flows in both the discrete forecast period and in the terminal (or residual) year. Such application would therefore use long-term expected inflation rates as inputs for both the home and the local (foreign) country.

However, this practical application does not work well when dealing with a country with high inflation for the foreseeable future, but which is expected to decline over time. In such cases, valuation analysts may have to calculate multiple discount rates (one for each year in the projections) to reflect the changing inflation differentials, until a long-term, more sustainable, inflation differential is expected to be reached.

Despite these limitations, the International Fisher Effect can be useful in ensuring that inflation assumptions embedded in the projected cash flows are consistent with those implied by the discount rates.38

**Summary**

Cross-border investing creates additional challenges relative to making an investment in domestic (or home) financial markets. Those challenges are exacerbated when contemplating investing in emerging (i.e., less-developed) countries. The latter are often characterized by incremental volatility created by so-called country risk factors.39

Country risk is generally described as financial, economic, or political in nature. These rules may create incremental complexities when developing cost of capital estimates for a business, business ownership interest, security, or an intangible asset based outside of a mature market such as the United States.

While years ago academics expected that an increase in global integration of financial markets would diminish the reason for expecting a country risk premium for investing in emerging markets, (i) there is still a certain degree of market segmentation; and (ii) correlation between developed (mature) and developing (i.e., “emerging”) markets has increased significantly in recent years. This means that the anticipation that country risk could be completely diversified away has not come fully into fruition.

To the extent that country risk is systematic in nature, a related premium may need to be incorporated into discount rate estimates, if not already embedded in the projected cash flows.

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38 For a discussion and examples of how to apply the methods outlined in this section, refer to the complementary CFA Institute webinar entitled “Quantifying Country Risk Premiums”, presented on December 6, 2016 by James P. Harrington and Carla S. Nunes, CFA, by Kroll. This webcast can be accessed here: https://rpc.cfainstitute.org/research/multimedia/2016/quantifying-country-risk-premiums.

39 For additional information on assessing country risk factors, please see Consensus Economics®. Visit: www.consensus economics.com.
Chapter 2
Strengths and Weaknesses of Commonly Used Models

The Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module includes (i) equity risk premia (ERPs) for 28 countries in local currencies, (ii) implied country risk premia (CRPs) calculated using the Country Yield Spread Model, (iii) implied relative volatility (RV) factors calculated using the Relative Volatility Model, and (iv) base country-level cost of equity capital and implied CRPs calculated using the Erb- Harvey-Viskanta Country Credit Rating Model.

For completeness, in Chapter 2 we briefly discuss additional international cost of capital models commonly mentioned by academics and/or valuation analysts.

World (or Global) CAPM

The World CAPM model has intuitive appeal where markets are integrated and/or when the subject company is a diversified multi-national corporation operating in many countries. This method recognizes cross-border diversification opportunities and prices securities accordingly. The following equation is typically expressed in U.S. Dollars:

\[
ke = R_{f,U.S.} + (\beta_w \times RP_w)
\]

Where:
- \(ke\) = Cost of equity capital
- \(R_{f,U.S.}\) = U.S. risk-free rate
- \(\beta_w\) = Market risk measured with respect to a world portfolio of stocks (i.e., beta)
- \(RP_w\) = Equity risk premium (ERP) (rate of return expressed in terms of U.S. Dollar returns) on a world diversified portfolio

Because we are estimating expected returns in terms of U.S. Dollars, this discount rate can be used for discounting net cash flows expressed in U.S. Dollars with the currency risk (preferably) treated in either the net cash flows or the discount rate.
The World CAPM model has been shown to work reasonably well for developed markets. However, this approach has several potential weaknesses, particularly when dealing with investments located in emerging markets. These potential weaknesses may include:

- Markets are not all fully integrated. In effect, the World CAPM approach assumes away meaningful differences across countries. If the subject company’s operations are concentrated in one or two countries, the risks of that business will differ from the risks of nearly identical companies operating in multiple countries. The prior specification is an idealized approximation unless there is complete integration.

- While developed countries’ betas may have some ability to discriminate between high and low expected return countries, realized emerging market returns suggest that there is little relation between expected returns and betas measured with respect to the world market portfolio.

To illustrate the second point, that there is seemingly little relation between expected returns and betas regressed against the world market portfolio, we present in Exhibit 2.1 the 60-month ordinary least squares (OLS) betas of MSCI developed and frontier market countries, sorted from smallest betas (on the left) to largest betas (on the right), as of December 2022.

Countries classified by MSCI as “developed” markets, as the name implies, include the most developed economies (e.g., U.S., Germany, Singapore, etc.), while the MSCI “frontier” markets include the least developed economies or whose equity markets have poor depth and liquidity (e.g., Bangladesh, Nigeria, Serbia, etc.). The betas of the countries classified as “frontier” markets (the solid green line) are systematically lower than the betas of “developed” markets (the solid blue line). This would imply that the risk associated with frontier markets is less than the risk associated with developed markets (all other things held the same), which investors would reasonably assume to be incorrect.

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1 See for example, Claude Erb, Campbell Harvey, and Tadas Viskanta, “Expected Returns and Volatility in 135 Countries”, Journal of Portfolio Management (Spring 1996): 46–58.
4 Countries classified by MSCI as “emerging” market countries are not shown. Emerging market countries have economies more developed than frontier market countries, but less developed than developed market countries. Emerging market countries were not used in this analysis because to illustrate the point, the most striking differences are observed between the developed and frontier market classifications.
Exhibit 2.1: MSCI Developed and Frontier Markets’ OLS Betas as Measured Over the 60-month Period Ending December 31, 2022

Source of underlying data: MSCI: All returns are based on MSCI indices, in U.S. Dollars, and accounting for capital gains/losses and dividends. The classification of developed and frontier markets corresponds to the countries in the MSCI indices of developed and frontier markets as of December 2022. MSCI Developed Markets represented in this analysis by: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States, and the United Kingdom. MSCI Frontier Markets represented in this analysis by: Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Croatia, Estonia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lithuania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, and Vietnam. The market benchmark used in the calculation of all betas is the MSCI World Index. All rights reserved; used with permission. All calculations by Kroll.

Single-country Version of the CAPM

The single-country version of the CAPM can be expressed as:

\[ k_{e,\text{local}} = R_{f,\text{local}} + \left( \beta_{\text{local}} \times RP_{\text{local}} \right) \]

Where:
- \( k_{e,\text{local}} \) = Cost of equity capital in local country
- \( R_{f,\text{local}} \) = Return on the local country government’s (default-risk-free) debt
- \( \beta_{\text{local}} \) = Market risk of the subject company measured with respect to the local securities market (i.e., beta)
- \( RP_{\text{local}} \) = Equity risk premium in local country’s stock market
If one estimates all inputs in local currency (e.g., Brazilian Real), then the resulting cost of equity capital estimate can be used to discount expected net cash flows expressed in local currency terms.

If one estimates all expected return in terms of rates of return in U.S. Dollars (or another home currency), then the resulting cost of equity capital is used to discount expected cash flows expressed in U.S. Dollars (or another home currency), with the currency risk treated (preferably) in the expected cash flows or as an adjustment to the discount rate.

This single-country version of the CAPM approach has appeal because local investors provide capital to local firms in the local market. This approach allows more local factors to be incorporated in the measure of local market risks. This type of model works best in developed economies. For example, the analyst could determine betas for U.S. firms relative to the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500, U.K. firms relative to the FTSE 100, and Japanese firms relative to the Nikkei 225.

Potential weaknesses of the single-country version of the CAPM include:

- The model does not work well in less developed markets.
- The model generally requires the “local” country to have a history of bond and stock market returns in local currency terms. Data may be poor or non-existent in segmented, developing country settings, especially the type of data required to develop the local beta and ERP. Even if some historical information is available, if the “local” country underwent a significant change in its economy, level of development, or political regime (to name a few), it would be unlikely that the historical data would represent a good proxy for what would be expected in the future (e.g., calculated historical ERPs would not be reliable indicators of forward-looking ERPs).
- Beta estimates using historical returns may be low because the local stock market may be dominated by just a few firms (or industries).
- The local country government’s debt is possibly not free of default risk.

**Damodaran’s Local Country Risk Exposure Model**

The Damodaran model compares the volatility of the local country’s stock market returns and bond returns (i.e., a proxy for the relative risk between debt and equity for investors in that country to estimate a country risk premium, or CRP). Damodaran also calls this the Lambda (λ) approach. Damodaran also calls this the Lambda (λ) approach. The Damodaran model can be applied in U.S. Dollars, Euros, or another currency that has a

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(default free) risk-free rate and is easily accessible. The following equation depicts Damodaran's model expressed in U.S. Dollar terms:

\[
ke_{local} = R_{f,U.S.} + (\beta_{U.S.} \times RP_{U.S.}) + \lambda \times (CRP)
\]

Where:
- \(ke_{local}\) = Discount rate for equity capital in local country
- \(R_{f,U.S.}\) = U.S. risk-free rate
- \(\beta_{U.S.} \times RP_{U.S.}\) = Risk premium (in U.S. Dollars terms) appropriate for a U.S. company in a similar industry as the subject company in the local country, where \(\beta_{U.S.}\) is the beta of the subject company expressed in U.S. Dollars and \(RP_{U.S.}\) is the U.S. equity risk premium also expressed in U.S. Dollars
- \(\lambda\) = Company's exposure to the local country risk
- \(CRP\) = \(\left( R_{local\ euro\ $\ issue} - R_{f,U.S.} \right) \times \left( \frac{\sigma_{stock}}{\sigma_{bond}} \right) \)
- \(R_{local\ euro\ $\ issue} - R_{f,U.S.}\) = Yield spread between government bonds issued by the local country in U.S. Dollars versus U.S. government bonds
- \(\sigma_{stock}\) = Volatility of returns in local country's stock market
- \(\sigma_{bond}\) = Volatility of returns in local country's bond market

This model is premised on two basic ideas:  

- A company's exposure to country risk (\(\lambda\)) comes from where it operates, and not where it is incorporated.

- If the country default spread is estimated through the premium demanded for buying a government bond issued by the subject country relative to a risk-free government bond issued by a developed (mature) market, then the country risk premium used to estimate a cost of equity for that country should be greater, because equities are riskier than bonds. This is accomplished by scaling the equity risk premium by the relative standard deviation of stocks vs. bonds (\(\sigma_{stocks} / \sigma_{bonds}\)) in the local market, which will generally yield a greater country risk (CRP) than merely using the spread between the respective countries' bonds (sovereigns or corporates).

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\(^6\) Letter to the Editor, Professor Aswath Damodaran, *Business Valuation Review* 31(2/3) (Summer/Fall 2012): 85 86.
If we are estimating expected returns in terms of U.S. Dollars, this discount rate can be used for discounting expected net cash flows expressed in U.S. Dollars (with the exchange risk treated preferably in the expected cash flows, or potentially as an adjustment to the discount rate).

For countries without rated debt, you can use country risk ratings to estimate the credit rating and the default spread, which is then used to estimate the country risk premium (CRP).

The company’s exposure to the local country risk is measured relative to the average company in the local country. Damodaran indicates that the determinants of such exposure would be influenced by at least three factors (if not more): (i) revenue source from the country in question; (ii) location of production facilities; and (iii) level of usage of risk management products. Using the simplest measure of lambda based entirely on revenues, if the average of local country companies has 80% revenue from operations in that local country, then you want to measure the subject company’s percent of total revenues generated in that country relative to the average company in the local country of 80%.

The country exposure measure in the Damodaran model is consistent with a study that measured global, country, and industry effects in firm-level returns between emerging and developed markets. The authors found that country effects dominate global and industry effects in emerging markets in contrast to developed markets. The implication of their results is that in applying country risk factors, you should consider the firm level amount of international business in determining the impact of country risk versus global and industry risk. One can incorporate the data published in this book to measure country level risks into the framework of the Damodaran model.

Some analysts are critical of this model, claiming that it does not have a strong theoretical foundation and is not consistent with a CAPM framework.

**Alternative Risk Measures (Downside Risk)**

Is beta a flawed measure of risk in emerging markets? We have already noted that in many local markets, beta measurements may be flawed because “market” returns in some markets are dominated by a few large companies (or industries) and the returns on other “local market” companies may not be correlated with those large companies. Returns of the local market companies may even be highly correlated to one another and experience high variance (risk), but they look like low-risk companies because their betas are low relative to the overall market index.

---


Mishra and O'Brien studied implied cost of capital estimates for individual stocks from 16 developing (i.e., emerging) economies. They found that total risk (volatility of returns) is the most significant risk factor in explaining implied cost of capital estimates for these stocks.\(^9\)

For companies based in those markets, but with global market presence, the global beta does explain, but to a lesser degree, differences in implied cost of capital estimates.

Other researchers have suggested that downside risk measures may result in more accurate risk measures in developing markets. Gendreau and Heckman found returns in emerging markets systematically related to downside risk, measured as the semi-standard deviation of returns compared with a benchmark return.\(^10\)

A model that incorporates downside risk as the measure of risk is expressed in the following equation in U.S. Dollars:

\[
k_{e,\text{local}} = R_{f,U.S.} + \left( \frac{DR_i}{DR_w} \right) \times RP_w
\]

Where:

- \(k_{e,\text{local}}\) = Discount rate for equity capital in local country
- \(R_{f,U.S.}\) = U.S. risk-free rate
- \(DR_i\) = Downside risk (i.e., semi-deviation with respect to the mean) of returns in the local stock market \(i\) (measured in terms of U.S. Dollar returns)
- \(DR_w\) = Downside risk (i.e., semi-deviation with respect to the mean) of returns in the global (“world”) stock market index (measured in terms of U.S. Dollar returns)
- \(RP_w\) = General market risk premium in global (“world”) stock market index

If we are estimating expected returns in terms of U.S. Dollars, this discount rate can be used for discounting expected net cash flows expressed in U.S. Dollars (with the exchange risk treated preferably in the expected cash flows or, alternatively, as an adjustment to the discount rate).

The semi-deviation of returns in the local stock market index (average of squared deviation of downside returns realized in the local market minus the average returns of the local market) is \(DR_i\), while \(DR_w\) is the semi-deviation of returns in a global stock market index (average of squared deviation of downside returns realized in the global index minus the average returns of the global index).\(^11\)

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A possible alternative downside risk measure to the preceding formula is using downside betas. This would entail replacing the downside risk ratio \( DR_i/DR_w \) shown in the preceding formula with a downside beta calculated for the subject country relative to the world market portfolio. The downside beta can be calculated in a few different ways, including using the following formula:

\[
\beta_i^D = \frac{\text{Cosemivariance}(R_i, R_w)}{\text{Semivariance}(R_w)}
\]

Where:

- \( \beta_i^D \) = Downside beta for local country \( i \)
- \( \text{Cosemivariance}(R_i, R_w) \) = Cosemivariance of returns (a.k.a. downside covariance) between the local country \( i \) and the global ("world") stock market index (all measured in terms of U.S. Dollar returns)
- \( \text{Semivariance}(R_w) \) = Semivariance of returns (i.e., square of the semi-deviation with respect to the mean) on the global ("world") stock market index (measured in terms of U.S. Dollar returns)

The advantages of the model are its theoretical foundations and empirical support.\(^{12}\) The downside beta has received some support in the literature. That is, portfolios of company stocks with high downside betas realize greater returns than portfolios of company stocks with low downside betas, consistent with the theory of CAPM.\(^{13}\)

However, more recent research has cast doubt on some of these findings, at least when applied to developed markets. Using six distinct measures of downside risk, including downside beta, the authors analyzed the relationship between downside risk and the cross-section of equity returns for 26 developed markets. They found that there is no significantly positive relation between systematic downside risk and the cross-section of equity returns, and in fact, this relation is mostly negative.\(^{14}\)

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From a practical standpoint, this model has gained limited acceptance in part due to limited published data on downside risk measures. In addition, the use of a country downside beta may or may not fully capture the incremental risk of investing in a given emerging market. To test this assertion, we have updated Professor Estrada’s calculations of downside betas by country (through December 2022) as fully explained in his 2007 academic paper.15

As background, Professor Estrada (2007) showed empirical evidence for developed and emerging markets, which supported downside beta as a superior measure of risk relative to CAPM’s beta when estimating required returns for emerging markets. Countries were categorized as “developed” or “emerging” based on MSCI’s market classification. Professor Estrada found that on average, downside beta generated a higher required return for emerging markets (as a group) than for developed markets (as a group). In contrast, average required returns on equity based on textbook CAPM were approximately the same for both groups of countries (i.e., the average OLS beta for developed markets was virtually the same as that for emerging markets).

We have updated the same type of analysis as in Estrada (2007) through December 2022, expanding it to include frontier markets. Again, the categorization of developed, emerging, and frontier markets was based on MSCI classification as of December 2022. Monthly return data from the MSCI database were used for developed markets and frontier markets. All returns were measured in U.S. Dollars and accounted for both capital gains and dividends (i.e., total returns).

Exhibit 2.2 depicts the same 60-month OLS CAPM betas as of December 2022 for developed countries (the solid blue line) and frontier markets (the solid green line) shown in Exhibit 2.1, again sorted from smallest betas (on the left) to largest betas (on the right). In Exhibit 2.2 we have added an additional line: the 60-month downside betas for frontier markets (the dashed gray line) are sorted and presented in a similar fashion. The result of this analysis is shown in Exhibit 2.2.

Exhibit 2.2: MSCI Developed Markets’ OLS Betas and Frontier Markets’ OLS and Downside Betas as Measured over the 60-month Period Ending December 31, 2022

Source of underlying data: MSCI: All returns are based on MSCI indices, in U.S. Dollars, and accounting for capital gains/losses and dividends. The classification of developed and frontier markets corresponds to the countries in the MSCI indices of developed and frontier markets as of December 2022. MSCI Developed Markets represented in this analysis by: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States, and the United Kingdom. MSCI Frontier Markets represented in this analysis by: Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Croatia, Estonia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lithuania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, and Vietnam. The market benchmark used in the calculation of all betas is the MSCI ACWI IMI. All rights reserved; used with permission. All calculations by Kroll.

As discussed previously, the OLS betas of the countries classified as “frontier” markets (the solid green line) are nearly always lower than the OLS betas of “developed” markets (the solid blue line in Exhibit 2.2), which we previously concluded runs counter to investors’ relative risk perceptions between these two groups of countries. The downside betas of frontier markets (the dashed light gray line), while doing a better job of estimating risk than the OLS betas of frontier markets, are still lower than the OLS betas of developed markets for about half of countries shown in Exhibit 2.2.

Exhibit 2.3 provides the summary statistics about the graph in Exhibit 2.2. Observations about the information in Exhibit 2.3 include:

- The downside betas of both developed markets and frontier markets are larger than their OLS beta counterparts.
- Downside betas for frontier markets increased significantly more compared to their OLS counterparts than did downside betas for developed markets compared to their OLS counterparts. For example, the average downside beta for developed markets is approximately 10% larger than its OLS counterpart (1.36 versus 1.49), but the average
downside beta for frontier markets is approximately 112% larger than its OLS counterpart (0.66 versus 1.40)

- Frontier market OLS and downside betas are systematically smaller than their developed market counterparts, which runs counter to investors’ relative risk perceptions between these two groups of countries.

**Exhibit 2.3:** Average OLS and Downside Betas for MSCI Developed and Frontier Markets Measured over the 60-Month Period Ending December 31, 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average CAPM (OLS) Beta</th>
<th>Average Downside Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developed Markets</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frontier Markets</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Either because stock markets located in frontier markets tend to exhibit very low liquidity or due to their low degree of integration with global markets (or both), it appears that expected returns of frontier markets have little relation to expected returns in a world market portfolio, even when risk is measured by downside beta.\(^\text{16}\) In fact, researchers have concluded that there is a low level of integration of frontier equity markets into the global market, even after the 2008–2009 global financial crisis.\(^\text{17}\) Nonetheless, these analyses suggest that downside betas may do a better job at capturing the risk of emerging and frontier markets, when compared to textbook CAPM (OLS) betas.

**What Model Should I Use?**

There is no consensus among academics and practitioners as to the best model to use in estimating the cost of equity capital in a global environment, particularly with regards to companies operating in emerging economies.

In choosing a model, the goal is to balance several objectives:

- **Acceptance and use:** The model has a degree of acceptance, and the model is actually used by valuation analysts.

- **Data Availability:** Quality data are available for consistent and objective application of the model.

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\(^{16}\) There could be other reasons why frontier markets’ OLS and downside betas are sometimes lower than those of developed markets over the period analyzed, which we do not explore in this publication.

\(^{17}\) Zaremba, Adam, and Alina Maydybura. "The cross-section of returns in frontier equity markets: Integrated or segmented pricing?" *Emerging Markets Review* 38 (2019): 219-238. The authors studied data for 22 frontier markets classified according to MSCI.
• **Simplicity:** The model’s underlying concepts are understandable and can be explained in plain language.

There are several common approaches to incorporating country factors into a cost of equity capital estimate. None are perfect.

**Economic Integration**

A key issue in choosing an international cost of capital estimation model is the degree to which the subject country is integrated into the global economy. An integrated economy has a significant portion of inputs and outputs of its economy that are sourced and sold internationally rather than locally. If all economies were fully integrated, it might be reasonable to expect that similar companies or projects located in different countries would have similar costs of capital.

However, the economies of developed countries are generally integrated into the global economy to a greater degree than are less-developed countries. Choosing the appropriate model(s) for estimating the cost of equity capital for a company or project in a less developed country (i.e., “emerging” and “frontier” countries), where local market volatility may become more important, is indeed an ongoing challenge.

We present a brief overview of models more commonly used for estimating the cost of equity capital in international settings. None of these models are perfect, so it is important to understand the strengths and potential weaknesses of each model in order to make well-informed choices when developing cost of capital estimates for global investments.

Exhibit 2.4 presents a summary of the general strengths and weaknesses of various international cost of equity capital models. In cases where countries lack stock and/or bond market return data, or yields on government debt denominated in “home” (or mature market) currencies, it may be appropriate to correlate the subject country’s credit (or risk) rating with ratings of other countries that do have these metrics.\(^{18}\)

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\(^{18}\) Country risk ratings are available from Fitch Solutions’ BMI or Political Risk Services’ *International Country Risk Guide*. Country risk ratings were previously also available from Euromoney’s Country Risk Ratings.
## Exhibit 2.4: A Comparison of International Cost of Capital Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Cost of Capital Model</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World (Global) CAPM Model</td>
<td>Can work well if country is integrated and/or the subject company operates in many countries.</td>
<td>Assumes away meaningful differences across countries. Generally requires the &quot;local&quot; country to have a history of bond market and stock market returns. Does not work well in emerging markets: generally results in lower betas for companies located in emerging markets, counter to expectations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Country CAPM Model</td>
<td>Allows more local factors to be introduced.</td>
<td>Does not work well in emerging markets. Generally requires the &quot;local&quot; country to have a history of bond market and stock market returns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damodaran Model</td>
<td>Introduces a measure of economic integration at the company level.</td>
<td>Complexity. Generally requires the &quot;local&quot; country to have a history of bond market and stock market returns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country (Sovereign) Yield Spread Model</td>
<td>Intuitive / easily implemented.</td>
<td>Requires that the &quot;local&quot; government issues debt denominated in the &quot;home&quot; government's currency. However, this can be overcome by using a regression of observed yield spreads against country risk ratings. May double count (or underestimate) business cash flow risks, particularly if the default risk of a given country is not a good proxy for the risks faced by the subject company operating locally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Volatility Model</td>
<td>Intuitive / easily implemented.</td>
<td>Does not work well in countries that do not have well-diversified stock markets. Requires the &quot;local&quot; country to have a history of stock market returns. Results are sensitive to the period selected to compute standards deviation of returns. At times does not work well for even the most developed countries resulting in implied adjustments far in excess of what would be expected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Credit Rating Model</td>
<td>Intuitive / can be applied to a significant number of countries.</td>
<td>Complexity Requires access to quality stock market return data from a large number of countries. Stock market data and country credit rating data is more frequently available for countries that are more developed, which may bias the results. Results are sensitive to the period chosen over which the regression is performed. The country credit ratings used as inputs in the CCR Model are (at least in part) based on qualitative factors that are subject to judgement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 3
International Equity Risk Premia

Description of Data

The Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module at costofcapital.kroll.com includes historical equity risk premia (ERPs) estimates for 28 world economies.¹ ²

Long-horizon historical ERPs are calculated in terms of each country’s “local” currency. In the case of the United States, the “local” currency is the U.S. Dollar, and so the long-horizon ERP is calculated only once, and labeled “in U.S. Dollars”, which is also the “local” currency.

The time horizon over which each country’s ERPs are calculated is dependent on data availability, and for most countries analyzed the time horizon is 1970–Present³. However, Canada and the United Kingdom are calculated over the time horizons 1919–Present and 1900–Present respectively. Note that if the analyst wishes to select a long-term ERP measured over the same time horizon as the majority of the other subject countries’ long-term historical ERPs are measured in Exhibit 1 (1970–Present in most cases), that information is still provided in the Canada, U.K., and U.S. long-term ERP tables.

The ERPs in the International Cost of Capital Module:

• Were calculated using the same general data sources that were used to calculate the ERPs previously published in the Ibbotson Associates/Morningstar International Equity Risk Premia Report.⁴

• Were calculated using the same general methodologies that were used to calculate the ERPs previously published in the Ibbotson Associates/Morningstar International Equity Risk Premia Report.

In estimating historical equity risk premia in the fashion previously reported in the Ibbotson Associates/Morningstar International Equity Risk Premium Report and now reported in the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module, changes in methodology and data were made to improve the analysis, and to strengthen internal consistency. This was primarily accomplished by:

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¹ Historical ERPs for 16 countries are calculated annually as of December 31.
² “Premia” is the plural of premium. A single equity risk premium is denoted “ERP”; the plural equity risk premia is denoted “ERPs”.
³ The 1970–Present ERP for the United States is available in the International Cost of Capital Module. The U.S. Historical ERP is calculated over 1926–Present in the U.S. Cost of Capital Module.
⁴ The Ibbotson Associates/Morningstar International Equity Risk Premia Report was discontinued in 2013.
• Minimizing the number of index “families” used (e.g., MSCI, IMF, DMS) to standardize the analysis and to increase internal consistency.

• Using the same (or similar) time horizons over which ERP estimates were estimated.

• Eliminating analysis for countries that had data histories which were likely not long enough to provide meaningful historical ERP estimates.⁵

A summary of the 16 countries for which historical ERPs are calculated, the currencies in which they are calculated, and the time periods over which they are calculated is presented in Exhibit 3.1.

**Exhibit 3.1: Countries Covered, Currencies, and Time Periods**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Local Currency</th>
<th>Currency Code</th>
<th>USD Long-Horizon Start Date</th>
<th>Local Currency Long-Horizon Start Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Australian Dollar</td>
<td>AUD</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Euro</td>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Euro</td>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Canadian Dollar</td>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Euro</td>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Euro</td>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Euro</td>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Euro</td>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Yen</td>
<td>JPY</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Euro</td>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>New Zealand Dollar</td>
<td>NZD</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Rand</td>
<td>ZAR</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1970</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>Euro</td>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Swiss Franc</td>
<td>CHF</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Pound Sterling</td>
<td>GBP</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>U.S. Dollar</td>
<td>USD</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>1926</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁵ A total of 10 countries’ ERP estimates that were previously reported in the Morningstar/Ibbotson 2013 *International Equity Risk Report* were eliminated from the analyses presented herein due to insufficient data. The countries eliminated were Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Malaysia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, and Thailand.
U.S. SBBI® Long-term Government Bond Series Data Revision (immaterial)

Morningstar reported data revisions in January 2016 and spring 2021 to the “SBBI® Long-term Government Bond” total return and income series, which are inputs in the calculation of U.S. long-term ERP estimates herein. These data revisions were small and did not materially affect U.S. ERP calculations. For more information, see the Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module’s “Resources Library” section.

Methodology

The Equity Risk Premium (ERP)

The ERP (often interchangeably referred to as the market risk premium) is defined as the extra return (over the expected yield on risk-free securities) that investors expect to receive from an investment in the market portfolio of common stocks, represented by a broad-based market index (e.g., the S&P 500 Index in the United States). A risk-free rate is the return available, as of the valuation date, on a security that the market generally regards as free of the risk of default (e.g., a U.S. Treasury security in the United States). The risk-free rate and the ERP are interrelated concepts. All ERP estimates are, by definition, developed in relation to the risk-free rate.

Calculating Historical ERP

There is no single universally accepted methodology for estimating the ERP. A wide variety of premia are used in practice and recommended by academics and financial professionals. These differences are often due to differences in how ERP is estimated. Generally, we can categorize approaches for estimating the ERP as either an ex post approach (based on actual results) or an ex ante approach (based on forecasts).

For example, some valuation analysts define expected returns on common stocks in terms of averages of realized (historical) single-period returns while others define expected returns on common stocks in terms of realized (i.e., historical) multi-year compound returns. These are ex post approaches. Some valuation analysts estimate the ERP using the returns on the diversified portfolio implied by expected (future) stock prices or expected dividends. These are ex ante approaches.

The ERPs herein are all calculated using an ex post approach: the examination of the historical relationship between equities (i.e., stocks) and a “risk-free” security. For example, the long-term historical average annual return of stocks in Belgium as represented by the MSCI Belgium equities total return index (in terms of Euros) over the time period 1970–2020 is 12.59%, and the

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7 No security is truly “risk-free”. A risk-free rate is the return available on a security that the market generally regards as free of the risk of default, and thus useable as a proxy for a risk-free security. For example, for a valuation denominated in U.S. Dollars (USD), analysts typically use the valuation date yield-to-maturity on a U.S. government security as a proxy for the risk-free rate.
historical average annual return of a long-horizon risk-free security in Belgium (also in terms of Euros) as represented by a long-horizon risk-free return index for Belgium over the same period is 6.34%, implying a long-term ERP of 6.25%:

“Historical” ERP = Average Annual Return of Stocks – Average Annual Return of Risk-free Security

6.25% = 12.59% - 6.34%

Equity Returns

The same “family” of equity indices is used in the analyses presented herein in order to maximize internal consistency. The primary source of equity total returns used in this analysis is MSCI Global Equity Indexes.8,9,10

The MSCI Total Return Indexes “measure the price performance of markets with the income from constituent dividend payments. The MSCI Daily Total Return (DTR) Methodology reinvests an index constituent’s dividends at the close of trading on the day the security is quoted ex-dividend (the ex-date)”. In all cases for which an MSCI equity index is available, the MSCI Total Return Indexes (with gross dividends) is used.11

There are five countries for which MSCI equity data was used, but only in part: Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, and the U.K. In these five cases, Dimson, Marsh, Staunton (DMS) equity returns data was used in earlier years (1919–1969 in the case of Canada, 1970–1987 in the case of Ireland and New Zealand; 1970–1992 in the case of South Africa, and 1900–1969 in the case of the U.K.)12 MSCI equity returns data was then used for the respective remainder of the years through 2022, for each of these five countries.

There is one country for which MSCI equity data was not used: the United States. For the U.S., equity returns are represented herein by the S&P 500 Index. The reason for this is straightforward: in the Cost of Capital Navigator (and in the former Valuation Handbook – U.S. Guide to Cost of Capital as well as the former SBBI® Yearbook), the series used to represent U.S. equities is (and

8 MSCI market-cap-weighted indexes are among the most respected and widely used benchmarks in the financial industry. Collectively, they provide detailed equity market coverage for more than 80 countries across developed, emerging and frontier markets, representing 99% of these investable opportunity sets. For more information, see: https://www.msci.com/market-cap-weighted-indexes.

9 MSCI equity series were also the primary series used in the former Morningstar/Ibbotson “International Equity Risk Premium Report”.

10 Source of MSCI Equity Indexes used: Morningstar, Inc. Used with permission. All rights reserved. To learn more about Morningstar, visit www.corporate.morningstar.com.

11 Gross total return indices reinvest as much as possible of a company's dividend distributions. The reinvested amount is equal to the total dividend amount distributed to persons residing in the country of the dividend-paying company. Gross total return indices do not, however, include any tax credits. See http://www.msci.com/indexes.

12 The Dimson, Marsh, Staunton data are summarized in the Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2023 (Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2023) by Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton. Copyright © Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton. All rights reserved. Used with Permission. Duff & Phelps has a data license to the full DMS dataset through Morningstar Inc.
was) the S&P 500 Index (unless otherwise stated). While it would be internally consistent to use the MSCI U.S. equity series within the historical equity risk premium analysis presented herein (since all the other countries’ equity returns are represented primarily by MSCI indices), doing so would be inconsistent with (i) Kroll’s other published valuation data resources, and (ii) what most analysts use to represent U.S. equities (the S&P 500).13,14

Currency translation is used only in cases for which MSCI does not supply a raw series in the appropriate currency. Specifically, the raw index data from MSCI is used, if available in the required currency. For example, MSCI creates a total return series for Belgium equities in USD, and so that series is used in the calculations and no additional currency translations are required for this series. When translation does become necessary (i.e., MSCI provides a total return series for the equity data needed, but the series is not denominated in the currency needed), the currencies are translated using the same currency conversion data and methodology that was utilized in the former Ibbotson Associates/Morningstar International Equity Risk Premium Report.15,16

Risk-free Returns (long-horizon)

The primary data source used in the construction of long-horizon risk-free returns is from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).17,18,19 Long-horizon government income return series constructed in this fashion are available for all 16 of the countries shown in Exhibit 3.1.

There is one country for which long-horizon risk free series based on IMF data were not used: the United States. For the U.S., long-horizon risk free returns are represented by the “SBBI® U.S. Long-Term Government Income Return” series.20 The reason for this is straightforward: in the

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13 The S&P 500 total return index was also used to represent U.S. equities in the former Morningstar/Ibbotson “International Equity Risk Premium Report”. In the Cost of Capital Navigator, the United States long-horizon equity risk premia is also calculated from 1926 to 2021 using the S&P 500 total return index.

14 In any case, a side-by-side analysis of the equity risk premium data over the full time-horizon presented here is calculated using (i) the S&P 500 index and the SBBI® U.S. LT Gov’t income return index and (ii) MSCI U.S. equity index and IMF U.S. LT Gov’t income return index produces very similar results.

15 Source of currency conversion data: Morningstar Direct database.

16 MSCI provides a total return equity series in USD for each of the 16 countries presented herein, and so for these series no currency translation was required.

17 The “IMF Long-Term World Government Bonds” are computed by Duff & Phelps using yields from the IMF. These IMF government bond yields have long-term maturities and vary from country to country. Returns are calculated assuming a single bond is bought at par (i.e., the coupon equals the market yield) at the beginning of each period. The bond is “held” over the period, and "sold" at the end of the period at the then-prevailing market yield. The end-of-period price is calculated as a function of the coupon, yield, and maturity remaining at period-end. The return in excess of yield (capital appreciation) is then derived as the change in price over the period, divided by the beginning-of-period price (i.e., divided by par). The yield is converted to an income return by (dividing it by 12) lagging it one period. Total return is equal to the income return plus the return in excess of yield.

18 Beginning in 2018, the “IMF-Long-term World Government Bonds” are now computed in house (i.e., by the Duff & Phelps Valuation Digital Services team) using yields from the IMF, Reserve Bank of Australia, European Central Bank, Bank of Canada, Federal Reserve of St. Louis, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Swiss National Bank, and the Bank of England. NOTE: this is (i) the exact same historical data, and (ii) methodology that Morningstar used in the past. Duff & Phelps cross-checked the data, methodology, and results with Morningstar.

19 These same series were the primary series used for long-horizon risk-free rates in the former Morningstar/Ibbotson International Equity Risk Premium Report.

20 Source: Morningstar, Inc. Used with permission. All rights reserved.
Cost of Navigator (and in the former Valuation Handbook – U.S. Guide to Cost of Capital as well as former SBBI® Yearbook), the series used to represent U.S. long-horizon risk-free returns is (and was) the SBBI® U.S. Long Term Government Income Return series (unless otherwise stated). While it would be internally consistent to use the long-horizon risk-free series based on IMF data within the historical equity risk premium analyses presented herein (since all the other countries’ long-horizon risk-free returns are represented primarily by these series), doing so would be inconsistent with Duff & Phelps’ other published valuation data resources.\(^{21}\)

**Description of Data Series Used\(^{22}\)**

**Australia**

**Equity Series:** The equity series used is the MSCI Australia Index.\(^{23}\) The MSCI Australia Index is designed to measure the performance of the large and mid-cap segments of the Australian market. With 63 constituents, the index covers approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in Australia.

**Long-Horizon Risk-free Rate:** The long-horizon risk-free series used is the IMF Australia Long-term Government Income Return series. The IMF Australia Long-term Government Income Return series assesses secondary market yields on non-rebate bonds with maturity of 10 years. Yields are calculated before brokerage and on the last business day of the month. The average maturity for the IMF Australia Long-term Government Income Return series is 10 years.

**Austria**

**Equity Series:** The equity series used is the MSCI Austria Index. The MSCI Austria Index is designed to measure the performance of the large and mid-cap segments of the Austrian market. With 5 constituents, the index covers approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in Austria.

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\(^{21}\) The SBBI® U.S. Long-Term Government Income Return series was also used to represent the U.S. long-horizon risk-free rate in the former Ibbotson Associates/Morningstar International Equity Risk Premium Report.

\(^{22}\) The descriptions of the equity series and risk-free series are from the following sources: (i) Morningstar Direct database; (ii) MSCI database; (iii) Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2021 (Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2021) by Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, Staunton; (iv) International Monetary Fund (IMF) database. All series data was accessed using the Morningstar Direct database, except for the long-term IMF government bond series yield data that is used to construct the IMF long-term government income series. Beginning in 2018, the “IMF Long-term World Government Bonds” are now computed in house (i.e., by the Duff & Phelps Business Publications team) using yields from the IMF, Reserve Bank of Australia, European Central Bank, Bank of Canada, Federal Reserve of St. Louis, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Swiss National Bank, and the Bank of England. NOTE: this is (i) the exact same historical data, and (ii) methodology that Morningstar used in the past. Duff & Phelps cross-checked the data, methodology, and results with Morningstar. To learn more about Morningstar, visit www.corporate.morningstar.com.

\(^{23}\) In all cases in this section, the MSCI indices used are “GR” (i.e., gross return) MSCI indices. MSCI “GR” equity indices account for both capital gains and dividends (i.e., “total” returns).
**Long-Horizon Risk-free Rate:** The long-horizon risk-free series used the IMF Austria Long-term Government Income Return series. This series refers to all government bonds issued and not yet redeemed. They are weighted with the share of each bond in the total value of the government bonds in circulation. The data include bonds benefiting from tax privileges under the tax reduction scheme. The average maturity for the IMF Austria Long-term Government Income Return series is 10 years.

**Belgium**

**Equity Series:** The equity series used is the MSCI Belgium Index. The MSCI Belgium Index is designed to measure the performance of the large-, mid-, and small-cap segments of the Belgian market. With 12 constituents, the index covers approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in Belgium.

**Long-Horizon Risk-free Rate:** The long-horizon risk-free series used is the IMF Belgium Long-term Government Income Return series. Prior to 1990, this series was represented by a weighted average yield to maturity of all 5–8 percent bonds issued after December 1962 with more than 5 years to maturity. From 1990 onward, this series was represented by the yield on 10-year government bonds. The average maturity for the IMF Belgium Long-term Government Income Return series is 10 years.

**Canada**

**Equity Series:** From 1919 to 1969, the equity series used is Dimson, Marsh, Staunton (DMS) equity returns for Canada. The main data source for DMS equity returns for Canada from 1926 forward is Panjer and Tan (2002). Prior to 1926, the primary source for DMS equity returns for Canada was the equity returns series produced by Moore (2012). From 1970 to present, the equity series used is the MSCI Canada GR Index (total return) series. The MSCI Canada Index is designed to measure the performance of the large and mid-cap segments of the Canada market. With 89 constituents, the index covers approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in Canada.

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Long-Horizon Risk-free Rate: From 1919 to 1957, long-term government securities data from the Bank of Canada Data and Statistics Office were used. From 1958 to present, the long horizon risk-free series used is the IMF Canada Long-term Government Income Return series, calculated from government bond yield issues with original maturity of 10 years or more. It is calculated based on average yield to maturity.

France

Equity Series: The equity series used is the MSCI France Index. The MSCI France Index is designed to measure the performance of the large and mid-cap segments of the French market. With 69 constituents, the index covers approximately 85% of the equity universe in France.

Long-Horizon Risk-free Rate: The long-horizon risk-free series used is the IMF France Long-term Government Income Return series. The series uses average yield to maturity on public sector bonds with original maturities of more than 5 years. Monthly yields are based on weighted averages on weekly data. Prior to April 1991, the data are average yields to maturity on bonds with original maturities of 15 to 20 years, issued on behalf of the Treasury by the Consortium of Credit for Public Works. Between April 1991 and December 1998, the data are average yields to maturity on bonds with residual maturities between 9 and 10 years. From January 1999 onward, monthly data are arithmetic averages of daily gross yields to maturity of the fixed coupon 10-year Treasury benchmark bond (last issued bond beginning from the date when it becomes the most-traded issue among government securities with residual maturities between 9 and 10 years), based on prices in the official wholesale market. The average maturity for the IMF France Long-term Government Income Return series is 10 years.

Germany

Equity Series: The equity series used is the MSCI Germany GR Index (total return) series. The MSCI Germany Index is designed to measure the performance of the large and mid-cap segments of the German market. With 61 constituents, the index covers approximately 85% of the equity universe in Germany.

Long-Horizon Risk-free Rate: The long-horizon risk-free series used is the IMF Germany Long-term Government Income Return series. From 1970 to 1979, the bonds issued by the federal government, the railways, the portal system, the Lander government, municipalities, specific-purpose public associations, and other public associations established under special legislation are used to compose this series. This series is calculated based upon the average yields on all bonds with remaining maturity of more than 3 years, weighted by the amount of individual bonds.


in circulation. On January 1980, the series was changed to comprise of yields on listed federal securities that can be traded on the German Financial Futures and Options Exchange (DTB) with a remaining maturity of 9 and 10 years. The average maturity for the IMF Germany Long-term Government Income Return series is 10 years.

Ireland

**Equity Series:** From 1970 to 1987, the equity series used is the DMS Ireland Index. The DMS equity return data for Ireland is comprised of the Irish CSO Price Index of Ordinary Stocks and Shares and Irish Stock Exchange Equity (ISEQ) total return index. From 1988 to present, the equity series used is MSCI Ireland GR Index (total return) series. The MSCI Ireland Index is designed to measure the performance of the large-, mid- and small-cap segments of the Irish market. With 5 constituents, the index covers approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in Ireland.

**Long-Horizon Risk-free Rate:** The long-horizon risk-free series used is the IMF Ireland Long-term Government Income Return series. This series uses secondary market yields of government bonds with a 10-year maturity.

Italy

**Equity Series:** The equity series used is the MSCI Index. The MSCI Italy Index is designed to measure the performance of the large and mid-cap segments of the Italian market. With 25 constituents, the index covers approximately 85% of the equity universe in Italy.

**Long-Horizon Risk-free Rate:** The long-horizon risk-free series used is the IMF Italy Long-term Government Income Return series. Prior to 1980, the data is derived from average yields to maturity on bonds with original maturities of 15 to 20 years, issued on behalf of the Treasury by the Consortium of Credit for Public Works. Beginning January 1980, average yield to maturity on bonds with residual maturities between 9 and 10 years is used. From January 1999 to present, monthly data are arithmetic averages of daily gross yields to maturity of the fixed coupon 10 year Treasury benchmark bond (last issued bond beginning from the date when it becomes the most traded issue among government securities with residual maturities between 9 and 10 years), based on prices in the official wholesale market. The average maturity for the IMF Italy Long-term Government Income Return is 17.5 years.

Japan

**Equity Series:** The equity series used is the MSCI Japan Index. The MSCI Japan Index is designed to measure the performance of the large and mid-cap segments of the Japanese market. With 259 constituents, the index covers approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in Japan.
**Long-Horizon Risk-free Rate:** The long-horizon risk-free series used is the IMF Japan Long-term Government Income Return series. This series is based on the arithmetic yield on newly issued government bonds with 10-year maturity. The monthly series are compiled from closing (end-of-month) prices quoted on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The average maturity for the IMF Japan Long-term Government Income Return series is 7 years.

**Netherlands**

**Equity Series:** The equity series used is the MSCI Netherlands Index. The MSCI Netherlands Index is designed to measure the performance of the large-cap and mid-cap segments of the Netherlands market. With 23 constituents, the index covers approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in Netherlands.

**Long-Horizon Risk-free Rate:** The long-horizon risk-free series used the IMF Netherlands Long-term Government Income Return series. This series is based on the yield of the most recent 10-year government bond. The average maturity for the IMF Netherlands Long-term Government Income Return series is 10 years.

**New Zealand**

**Equity Series:** From 1970 to 1987, the equity series used is the DMS New Zealand Index. The DMS equity return data for New Zealand comprises the Reserve Bank of New Zealand index, the Datex Index, and the New Zealand Stock Exchange gross index. From 1988 to present, the equity series used is the MSCI New Zealand Index. The MSCI New Zealand Index is designed to measure the performance of the large and mid-cap segments of the New Zealand market. With 6 constituents, the index covers approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in New Zealand.

**Long-Horizon Risk-free Rate:** The long horizon risk-free series used the IMF New Zealand Long-term Government Income Return series. The average maturity for the IMF New Zealand Long-term Government Income Return series is 10 years.

**South Africa**

**Equity Series:** From 1970 to 1992, the equity series used is DMS South Africa Index. The DMS equity return data for South Africa is comprised of the Rand Daily Mail Industrial Index and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Actuaries Equity Index. From 1993 to present, the equity series used is the MSCI South Africa Index. The MSCI South Africa Index is designed to measure the performance of the large and mid-cap segments of the South African market. With 38 constituents, the index covers approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in South Africa.
**Long-Horizon Risk-free Rate:** The long-horizon risk-free series used is the IMF South Africa Long-term Government Income Return series. The average maturity for the IMF South Africa Long-term Government Income Return series is 10 years.

**Spain**

**Equity Series:** The equity series used is the MSCI Spain Index series. The MSCI Spain Index is designed to measure the performance of the large and mid-cap segments of the Spanish market. With 18 constituents, the index covers about 85% of the equity universe in Spain.

**Long-Horizon Risk-free Rate:** The long-horizon risk-free series used is the IMF Euro Area Long-term Government Income Return series. This series is based on the Euro Area yield for 10 year government bonds calculated on the basis of harmonized national government bond yields weighted by GDP. The average maturity for the IMF Euro Area Long-term Government Income Return series is 10 years.

**Switzerland**

**Equity Series:** The equity series used is the MSCI Switzerland Index (total return) series. The MSCI Switzerland Index is designed to measure the performance of the large and mid-cap segments of the Swiss market. With 41 constituents, the index covers approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in Switzerland.

**Long Horizon Risk-free Rate:** The long-horizon risk-free series used is the IMF Switzerland Long-term Government Income Return series. Prior to 1987, the data is derived from yields on 15-year government bonds. Beginning January 1987, the series uses secondary market yields on 10-year bonds. The average maturity for the IMF Switzerland Long-term Government Income Return series is 10 years.

**United Kingdom**

**Equity Series:** From 1900–1969, the equity series used is DMS United Kingdom Equity Total Return. The main data source for DMS equity returns for the U.K. over the period 1955–1969 is the fully representative record of equity prices maintained by London Business School. For earlier periods (specifically, 1900–1954), an index comprised of the largest 100 firms by market capitalization was constructed using share price data collected from the *Financial Times*.

From 1970 to present, the equity series used is the MSCI United Kingdom Index. The MSCI United Kingdom Index is designed to measure the performance of the large-cap and mid cap segments

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28 For detailed index construction methodology, see Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2021 (Credit Suisse, 2021), pages 209–210.
of the U.K. market. With 84 constituents, the index covers approximately 85% of the free float adjusted market capitalization in the U.K.

**Long-Horizon Risk-free Rate:** From 1900–1969, the long-horizon risk-free series is based upon “gilt” redemption yields available from the Bank of England as a proxy for income returns. From 1970 to present, the long horizon risk-free series used is the IMF U.K. Long-term Government Income Return series. The average maturity for the IMF U.K. Long-term Government Income Return series is 20 years. These are theoretical gross redemption bond yields.

**United States**

**Equity Series:** U.S. equities are represented by the Standard & Poor’s S&P 500® Index (total return) series. The S&P 500 Index is a readily available, carefully constructed, market-value-weighted benchmark of common stock performance. Market-value-weighted means that the weight of each stock in the index, for a given month, is proportionate to its market capitalization (price times the number of shares outstanding) at the beginning of that month. Currently, this composite index includes 500 of the largest stocks (in terms of stock market value) in the United States; prior to March 1957 it consisted of 90 of the largest stocks.

**Long-Horizon Risk-free Rate:** The long-horizon risk-free series used is the SBBI® U.S. Long term Government Income Return series. The total returns on long-term government bonds from 1977 to present are constructed with data from the *Wall Street Journal*. The data from 1926–1976 are obtained from the Government Bond File at the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business. To the greatest extent possible, a one-bond portfolio with a term of approximately 20 years and a reasonably current coupon whose returns did not reflect potential tax benefits, impaired negotiability, or special redemption or call privileges was used each year. Where “flower” bonds (tenderable to the Treasury at par in payment of estate taxes) had to be used, the bond with the smallest potential tax benefit was chosen. Where callable bonds had to be used, the term of the bond was assumed to be a simple average of the maturity and first call dates minus the current date. The bond was “held” for the calendar year and returns were computed. From 1977 to present, the income return is calculated as the change in flat price plus any coupon actually paid from one period to the next, holding the yield constant over the period. As in the total return series, the exact number of days comprising the period is used. From 1926–1976, the income return for a given month is calculated as the total return minus the capital appreciation return.

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29 “Redemption” yield of a gilt is a measure of the return implicit in its prevailing market price, assuming that the gilt is held to maturity and that all cash flows are reinvested back into the gilt.

30 Historical average conventional gilt yields are provided, these being calculated as the average daily close of business yields for the prevailing short, medium, long and ultra-long dated benchmark gilts for each month since April 1998. Average daily yields for 2½% Consolidated Stock are available on an annual basis from 1727 to 2015. To learn more, visit: https://www.dmo.gov.uk/data/ExportReport?reportCode=D4H.
Currency Translation

Currency translation is used only in cases in which a series not in the needed currency (specifically, USD or “local”) is available.

**Equities:** MSCI provides a total return equity series in USD for each of the 16 countries presented here, and so for these series no currency translation was required. MSCI provides a total return equity series in local for each of the 16 countries presented here, and so for these series no currency translation was required. Dimson, Marsh, Staunton (DMS) total return equity series were available in USD and local, and so for these series no currency translation was required.

**Risk-free Rates:** Long-term IMF risk free series in local currency were available, and so for these series no currency translation was required. These series were then translated into USD currency.\(^{31}\) Short-term Dimson, Marsh, Staunton (DMS) risk-free series were available in USD and local, and so for these series no currency translation was required. Exhibit 3.2 provides a summary of the data series used to calculate the historical ERPs presented in the International Cost of Capital Module, “2020 International Equity Risk Premia” (next page), as an example. More recent data is now available.

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\(^{31}\) Source of currency conversion data: Morningstar, Inc. Used with permission. All rights reserved. Exchange rate sources (as reported by Morningstar): 1960–1987 Main Economic Indicators Historical Statistics (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development); 1988–present the Wall Street Journal.
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Long-Horizon ERP Start Date</th>
<th>Short-Horizon ERP Start Date</th>
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<th>Short-Horizon Risk-Free Series</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1988–2019 MSCI Ireland GR</td>
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<td>IA SBBI U.S. 30 Day Tbill</td>
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How to Use the International ERP Tables

The previous Morningstar/Ibbotson *International Equity Risk Premium Report* included large “wedge” tables in which historical ERP estimates were calculated over all possible start-year and end-year combinations (e.g., ERPs calculated over the time horizon 1970–2020, 1984 1995, or 1976–1977). While this presentation was complete, one could argue that ERPs calculated over many of these possible time horizons are extraneous, and not very informative.

For this reason, the historical ERP estimates presented include all possible estimates calculated over the (i) longest period available, and then (ii) beginning in years divisible by 5, and finally (iii) the most recent completed calendar year.

For example, Germany has equity return and risk-free rate data available starting in 1970, and so 1970–2020 is the longest period available (see Exhibit 3.3 on the next page). Then, the “starting years divisible by 5” are 1975, 1980, etc. Finally, 2020 is the “most recent completed calendar year”.

Like the previous Morningstar/Ibbotson *International Equity Risk Premium Report*, historical ERPs are calculated in USD and “local” currencies.

Using “Germany Long-Horizon Equity Risk Premia In Local Currency” (see Exhibit 3.3 on the next page), in example “A” the long-horizon historical ERP as measured over the period 1970 (the “start date”) and 2020 (the “end date”) is 5.1%. Alternatively, in example “B” the long-horizon historical ERP as measured over the period 1974 (the “start date”) and 1983 (the “end date”) is 3.6%.

Note that the example shown in Exhibit 3.3 is Germany long-horizon ERP, as calculated in local currency. In the case of Germany, the “local” currency is the Euro, as reported in Exhibit 3.1.

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32 All values are presented in percent format, rounded to one decimal place.
### Exhibit 3.3: Using the Tables (examples using an abbreviated version)

#### Germany Long-Horizon Equity Risk Premia
in Local Currency (Euro, "EUR")
in Percent

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Appendix 3A
Additional Sources of International Equity Risk Premium Data

The Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module at costofcapital.kroll.com includes equity risk premia (ERPs) estimates for 28 economies around the world.\(^1\)\(^,\)\(^2\) Select ERP values are calculated using the same general data sources and methodologies that were used to calculate the ERPs previously published in the Ibbotson Associates/Morningstar International Equity Risk Premia Report.\(^3\)

For completeness, in Appendix 3A we briefly discuss additional sources of international ERP information.

Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton Equity Risk Premia Data

Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (DMS) studied the realized equity returns and equity premia relative to bonds for 21 countries (including the United States) from 1900 to the end of 2022.\(^4\)\(^,\)\(^5\) These authors report the following realized equity risk premia relative to the total return on long-term government bonds for a selection of countries and regions (returns for the three geographic regions are expressed in U.S. Dollars, from a global investor perspective), as illustrated in Exhibit 3A.1.

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1 Historical ERPs for 16 countries are calculated annually as of December 31 of each year. The remaining 12 countries rely on a Eurozone ERP.
2 “Premia” is the plural of premium. A single equity risk premium is denoted “ERP”; the plural equity risk premia is denoted “ERPs”.
3 The Ibbotson Associates/Morningstar International Equity Risk Premia Report was discontinued in 2013.
4 The Dimson, Marsh, Staunton data are summarized in the Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2023 (Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2023) by Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton. Copyright © Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton. All rights reserved. Used with Permission. Elroy Dimson is Chairman of the Centre for Endowment Asset Management at Cambridge Judge Business School, Emeritus Professor of Finance at London Business School, and Chairman of the Academic Advisory Board and Policy Board of FTSE Russell. Paul Marsh is Emeritus Professor of Finance at London Business School. Mike Staunton is Director of the London Share Price Database, a research resource of London Business School, where he produces the London Business School Risk Measurement Service.
5 The Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2023 reports 122-year historical equity risk premia relative to (i) bills and (ii) bonds in Table 10 and Table 11 therein, respectively, for 21 countries and composite indexes for the World, the World ex-USA, Europe, Developed markets, and Emerging markets. The 21 countries for which ERPs are reported are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.
Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton observe larger equity returns earned in the second half of the twentieth century than in the first half due to (i) major / global wars being averted, (ii) corporate cash flows growing faster than investors anticipated (fueled by rapid technological change and unprecedented growth in productivity and efficiency), (iii) transaction and monitoring costs falling (i.e., improved governance) over the course of the century, and (iv) required rates of return on equity declining because of diminished business and investment risks.

The authors conclude that:

- The nearly 9% annualized real return on the world equity index from 1950 to 1999 (or the approximately 7% from 1950–2022) almost certainly exceeded expectations and more than compensated for the poor first half of the 20th century when the annualized real return was just short of 3%;

- Prior to 1950, dividend growth was only positive for three countries (Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S.), in real terms. In contrast, from 1950 to 2022 real dividend growth was positive for 19 of the 21 countries reported (the exceptions were Italy and New Zealand). However, the healthy real dividend growth on the world index post-1950 relied heavily on the contribution of the U.S. market. The authors argue that the positive 1900–2022 average real dividend growth was partly due to “good luck” observed in the post-1950 years, which far outweighed the “bad luck” seen in the first half of the century, and
this trend should not be expected to continue in the future. Alternatively, they argue that the expected dividend yield should be lower than in the past, if one assumes the same (or a higher) real growth rate in dividends. The authors conclude that a dividend yield similar to the 1900–2022 historical average, combined with a real dividend growth rate in excess of 2.1% per year (similar to the post-1950 level) is unlikely.

- The observed increase in the overall price-to-dividend ratio during the past century is attributable to the long-term decrease in the required risk premium. Equity risk became more diversifiable as diversified funds and new industries came into existence, while liquidity (accompanied by a decline in transaction costs) and risk management improved. These developments have likely reduced the required equity premium, but the resulting increase in realized equity returns does not signal an increase in the required ERP going forward. In addition, a further increase in stock prices due to declining barriers to diversification is not a repeatable phenomenon and the price-to-dividend ratio re-rating (i.e., an expansion in this valuation multiple) is not likely to continue into the future.

Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton conclude that downward adjustment to real growth in dividends in the future compared to history is likely and the realized risk premia due to the increase in price-to-dividend ratio are warranted. One can estimate a range of likely forward-looking ERP estimates by adjusting the historical data via (i) a reduction in the expected real growth rate in dividends or (ii) by removing the increase in the price-to-dividend ratio, while keeping the same expected real growth rate in dividends.

**Pablo Fernandez Equity Risk Premia and Risk-free Rate Surveys**

Professor Pablo Fernandez and his co-authors survey “finance and economics professors, analysts and managers,” asking them what risk-free rate and ERP they are using to “calculate the required return to equity in different countries” (the “Fernandez survey”).

In March 2023, Professor Fernandez and his co-authors sent an email to more than 15,000 finance and economics professors, analysts, and managers of companies. By March 31st he had received 1,717 email responses for ERPs and/or risk-free rates used in 2023. This year’s study by Professor Fernandez and his colleagues focused on ERP and risk-free rates for 80 countries.

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7 Pablo Fernandez is professor in the Department of Financial Management at IESE, the graduate business school of the University of Navarra, Spain, and holder of IESE’s Corporate Finance Chair. He is also visiting professor at the Piura (Peru), INALDE (Colombia), IAE (Argentina), IEEM (Uruguay) and IPADE (Mexico) Business Schools.


9 In the 2023 survey there were 1,717 respondent emails received, with 194 of those coming from respondents who said they do not use ERP for one reason or another, leaving 1,523 (1,717 – 194) total respondent emails that included ERP and/or risk-free rate figures. Of the remaining emails, the survey authors excluded the following answers for the reasons listed: 74 because they were considered outliers (i.e., ERP estimate was below 2%), 47 because they were considered confidential, and 36 because the answer only provided either a risk-free rate or an ERP estimate (but not both). This left a universe of 3,812 answers that were used to calculate the survey statistics (i.e., some respondents provided risk-free rate and ERP estimates for multiple countries).
Exhibit 3A.2 presents the year-to-year changes in the median ERP of each individual country, grouped by magnitude of annual changes in survey responses. As can be observed herein, ERP estimates from survey responses are generally stable from one year to the next. Notably however, the 2023 survey responses show a greater magnitude of ERP changes greater than 1.5% change (light blue bar). Over the last four years, on average 53.4% of countries saw ERP changes of less than 0.5% in magnitude (the green bars), while 73.3% saw changes of less than 1.0% (green and dark blue bars combined). Twenty four countries have seen a change exceeding 1.5% in the last year, which is the highest number of “large” changes in the last five years. The change in the median Argentina ERP, Greece ERP, Ukraine ERP and Venezuela ERP have changed by more than 1.5% three times in the last four years.

**Exhibit 3A.2:** Annual Change in the Median Equity Risk Premium (ERP) by Magnitude for the 58 Countries/Markets that had Results Published in All of the Published Surveys for the Last Four Years (2020–2023)

Note: The Fernandez survey publishes the “average” and “median” responses of survey participants, by country/market. The magnitude of ERP changes illustrated in Exhibit 3A.2 are calculated using the “median” survey responses for each country/market. The 63 countries/markets that had average and median ERP information reported in each of the last four years’ surveys (2020–2023) and therefore could be used to calculate the annual changes in ERP estimates, as illustrated in Exhibit 3A.2, include: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China (Mainland), Hong Kong SAR, and Taiwan, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Of note, the 2020 Survey was conducted between February and mid-March and did not reflect the full impact of the COVID-19 crisis. COVID-19 was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) on March 11, 2020.\textsuperscript{10} The 2020 survey incorporated responses captured through March 23, 2020 but only a little over 50 out of 1,946 survey respondents (or approximately 3%) considered the effect of COVID-19. Therefore, it is not surprising that at that time no major changes were reported in ERPs by survey participants. In 2022, as result of inflationary pressures and Russia’s war on Ukraine, we can actually observe a relatively larger change on ERPs. Russia saw the largest increased in median ERP, after Argentina.

A takeaway from Exhibit 3A.2 is that, generally, the ERP estimates reported by participants of the Fernandez survey do not vary greatly from year to year, unless a big shock impacts the global inflationary and interest rate environment.

**Exhibit 3A.3:** The Median “Country/Market-Level Base Cost of Equity Capital” in Local Currency in the 2023 Survey for the 63 Countries/Markets that had Results in the Surveys Published in *Each* of the Last Four Years (2020–2023).

Note: For each country/market, the Fernandez survey publishes the “average” and “median” responses of survey participants for the risk-free rate ($R_f$), ERP and required return to equity (calculated as the sum of $R_f$ and ERP) being used in each year. The median of each country/market’s required return to equity as reported in the 2023 survey was used as the base cost of equity capital for each of the countries/markets shown. The 63 countries/markets shown in Exhibit 3A.3 are the same 63 countries/markets included in Exhibit 3A.2.

In Exhibit 3A.3, the country/market-level base cost of equity capital is shown for the same 63 countries/markets analyzed in Exhibit 3A.2. The “country/market-level base cost of equity capital” represents investors’ baseline return expectations for investing in a country/market’s equity market as a whole (i.e., a market beta of 1.0 is assumed), and is defined here as the sum of the median risk-free rate and median ERP reported for each country/market (in turn) in the 2023 survey.

There is a significant variance in country-level base cost of equity capital as reported in the 2023 survey for the countries included in Exhibit 3A.3. The country with the lowest median cost of equity capital is the Japan (6.5%), and the country with the highest median cost of equity capital is Venezuela (61.5%). These large variations between countries can be partly explained by expected inflation differentials and different country risk perceptions.

A caveat to the results of this survey is that it is not completely clear (i) in which currency the risk-free rate and ERP estimates are being provided, and (ii) whether estimates are provided in real or nominal terms. A case in point is Venezuela, which has suffered of hyperinflation for several years. According to some estimates, annual inflation in Venezuela has exceeded 2,000%, and is now exceeding 300%, which is inconsistent with a local currency estimate for cost of equity capital of 66.7%.\(^ {11,12}\)

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Appendix 3B
Guidelines for Selecting Risk-Free Rate and Equity Risk Premium – Australia

In Appendix 3B, thoughts and guidelines are provided for selecting an Australian risk-free rate and equity risk premium (ERP) assumption when estimating the cost of equity using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).\(^1\)\(^2\) The content and analysis in Appendix 3B was developed in collaboration with Dr. Steven Bishop, a valuation specialist and former academic who is renowned in Australia for his ERP research.\(^3\)

Throughout this appendix, International Organization for Standardization (ISO) currency codes are used as a convention: AUD stands for Australian Dollars, while USD stands for U.S. Dollars.

The Consistency Principle

An essential principle to adhere to when performing valuations using a discounted cash flow (DCF) method is the Consistency Principle. This principle provides guidance to ensure the discount rate and cash flow forecasts are in harmony. It assists in selecting a risk-free rate that is internally consistent with the ERP guidance provided.

Applying the Consistency Principle assists in ensuring consistency in matters such as:

- The definitions of cash flow used in forecasting and the discount rate. Examples of this include using a cost of equity to discount free cash flows to *equity* and using a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) to discount cash flows to the *firm*.

- Treating the tax advantage of debt only *once* (in either the projected cash flows or in the discount rate).\(^4\)

- Matching the risk of the projected cash flows to the risk used in the discount rate.

- Matching the currency of the projections with the local discount rate.

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\(^1\) The term “equity risk premium” (ERP) is often interchangeably referred to as the “market risk premium” (MRP) or “equity market risk premium” (EMRP).

\(^2\) Some of the concepts in this section are generic in nature and applicable to the selection of a risk-free rate and ERP in other countries (in addition to Australia).

\(^3\) Dr. Steven Bishop is a Director of Education & Management Consulting Services Pty Ltd. His consulting specialties include cost of capital estimation, expert business valuations, implementation of value-based management and strategy consulting. He has been an expert witness for regulatory hearings on the cost of capital for valuation compliance.

\(^4\) This concept applies similarly for dividend imputation tax benefits accruing to shareholders, thereby avoiding double taxation. This benefit should be captured either directly in the projected cash flows or in the discount rate.
• Matching nominal (real) cash flow forecasts with nominal (real) discount rates. A related consideration is the interaction of the growth rate used in cash flow forecasts – particularly for continuing (or terminal) value estimation – and a growth rate implied in the risk-free assumption used in the discount rate.

This chapter draws on application of the last item when thinking about inflation and growth and selection of a risk-free rate. It then provides commentary about selecting an ERP in Australia.

As a reminder, any cost of capital estimate (cost of equity capital, cost of debt capital, and WACC) should be:

• The current expected cost of raising capital over the duration of an investment’s expected life.

• An opportunity cost (i.e., the minimum return investors require from an alternative investment with equivalent risk).

• Forward-looking: the cost of capital (like valuation itself) is based on investors’ expectations of what will happen in the future.

Of the three key inputs to the CAPM equation (the risk-free rate, the beta, and the ERP), only the risk-free rate is observable as a current, forward-looking opportunity cost. However, there are some concerns about using current spot risk-free rates without further adjustments, given their recent abnormally low levels. The beta and the ERP have to be estimated, typically by using historical data as an input or a starting point.

The estimation of a forward-looking ERP is subject to debate since there is no universally accepted view as to how to derive such a forward-looking ERP. This may well explain the reliance of many valuation professionals on historical averages instead. However, there is no reason to expect the ERP to be stable – it will change with the level of risk and investors’ attitudes toward risk.

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5 This concept applies similarly to considerations of the growth rate used in cash flow forecasts and in the discount rate – particularly for continuing (or terminal) value estimation.

6 Just as the cost of capital itself is forward-looking, it follows that all inputs (e.g., the risk-free rate, the beta, the ERP, etc.) used in the development of cost of capital estimates must also be forward-looking.

7 It is not unusual for additional adjustments to be made to the CAPM. For example, a size premium is often used to adjust for the differences in the risks (and expected returns) of small versus large companies (i.e., as size decreases, risks and returns tend to increase, and vice versa). The application of a size premium is not universal (e.g., in the United States it is common; in Germany it is not).

8 Because there is a range of views on the subject, it is important to note that these guidelines reflect the view of Dr. Steve Bishop. Others may have a different view.

9 See for example, Antti Ilmanen, “Time Variation in the Equity Risk Premium,” in Rethinking the Equity Risk Premium, ed. P. Brett Hammond, Jr., Martin L. Leibowitz, and Lawrence B. Siegel (The Research Foundation of CFA Institute, 2011).
**Important Caveat**

While these suggested guidelines relate primarily to selecting a risk-free rate and an ERP, which are both important inputs to business valuations, it is even more critical to carefully link cash flow forecasts to the strategic position of the business (i.e., how the current industry and the competitive position of the business is expected to evolve over time). This includes careful examination of the evolution of economic profit and its drivers. A business will create value (i.e., earn economic profit above its cost of capital), if it has a competitive advantage and/or is operating in an attractive market. So, linking this strategic analysis with the valuation of the business provides an essential reasonability test of forecasts and the valuation outcome.

**Risk-Free Rate**

The risk-free rate is a key input in the CAPM model. In Australia, the yield on 10-year Commonwealth Government Bonds (CGBs) issued by the Australian government is generally used as a proxy for the risk-free rate in the CAPM equation and to calculate historical ERPs. However, in line with the Consistency Principle, when alternative ERP estimates are used, it is imperative to use a risk-free that would match these alternative measures. This includes, for example, using a maturity for the risk-free security that is similar to the one used to calculate historical ERPs.\(^\text{10}\)

Sovereign yields in many developed countries, including Australia, have reached (or have been near) historical lows in recent times. However, yields have been increasing since mid-2021 and during the first half of 2022 due to a change in the underlying real rate and an increase in expected inflation. The changes subsequently slowed up until mid-2023. The significant inflationary pressures, which surged significantly in 2022, led to a reversal in major central bank policies (including the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA)) to increase short term rates, in an attempt to bring inflation under control.

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\(^{10}\) Recall the CAPM equation is \(E[R_i] = R_f + \beta(E[R_m] - R_f)\). The ERP is the expected return on the market less the risk-free rate. Note \(R_f\) appears twice in the equation so it should be of the same maturity and number.
Prior to this recent interest rate reversal, the academic and investment communities had been trying to explain the secular decline in global interest rates, but diverged on the exact reasons. One of the several explanations put forward is the scarcity of safe assets (i.e., government bonds of developed countries considered “safe” or “risk-free” by investors) leading to a misalignment in demand and supply.\(^\text{11}\) Another could reflect a revised view of the underlying real production i.e., low expected economic growth and a consequent low real rate of interest, among others.\(^\text{12}\) In spite of the recent increase in real and nominal interest rates, some academics have recently posited that the secular trends toward lower rates still exist and will become apparent after inflation gets under control.\(^\text{13}\)

Exhibit 3B.1 shows the yield of both nominal and inflation-indexed 10-year CGBs since July 1986. This exhibit also shows the “breakeven inflation”, (i.e., the expected inflation implicit in the difference between nominal and inflation-indexed i.e., real yields).\(^\text{14}\)

Until December 2020, all three series in Exhibit 3B.1 show a clear downward trend. For instance, during the last six months of 2020, the yield on 10-year CGB and inflation-indexed 10-year CGB reached their lowest levels in over three decades, to end the year at 0.98% and −0.08% respectively. Using a breakeven inflation measure at year-end 2020 implied an annualized average expected inflation of approximately 1.06% over the following 10 years. The combination of investors’ flight to quality, possible low economic growth expectations, and RBA interventions, particularly during the height of the COVID-19 crisis, contributed to the record low yields observed during 2020.

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\(^\text{12}\) For an interesting summary of different reasons for a generalized decline in interest rates, see for example, Łukasz Rachel and Thomas D Smith, “Secular Drivers of the Global Real Interest Rate”, Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 571, December 2015.

\(^\text{13}\) Barrett, Philip, Christoffer Koch, Jean-Marc Natal, Diaa Noureldin, and Josef Platzer, “The Natural Rate of Interest – Drivers and Implications for Policy”, included as Chapter 2 of “World Economic Outlook: A Rocky Recovery”, International Monetary Fund, April 2023.

\(^\text{14}\) Breakeven inflation is a measure of market expected inflation calculated as the difference between nominal and inflation-indexed government securities. It is sometimes referred to as market implied inflation or market expected inflation. For more details, please refer to: Moore, Angus “Measures of Inflation Expectations in Australia”, Reserve Bank of Australia, Bulletin – December Quarter 2016. A copy can be found here: https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2016/dec/3.html.
Exhibit 3B.1: Nominal Yields and Inflation-Indexed (i.e., Real) Yields on 10-year Commonwealth Government Bonds (CGBs), and the Breakeven Inflation Rate (July 1986‒June 2023)

Consistent with global trends mentioned earlier, yields in Australia reversed their downward trend starting at first in early in 2021, and more sustainably in mid-2021 and onwards, partially driven by a surge in inflation globally, which has led to a change in the RBA’s monetary policy – a move that mirrored that of other major central banks. Yields on CGBs have risen, reflecting increases in both expected inflation and real yields. As noted by the RBA in May 2022 and subsequently, energy and food-based prices have increased sharply following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but prices were already rising due to higher global demand and persistent supply chain disruptions following the lifting of COVID-19 lockdowns.\(^{15}\)

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China’s policy of zero COVID-19 cases continued to add pressure to global supply chains. Labor shortages, primarily due to absenteeism related to COVID-19 illness, exacerbated by a reduction in immigration and short-term overseas worker-travelers, have created shortages across supply chains, particularly in agriculture and the services industry. These pressures have remained elevated, leading to a 12-month trailing Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation of 7.8% for the year ending in December 2022, which was the highest level since March 1990, but falling slightly to 6.0% for the year ending in June 2023. The August 2023 Statement of Monetary Policy by the RBA predicted that CPI inflation will continue to decline to around 3.25% by the end of 2024 and to be back in the 2.0 to 3.0% target range in late 2025.\(^{16}\)

Long-term market-based inflation expectations, as measured by the 10-year breakeven inflation, began rising in 2022. By April 2022 breakeven inflation had risen to 2.06%, which was just above the low end of the RBA inflation target range of 2.0% to 3.0%, the first time this happened since 2014. It has since oscillated between the low and mid-point of the RBA target range. The concept of breakeven inflation and its value as a predictor of expected inflation is further discussed below. Recent actual annual inflation has eased marginally since the December year-end high of 7.8%.

In Exhibit 3B.2 nominal 10-year CGB yields are shown over a longer time horizon (1900–2022). Yields on Australian 10-year CGBs reached record lows in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. By June 2023 yields had increased to 3.9% (shown in Exhibit 3B.1) but were still below the long-term (1900–2022) average (5.6%).

**Exhibit 3B.2: Yields on 10-year Commonwealth Government Bonds (CGBs) (1900–2022)**

Yields on other maturities have also decreased over the last four decades. The relationship between long- and short-term yields can provide valuable information about the economy. It has been argued that the shape of the yield curve, which depicts the level of yields at different maturities at the same point in time, can indicate the market’s future expectations about economic growth. As Campbell Harvey, Finance professor at Duke University, explains when talking about the United States:\footnote{17}  

“The intuition is straightforward. If a recession is expected next year, there is an incentive to sacrifice today to buy a one-year bond that pays off in the bad times. The demand for the bond will bid up its price and lower its yield. The theory implies that current real interest rates contain information about expected economic growth.”

In the case of Australia specifically, Piyadasa Edirisuriya, lecturer of Banking and Finance at Monash University in Australia, explores the predictive power of financial variables on economic growth and he states:\footnote{18}  

“On the basis of our results, we conclude that most financial variables are suitable for predicting real economic activity. Among these variables are 10-year Treasury bonds and 90-day bank bills . . .”

There are (at least) two important messages from these statements. One is that the shape of the yield curve can signal expectations of changes in growth and expected inflation. An upward sloping yield curve anticipates higher short-term interest rates in the future i.e., interest rates will rise due to higher expected growth (economic expansion) and/or inflation. Conversely, a downward-sloping or inverted yield curve, may indicate lower expected growth and that investors expect the central bank will cut short-term rates in the future. In fact, an inverted yield curve may signal a forthcoming recession. Another important message is that the real rate of interest conveys information about the expectation of real growth in the economy and should be carefully considered when forecasting long-term cash flows.\footnote{19}  

Taking each of these in turn:

- **Inversion:** Since the 1960’s, all recessions in the U.S. were preceded by an inversion of the yield curve, but there is a debate about the ability of the yield curve to predict recessions in countries other than the U.S. Nevertheless, there are indications that the shape of the yield curve predicts, to some extent, future economic performance in other countries.\footnote{20}

• **Steepness:** The level of steepness of the yield curve is typically measured by the difference between the 10-year and 2-year yields (although other measures are preferred by some). A positive number would indicate that the yield curve is upward sloping, and a negative number would indicate the inverse. Exhibit 3B.3 reports the difference between these two maturities from January 1996 to June 2023.

**Exhibit 3B.3:** Yield Difference Between 10-Year and 2-Year Commonwealth Government Bonds (CGBs) (January 1996 to June 2023)

*Source of underlying data: Reserve Bank of Australia*
The yield curve inverted twice over the period shown in Exhibit 3B.3: (i) between August and September 2000, and (ii) between June 2006 and August 2008. However, until COVID-19 was declared a pandemic in March 2020, Australia had not experienced a technical recession since 1991. The technical definition of a recession is two consecutive quarters with negative economic real growth. According to this definition, the worst quarter was June 2020, which saw a year-on-year decline of 5.7%. Nevertheless, the Australian economy recovered quickly from the 2020 pandemic and ensuing lockdown periods, surpassing its pre-pandemic real GDP level in March 2021. As the economy continued to recover, the widening spread between the 10- and 2-year maturities reversed and the difference in yields began to narrow to its near-zero spread in June 2023.

Global factors like supply chain disruptions, China’s zero COVID-19 policy, the war on Ukraine and the resurgence in domestic demand led to a spike in inflation and inflation expectations, which in turn led to higher yields. Inflation expectations have differed between the short and long term;

For a detailed discussion about one of the longest economic growth cycles among developed countries please visit: https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook46p/LastRecession.

For more details about the Australian “mini” recessions please visit: https://www.econlib.org/why-does-australia-have-mini-recessions/.

From early 2020 through mid-2021 the spread between 10- and 2-year maturities generally widened (first as the 2-year yield declined to a greater degree than the 10-year yield, and then later as the 10-year yield increased to a greater degree than the 2-year yield). In March 2021, the 10-year CGB yield reached 1.69% whereas the 2-year yield was at 0.1%, indicating a difference of 159 basis points (b.p.), the highest spread since June 2009.


According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the real GDP before COVID-19 was declared a pandemic was AUD 519 bn in December 2019. In March 2021, the Australian GDP recovered to AUD 5.29 bn. Based on the “Gross domestic product: Chain volume measures; $ Millions, Seasonally Adjusted, Derived” series. For more details and latest data updates, please visit the Australian Bureau of Statistics: www.abs.gov.au.
yields at the short end of the curve have seen a much larger increase compared to the long end.\footnote{Yields on 2-year CGBs increased from 0.14\% at the end of June 2021 to 3.84\% the end of June 2023. Yields on 10-year CGBs increased from 1.52\% at the end of June 2021 to 3.92\% at the end of June 2023.} One possible reason for this diversion in yields might be that market participants and forecasters believe that the heightened levels of inflation are short-lived and will revert to pre-pandemic levels in the near to medium term. Another reason might be that the RBA abandoned its targeting of the 3-year yield in November of 2021, while raising its (short-term) policy rate at a rapid pace in its attempt to curb inflation. Short-term yields are more sensitive to changes in policy rates than long term yields.\footnote{Reserve Bank of Australia, “Review of the Yield Target”, June 21, 2022. Available here: https://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/reviews/yield-target/index.html.}

While the yield curve failed to ultimately predict Australia’s 2020 two consecutive quarters of decline in real GDP (its first recession in 29 years), the contraction was of a very different nature and not driven by direct economic reasons. Rather, it was caused by external shocks to the economy: (i) the damages inflicted by lockdowns associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, and (ii) bushfires.\footnote{“Australia in first recession for nearly 30 years”, BBC, September 2, 2020, accessed here: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-53994318.} Despite the 5.75\% real GDP contraction in the year ending June 2020 (using Australia fiscal years), the economy recovered thereafter, with real GDP expanding by 10.3\%, 3.1\% and 2.1\% in the years ending in June of 2021, 2022 and 2023, respectively. According to the RBA’s monetary policy statement of August 2023, the Australian economy is expected to grow at around 1.75\% in 2024 and 2.25\% in 2025.\footnote{“Australia in first recession for nearly 30 years”, BBC, September 2, 2020.}

The Consistency Principle would suggest that the market view of both expected inflation and economic growth implicit in current CGB yields should be taken into account when building cash flow forecasts for DCF valuations, especially when estimating the continuing (terminal) value – otherwise there can be a mismatch resulting in flawed valuations. For instance, if the spot 10-year CGB yield at end of June 2023, 3.9\%, is used as the risk-free rate input in the CAPM equation, then the real yield of 1.5\% as of the same date would imply an expected inflation over the next 10 years of 2.4\%. These yields can, and perhaps should, influence the view of expected inflation and economic growth for the “average” company when estimating expected cash flows.

A valuation professional may use different growth rates in the discrete forecast period to reflect the particular circumstances of the entity being valued and the industry in which it operates, but such rates are less appropriate to use in the terminal (or continuing) value estimate. In fact, there are arguments that the projected growth rate used in the terminal year should be less than the rate for the overall economy since few companies last forever in their current form – the attrition rate is high, with an average lifespan of listed companies being around 20 years, according to some estimates.\footnote{Of course, these estimates capture not just companies that have truly failed (i.e., filed for bankruptcy), but also those that have merged, were acquired by other companies, or went private.} See, for example, Mauboussin, Michael J., Dan Callahan, Darius Majd, “Corporate Longevity Index Turnover and Corporate Performance”, Credit Suisse, February 7, 2017. Available here: https://plus.credit-suisse.com/rpc4/ravDocView?docid=V6y0SB2AF-WEr1ce.
In addition, some will argue (e.g., William Bernstein and Robert Arnott) that new enterprises are the key drivers of economic growth, but they do not contribute to the growth of existing companies (i.e., earnings growth of existing publicly traded companies). Under this argument, it follows that the long-term growth of projected cash flows should be less than the projected growth of the overall economy. Ultimately, particular circumstances need to be carefully considered if the valuation professional moves away from the overall market view.

Alternative Sources of Risk-Free Rates

Given the unusually low, but rising nominal yields shown since 2021 in Exhibit 3B.1, some valuation professionals consider using alternative risk-free measures to reflect a different view of a forward-looking estimate of the risk-free rate. In this section, two of these alternatives are discussed: (i) long-term averaging, and (ii) the build-up method. The first alternative assumes that interest rates revert to a long-term average; hence, taking a historical average of government bond yields could be a proxy for future yields. The second alternative relies on the “Fisher equation” and uses a projected real rate based on economic conditions (e.g., neutral or natural rate of interest) and expected inflation.

In recent years, KPMG Australia used to conduct a survey of valuation professionals in Australia. As part of the survey, views were gathered on cost of capital inputs, among other key valuation assumptions. The surveys were sent to valuation professionals from a variety of organizations across Australia, including Australia’s Big Four accounting firms, leading corporates, investment banks, investment funds, prominent boutique firms, second-tier accounting firms and smaller practitioners.

The KPMG survey has been replaced by a similar survey, now conducted by the Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (CAANZ). The third edition of the “CAANZ Business Valuation Survey” was conducted in August 2022 and includes results from 67 respondents working in valuation-related disciplines across the public and corporate sector.

In the 2022 survey, 42% of valuation professionals surveyed reported that they used (or would have used) a risk-free rate between 3.0% and 3.9% for valuation performed as of June 30, 2022, compared with most using between 1.0% and 1.9% for valuations as of June 30, 2021. For perspective, the nominal spot 10-year CGB yield on June 30, 2022 was 3.7%, while the 10-year real yield (i.e. using Australian Commonwealth Government Indexed bonds) stood at 1.37%.

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When estimating the risk-free rate, the nominal spot rate for Commonwealth Government securities was used by 53% of respondents and 36% used a historical average of spot nominal rates (note that the survey responses did not indicate the maturities being used). Because some valuations use real projections and real discount rates (e.g., globally, mining industry valuations will sometimes be prepared in real terms), 21% of respondents relied on the spot real Australian real yields, and 15% relied on an average of real yields (note: multiple selections were allowed, so the total responses exceed 100%). A great majority used a rate of 3.9% or lower, but this is not an apples-to-apples comparison, since nominal and real rates are being conflated in the responses (and we cannot glean the debt maturities/tenors used).

If a valuation professional was of the view that the current spot yield was not a reflection of a sustainable long-term risk-free rate, either long-term averaging and/or the build-up method could be used to develop an alternative estimate. The choice of an alternative measure of risk-free rates implies that it is a better view of the market, which may be inconsistent with some accounting standards (e.g., impairment) that call for the use of a market-based rate. Specifically, a rate that differs from the current spot rate implies a different view of expected inflation and/or expected economic growth than in the spot rate. Consequently, these views should also be considered and reflected in the cash flow forecasts.

**Alternative 1: Averaging Spot Risk-Free Rates**

A challenge when estimating an average risk-free rate is the selection of an averaging period for the computation. Exhibit 3B.4 and Exhibit 3B.5 illustrate two important issues regarding how the choice of the period can significantly alter the concluded average.

Exhibit 3B.4 illustrates how the average of monthly spot risk-free rates can change significantly depending on the length of the period over which the average is computed. The leftmost point in Exhibit 3B.4 is a single month’s “average”: the spot rate of 10-year CGBs at the end of June 2023. The rightmost point in Exhibit 3B.4 is the average monthly 10-year CGB yield over the whole sample, from July 1986 to June 2023 (444 months). Exhibit 3B.4 clearly demonstrates that the monthly average can vary significantly depending on the length of the averaging period. This raises a challenge as to how to decide on an averaging period.

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34 This is a function of how accounting standards are interpreted and typically applied in a given country and how different methodologies are accepted by auditors and other reviewers. For example, the use of a normalized risk-free rate in the context of goodwill impairment testing is accepted in the United States and various European countries. Conversely, local valuation practices in Germany do not generally accept the use of normalized risk-free rates.
The whole premise behind averaging is to find a forecast to which future data is expected to converge. However, average 10-Year CGB yields did not stabilize as the averaging period was extended in Exhibit 3B.4. This could lead to very different risk-free rate assumptions depending on the length of time over which an analyst decides to calculate an average. For example, as of June 2023, Analyst “A” could select a 10-year averaging period, and Analyst “B” could select a 20-year averaging period, implying a 2.5% risk-free rate and 3.8% risk-free rate, respectively. The concluded risk-free rate would have been even higher (6.2%) if the average is calculated over the entire sample period of 37 years.

**Exhibit 3B.4:** The Average 10-Year CBG Yield Can Vary Significantly Depending on the Length of the Averaging Period Selected

Source of underlying data: Reserve Bank of Australia
Taking an average over the whole sample period can also be misleading, especially since interest rates in the 1980’s and 1990’s were quite dissimilar to the current inflation and interest rate environment (see Exhibit 3B.1). Analysts often use long-term averages of 10 years, although other averaging periods are also considered. Exhibit 3B.5 shows the trend over the last few decades in the 10-year moving average of 10-year CGB yields, juxtaposed with the corresponding spot yields. The leftmost data point in Exhibit 3B.5 is the 120-month average CGB 10-year yield from January 1977 to December 1986; the rightmost data point is the 120-month average CGB 10-year yield from July 2013 to June 2023.

**Exhibit 3B.5: The 10-Year CBG Spot Yield and its Corresponding 10-year Moving Average (December 1986–June 2023)**

Over most of the December 1986 to June 2023 period in Exhibit 3B.5, the 10-year moving average was generally higher than the spot rate. This relationship persisted over most of the last decade because spot rates generally fell over this period. Both the spot yield and the 10-year moving average have been trending downward since the end of the 1980’s, with the spot only reverting to its average briefly around the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 (“Global Financial Crisis”) and the Euro Sovereign Debt Crisis in the early 2010’s. A more recent exception has been the period since December 2021 in which spot rates have risen significantly, and quickly. At the end of June 2023, the 10-year moving average yield on 10-year CGBs was 2.5%, whereas the spot rate was 3.9%.

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35 Even the choice of a 10-year moving average is arbitrary, but it does provide a useful reference.

36 This relationship would be the opposite if rates had generally risen over the period.
The picture that arises from Exhibit 3B.4 and Exhibit 3B.5 raises legitimate questions about the ability of long-term averages to improve the forecast of Australian risk-free rates to use in valuation projects.

There are two additional challenges with using an average risk-free rate. First, if the current spot market rate is viewed as being artificially low, then logically there should also be times when market rates are viewed as too high. If a non-market rate (e.g., an average) is perceived to be a better forecast than the market rate, then logic suggests the average rate should be used consistently in both “too high” and “too low” interest rate environments. By putting a floor on rate levels (but not a ceiling), a bias toward using higher rates may be created.

A second challenge when using an average rate is identifying the expected inflation and view of real growth embedded in the average rate so that it can be internally consistent with inflation and growth assumptions used to project cash flows, thereby adhering to the Consistency Principle. If a valuation professional does not regard the spot risk-free rate as a suitable forward rate, there is a need to carefully consider whether (i) the projected cash flows (the numerator in the DCF relationship) should reflect the expected inflation embedded in that average rate, and (ii) the real growth rate used in cash flow forecasts is largely consistent with the average rate, particularly in the continuing (terminal) value calculation.

A third challenge can arise from using a different risk-free rate from that used to estimate an ERP. Recall that the CAPM relationship is \( E(R_i) = R_f + \beta[E(R_m) - R_f] \), where \( [E(R_m) - R_f] \) is the ERP. Conceptually the risk-free rate should be the same. To the extent that an ERP estimate is based on historical data, it is important to recognize that historical (i.e., realized) ERPs are usually calculated using spot rates and not average rates, so there is potential for a mismatch. How significant this potential mismatch may be is challenging to assess as the current forward-looking risk-free rate is observable, but no equivalent rate for \( E(R_m) \) or the ERP is observable.

### Alternative 2: Build-Up Model (Fisher Equation)

Another alternative to a spot risk-free rate is a build-up model based on the Fisher equation. The following is simplified version of the Fisher equation:

\[
\text{Nominal Risk-Free Rate} = \text{Real Risk-Free Rate} + \text{Expected Inflation}
\]

Note that if relying on breakeven inflation rates as the proxy for historical inflation expectations, these can only be inferred from data starting in 1985 when inflation-indexed CGBs were introduced.

This is a simplified version of the “Fisher equation”, named after Irving Fisher. Fisher’s “The Theory of Interest” was first published by Macmillan (New York), in 1930. The Fisher equation is formally expressed as \((1 + \text{Nominal Rate}) = (1 + \text{Real Rate}) \times (1 + \text{Expected Inflation})\). When rates are low, there is very little difference between the simple form and the Fisher equation.

Various academic research papers show that the decomposition of the nominal rate into a real rate and expected inflation should include an additional component excluded from the Fisher equation: the inflation risk premium. This premium reflects the risk that inflation may vary significantly from expected inflation. The sign of the premium may be positive or negative, depending on the direction of the unexpected movements in inflation. Note that if both the inflation risk premium and the variance of inflation surprises are negligible, then the Fisher equation holds precisely, as indicated in the following article: Sarte, Pierre-Daniel G., "Fisher’s Equation and the Inflation Risk Premium in a Simple Endowment Economy", Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Quarterly, Volume 84/4 Fall 1998. Subsequent academic literature corroborates these findings and attempts to quantify the magnitude of the inflation risk premium over time.
**Real Risk-Free Rate**

Real risk-free rates are often proxied by inflation-indexed bonds. Australia started issuing these bonds in 1985. As Exhibit 3.B1 shows, the real rates on these bonds have been decreasing largely in tandem with nominal yields since their introduction (the correlation is 91%). As of June 30, 2023, the yield on 10-year inflation-indexed bonds was 1.5%. If the valuation professional believes that the market nominal risk-free rate is artificially low (or high), the same might apply to the market real risk-free rate.

Another proxy for the forward real rate is the neutral (or natural) rate, which usually refers to the interest rate that would prevail when the economy is at full employment and stable inflation. The neutral rate is not observable, but there are numerous models that are used to capture this rate. Bear in mind that the neutral rate is a short-term rate concept. The RBA considers its own estimate of the neutral rate when setting its policy interest rate (i.e., the target cash rate). In contrast, the risk-free rate used in the CAPM is usually a longer-term nominal rate (e.g., 10 years) and will normally attract a term premium. However, that term premium can be captured in the nominal risk-free rate by using long-term (rather than short-term) inflation expectations.

Rachael McCririck and Daniel Rees, researchers at the RBA, have studied and provided estimates for the Australian neutral rate (also called a natural rate of interest or an equilibrium real rate). They define the neutral rate as follows:

“...the real policy rate required to bring about full employment and stable inflation over the medium term.”

They further clarified:

“The term ‘neutral interest rate’ sometimes refers to the real short-term interest rate that will bring about full employment at any point in time, given the presence of these transitory business cycle influences. On average, over a normal business cycle, this interest rate will coincide with the medium-run concept . . . but will exhibit greater volatility because it will also adjust in response to transitory economic developments.”

The RBA paper notes that because the neutral rate is not directly observable “we must infer its value from the behavior of market interest rates and other economic variables”. The authors use two economic models to estimate the rate over time, noting that the rate was fairly stable around 3.5% from the early 1990s until 2007. By 2017 the estimate declined to around 1.0%. The authors also compared these estimates with market-based expected short-term real interest rates as

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40 Daniel Rees is now a Senior Economist in the Monetary and Economic Department, Macroeconomic Analysis of the Bank of International Settlements, Basel, Switzerland.

implied by yields on inflation-indexed government bonds. Financial market estimates of the neutral interest rate ranged between 0.5% to 1.5%, which was consistent with the authors’ model-based estimates. The authors attributed the decrease in neutral rate estimates primarily to a decrease in potential growth and an increase in risk aversion. A separate research paper suggests that the decrease in the neutral rate of a small open economy, like Australia, is due to external factors, mainly foreign output shocks.\textsuperscript{42}

In their paper, McCririck and Rees stated that the RBA intended to update and monitor their estimates of the neutral rate on a regular basis, but these updates do not appear to be made public on a regular basis. RBA’s researchers Rochelle Guttmann, Dana Lawson and Peter Rickards suggest that the RBA estimate of the natural rate for Australia as of December 2019 was still hovering around 1% and has stayed at the same level since 2017.\textsuperscript{43}

More recently, the minutes to the RBA Board meeting on July 5, 2022 discussed neutral rate estimates, noting that:\textsuperscript{44}

“…The [RBA] staff apply a range of methods for estimating the neutral rate, each with its own advantages and disadvantages, and each method produces a different estimate. The range of estimates is wide….The neutral rate framework provides only a general guide and any specific estimates need to be treated with caution.”

No official estimates of the neutral rate were reported after this or subsequent meetings. However, in a keynote address to the Citi Australia & New Zealand Investment Conference on October 12, 2022, the RBA’s Assistant Governor for Economics indicated that the central bank monitors nine different models. It then takes a simple average across the estimates to derive a central estimate of the neutral real rate. She went on to say this is a standard approach to dealing with model uncertainty, but noted the wide range in estimates from the nine models, which stood at -0.5% to 2.0% with an average just under 1.0% at the time the speech was delivered.\textsuperscript{45}


Independently, the National Australia Bank estimated the natural interest rate for Australia using the Holston, Laubach and Williams (2017) model as of June 2021 and found that the rate was around 0.8%, which is close to RBA’s own estimates of 1.0%.\(^{46,47}\) Research from The Commonwealth Bank of Australia released in March 2022 estimated the neutral rate to have declined to -0.3%. However, this work has since been removed from The Commonwealth Bank of Australia’s website (we have no way of knowing if the work has been retracted).\(^{48}\)

In summary, while the body of research estimating the neutral (real) rate for Australia is relatively small, the estimates range from -0.3% to 1.0%, with a median of 0.9% (or a wider band of -0.5% to 2.0%, should the informal indications from the RBA be used).

**Expected Inflation**

The second component of the Fisher equation is expected inflation. One important aspect that stems from the Consistency Principle is to ensure that the expected inflation in the discount rate is consistent with the inflation assumptions used to develop the cash flow projections. While there may be different inflationary forces in different sectors of the economy that drive inflation built into the cash flows to differ from the economy overall, especially in the short to medium term, it is useful to be aware of the rate built into the risk-free rate and therefore the cost of capital. In the current discussion, the focus is on long-term inflation expectations, since a long-term perspective is appropriate when valuing a business into perpetuity (i.e., assuming a going concern).\(^{49}\)

Expected inflation can be estimated using different techniques. A common method uses market-based estimates of the yield on nominal and indexed CGBs to infer breakeven inflation estimates. Another methodology is based on surveys of economists to gather their views on what inflation will be in the future. The RBA regularly publishes inflation forecasts, but they only cover the short term (the next two years), whereas for valuation purposes a more long-term forecast is needed.

Anecdotally, many Australian valuation professionals use the mid-point of the RBA’s target inflation range (2.0% to 3.0%) as their long-term inflation estimate for projected cash flows.\(^{50}\) However, the 2.5% mid-point of the target range exceeded the nominal yield on 10-year CGBs until March 2022.

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\(^{49}\) Note that the ERP is a real rate (it is built into the expected return on the market and the risk-free rate so the difference, ERP, has no inflation in it).

\(^{50}\) The RBA introduced the inflation target range in the early 1990’s to help anchor the private sector inflation expectations. For more details, visit: https://www.rba.gov.au/inflation/inflation-target.html.
If a valuation professional were to use 2.5% as the expected inflation in cash flow projections (particularly, as the long-term growth rate assumption), then it would be appropriate to adjust the risk-free rate to ensure consistency between the numerator and denominator of the DCF equation for an average growth company. Using the median (neutral) real rate estimates from the academic papers cited above of 0.9% as a proxy for the expected real rate, the proposed alternative risk-free using the Fisher equation would be 3.4% (2.5% + 0.9%) as of June 30, 2023 – in this case close to but below the spot 10-year yield of 3.9%.

Australia was one of the first countries to adopt an explicit inflation targeting policy. The RBA inflation target range was established in the early 1990s when the 10-year trailing average inflation was 8.1%. After the RBA introduced the inflation targeting policy, inflation started a downward trend toward the central bank’s target range. However, over the last decade and up to June 2021, inflation has been consistently below the mid-point RBA range except for the calendar year 2012, and yet the target range was never revised downward. This raises a major question about the ability of the RBA’s mid-point range to indicate the underlying long-term expected inflation in Australia. It may also cast a cloud over the use of RBA’s mid-point target range as the basis for Australia’s expected inflation in DCF-based analyses.

An alternative methodology to estimate inflation also applies the Fisher equation but infers future inflation expectations from financial markets. By rearranging the Fisher equation, and using market-based data on nominal and real government bond yields with a similar maturity, a (simplified) breakeven inflation for Australia can be computed as follows:

\[ \text{Breakeven Inflation} = \text{10-year CGB Yield} - \text{10-year Australia Inflation Indexed Yield} \]

In Exhibit 3B.6 the breakeven inflation rate at the end of June 2023 was at 2.4%, which is close to the static RBA mid-point target range of 2.5%. However, from 2014 until mid-2022, the breakeven inflation rate was consistently below 2.0%, the low end of the RBA target range, increasing slightly since then (but still below the mid-point of RBA’s target range). How this will evolve in the future is unclear.

Applying this to the estimate of the neutral real risk-free rate of 0.9% cited above results in an adjusted risk-free rate for Australia of 3.3% (0.9% + 2.4%) compared with the spot rate of 3.9%.

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52 The average annual change in the Australia Consumer Price Index over the period 1981 and 1990 was 8.1%.


54 The breakeven inflation rate is calculated as the difference between nominal bond yields and the inflation indexed bond yields with the same maturity (in this case, 10 years). Using the formal (geometric) specification of the Fisher equation, the breakeven inflation is calculated as \( i = \frac{1 + 0.92\%}{1 + 2.4\%} - 1 = 2.4\%\) at the end of June 2023. Note, the simple difference has been used in examples above.
A valuation professional should carefully consider which method to estimate inflation expectations is a better predictor and more closely aligns with realized inflation.

**Exhibit 3B.6: Breakeven Inflation and the RBA Inflation Target Range**
(June 1986 – June 2023)

Besides displaying the Australian breakeven inflation expectation between June 1986 and June 2023 (quarterly), Exhibit 3B.6 also compares the annual change in Australia’s CPI inflation and the RBA’s inflation target range over the time period from December 1993 to June 2023 (quarterly). Note that the change in the CPI is quarterly whereas the other rates are based on a long-term view.

There are three interesting observations from Exhibit 3B.6. First, the RBA inflation targeting policy has generally been effective in anchoring inflation, at least until recently. Second, the market-implied breakeven inflation has tended to be a leading indicator of actual inflation, despite the difference between a short-term view (1 year in the CPI data) versus a 10-year view embedded in the breakeven inflation data. This shows some ability of financial markets to predict inflation.

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55 While Exhibit 3B.6 displays the RBA “inflation target range” for the entire period since 1986 (for simplification), this approach commenced in the early 1990s. The earliest references to it were contained in speeches by the then Governor in August 1992 and March and August 1993. For more information visit: https://www.rba.gov.au/inflation/inflation-target.html.
Third, both actual inflation and breakeven inflation started to trend downward after the Global Financial Crisis, and both have stayed below the RBA mid-range target until the quarter ended in June 2021. Given the surge in global energy and food prices, realized inflation in Australia spiked to 7.8% at the end of 2022, which is more than double the upper end of the target range. There is an ongoing debate about whether central banks will be able get the current levels of inflation under control in developed markets, but it seems that both financial markets (approximately 2.5%) and professional forecasters (approximately 2.9% – more details below) have long-term inflation estimates for Australia that are within the range of the 2.0% to 3.0% inflation target.  

The choice of a reliable method depends on the forecasting accuracy, which measures how close the forecast was to the actual inflation. Over the whole sample period, the RBA mid-range target rate had a lower forecasting error than breakeven inflation rates. However, during the post-Global Financial Crisis period, breakeven inflation forecasts provide a marginally better forecast over the short term. Focusing just on the post-pandemic period (1920-1923), the RBA mid-range target reverted to having a lower forecasting error.

Nevertheless, several academic studies have noted that breakeven inflation is an imperfect measure of expected inflation because it ignores the presence of inflation risk premia in nominal yields (which can be negative or positive) and illiquidity premia common in inflation-indexed bonds. Inflation risks and illiquidity premia vary over time. An alternative measure of expected inflation is to consider projections issued by economists and professional forecasters. Different private and public institutions provide their forecasts for different countries on a frequent basis. Some are publicly available, while others are only available through subscription services.

56 Long-term inflation forecasts show that the long-term median inflation expectation is 2.9% as of June 2023. Source of inflation forecasts: Consensus Forecasts Asia Pacific, June 2023/April 2023; Economist Intelligent Unit, June 2023; IHS Markit-Comparative World Overview Tables, June 2023; IMF World Economic Outlook – April 2023; Oxford Economics Country Economic Forecast – Australia. June 2023; and PwC Global Economy Watch; May 2023.

57 The accuracy of both measures is evaluated using Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE). In simple terms, this technique measures the squared deviation between the forecasted parameter and the actual series. The lower the deviation, the more accurate the forecast. Over the whole period (1990–2022), the RMSE between the RBA mid-point range and the actual inflation was 1.61% compared to 1.90% between the 10-year breakeven inflation and the following year actual inflation. However, post-Global Financial Crisis through 2019 (before the COVID-19 pandemic), the two RMSE numbers become 0.82% and 0.31% respectively, indicating that breakeven inflation forecasting error decreased more than the RBA target mid-point forecasting error. The high level of inflation since mid-2021 reversed the trend of declining RMSEs again. The two RMSEs became 3.71% and 4.16% for the mid-point and breakeven inflation, respectively. A caveat to this analysis is that technically the forecast errors should be computed by comparing a 10-year market expected inflation to the actual average inflation rate realized over the ensuing ten years. Calculating the RMSEs by looking at next year’s realized inflation is a simplification.


Economic forecasts depend on the institutions’ forecasting models and their level of sophistication. There is a considerable level of uncertainty in long-term inflation and real GDP forecasts. Hence, it is advisable to use multiple sources to help minimize forecasting errors. Examples of reputable economic consulting firms include, but are not limited to, IHS Markit (recently acquired by S&P Global and now relabeled as S&P Global Market Intelligence), Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Oxford Economics, and Consensus Economics. These firms provide regular forecasts of real GDP, inflation, and other annual growth rates that can be helpful in building cash flow projections. Other alternatives include projections issued by international organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

For example, IMF forecasts as of April 2023 suggested that Australia’s consumer price inflation would reach 5.3% in 2023, 3.2% in 2024, 3.0% in 2025, 2.7% for 2026 and 2027, and 2.6% for 2028. They also forecast the Australian real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to be 1.6% in 2023, 1.7 in 2024, 2.1% in 2025, 2.2% in 2026, and 2.3% in both 2027 and 2028.

The RBA does not provide long-term forecasts of inflation and GDP growth, but it does provide the bank’s view for the next three years. In the August 2023 Statement on Monetary Policy, the RBA forecasts the CPI inflation to be 4.1% in 2023, 3.3% in 2024, and 2.8% in 2025. The RBA forecasted GDP growth to be 0.9% in 2023, 1.6% in 2024, and 2.3% in 2025.

Risk-Free Rates and Breakeven Inflation

Breakeven inflation captured by the difference between nominal and risk-free CGB’s is one source that can be used to estimate expected inflation. However, like many estimates, caution must be exercised, as illustrated in Box 3B.1 titled “The COVID-19 Crisis and the Impact on Risk-Free Rates and Breakeven Inflation” (see below).

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The discussion in Box 3B.1 demonstrates that breakeven inflation measures can be misleading during times of significant market upheaval. Periods of high uncertainty are often accompanied by flights to quality, which means investors shift significant capital to liquid assets considered “safe”, such as government securities of major advanced economies. This leads to a repricing of liquidity premia, while also driving nominal yields down. As a result, the yield spread between nominal and inflation-indexed bond yields tend to narrow, but that does not necessarily translate into lower long-term inflation expectations. These bond market mechanisms should be taken into consideration when a measure of long-term expected inflation is considered for valuations performed during these periods. The recent volatility in yields and, to some extent, in breakeven inflation measures clearly highlights how global and domestic economic and financial market indicators can be difficult to predict.

Despite the volatility around the COVID period, the breakeven inflation rate has been relatively stable since January 2022 despite a substantive change in the cash rate as set by the RBA. The nominal CGB yield has largely followed the changes in the underlying real rate as captured by the 10-year indexed CGB bond. The cash rate was kept at 10 basis points from when it was set at that level (effective from November 4, 2020) through May 2022. Starting in May 2022, in an attempt to get inflationary pressures under control, the RBA hiked its cash rate twelve times through June 2023, reaching 4.1% at that time.

Exhibit 3B.7 shows that the nominal 10-year CGB yield has oscillated between 3.0% and 4.0% over the starting in April 2022 through June 2022, period while breakeven inflation has generally been in the 2.0% to 2.5% range during the same period. This relative stability of the breakeven inflation shows some confidence by investors that the RBA will be able to get inflation under control.63

62 Australia is one of only nine countries with a AAA rating from all three major rating agencies. Countries with AAA ratings are considered the safest sovereign investment. See: “Australia’s AAA credit rating affirmed following Federal Budget”, March 16, 2023. Available here: https://ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/jim-chalmers-2022/media-releases/australias-aaa-credit-rating-affirmed-following-federal.

63 The cash rate in Exhibit 3B.7 represents the effective date of the rate change. The announcement is usually a day earlier. It is likely that the announcements were anticipated by investors as there was little reaction in the 10-year bond yield (or the 3- and 5-year rates, not shown here) following the announcement.
Exhibit 3B.7: Bond Market Reaction to RBA Cash Rate Increase Announcements (January 2022 – June 2023)

Source of underlying data: Reserve Bank of Australia.
Box 3B.1:
The COVID-19 Crisis and the Impact on Risk-Free Rates and Breakeven Inflation

The outbreak of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), a respiratory illness that was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization on March 11, 2020, caused significant turmoil in global financial markets. Concerns about lack of liquidity in the financial system led to swift intervention by major central banks around the world, including in Australia. The RBA intervened to lower borrowing rates and to provide liquidity to financial markets.64

To support the Australian economy, the RBA lowered its target cash rate (the policy rate) twice in March 2020 to 0.25% and once in November 2020 to 0.1%. In March 2020, the RBA also announced new unconventional monetary policy measures such as establishing a target of around 0.25% for the Australian 3-year CGB yield, which was further reduced to 0.1% in November 2020. To achieve this target yield, the RBA committed to purchasing government bonds in the secondary market, thereby creating an artificial level for the 3-year CGB. In its November 2020 Statement the RBA issued a firm commitment to not increase the cash rate target until inflation reaches (sustainably) its target inflation range of 2.0% to 3.0%, and suggested that this was unlikely to happen for at least three years (2024 at the earliest). The February and March 2021 RBA Statements reaffirmed the targets for both the cash rate and 3-year CGB yield.

Other unconventional monetary policy measures introduced in March 2020 included the creation of a Term Funding Facility (TFF) with the objective of reducing funding costs of financial institutions, and in turn facilitate access to low-cost funding by businesses. An increase and extension of the TFF was announced in September 2020. In November 2020, the interest rate on the TFF was reduced from 0.25% to 0.1%.

After the Global Financial Crisis, major central banks around the world introduced several unconventional monetary policy programs. These policies included QE programs comprised of massive purchases of government securities, partly with the objective of driving down long-term interest rates. Some of those QE programs were later expanded to include corporate bonds and even equities. Australia was one of the few major developed economies that did not implement such programs in the aftermath if the Global Financial Crisis. However, the COVID-19 crisis changed that.

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In addition to lowering its cash target rate to 0.1% and imposing a target of 0.1% on the Australian 3-year government bond yield, the RBA started buying government bonds with maturities up to 10 years in sizeable amounts. In November 2020, the RBA indicated it would purchase bonds issued by the Australian Government (and by the states and territories) in the secondary market under an AUD 100 billion bond purchase program. In February 2021, the RBA announced it would add an additional asset purchase program for another AUD 100 billion, following the completion of the initial program slotted for April 2021.65

On July 6, 2021, the RBA announced the extension of its second government bond purchase program of AUD 100 billion, which was scheduled to be completed in early September 2021. The new purchases amounted to AUD 4 billion per week, to be conducted until at least mid-November 2021 (or a combined AUD 40 billion approximately).66 On September 7, 2021 the RBA announced that the AUD 4 billion weekly purchases would continue until at least mid-February 2022.67 In November 2021, the RBA discontinued its targeting of the 3-year CGB yield, but the unwinding of this policy had a disruptive impact on markets.68 Subsequently, the RBA conducted a review of its yield target policy and acknowledged that the ending of the program was disorderly and was associated with bond market volatility and some market dislocation. The RBA concluded that the experience had caused some damage to its reputation.69

On February 1, 2022, the RBA stated that its bond purchase program would cease after February 12th.70 On March 2, 2022, the RBA balance sheet had grown by almost four-fold relative to its size on January 29, 2020.71 According to the RBA, by February 2022 it owned approximately 35% of outstanding Australian government securities. This compares to only 9% in October 2020.72

71 The RBA total assets on January 29, 2022, and March 2, 2022 were AUD 170.4 billion and AUD 647.5 billion, respectively. For more details please visit: https://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/.
Box 3B.1 (continued)

QE policies, along with flights to quality, exacerbated volatility in the bond market, distorting observed CGB and real yields. In March 2020, the 10-year CGB yield decreased to 0.89%, versus 1.20% in December 2019. At the same time, the 10-year inflation-indexed (i.e., real) yield jumped from 0.21% to 0.65% in March 2020, implying a 10-year breakeven inflation rate of 0.24% (0.89% – 0.65%), at the height of COVID-19. This compares with the 10-year breakeven inflation of 0.99% (1.20% - 0.21%) in December 2019, as shown in Exhibit 3B.6. By the end of 2021, both nominal and real yields rebounded to pre-pandemic levels, while breakeven inflation rose to levels last seen in 2018. Specifically, in December 2021, the yields on 10-year CGB and inflation-indexed bonds reached 1.61% and 0.12%, respectively, implying a 10-year breakeven inflation rate of 1.49%. However, actual inflation had jumped to 7.8% at the end of December (see Exhibit 3B.6).

In May 2022, as inflation pressures continued to build, the RBA decided to officially start quantitative tightening (QT) measures, by not reinvesting the proceeds of maturing government bonds held in its balance sheet. This, together with a series of RBA interest rate rises, contributed to a significant increase in long-term yields and a considerable increase in 10-year breakeven inflation. At the end of June 2022, 10-year CGB nominal and real yields reached 3.77% and 1.70%, respectively, implying a 10-year breakeven inflation of 2.04% \( \frac{(1+3.77\%)}{(1+1.7\%)}-1 \)).

A similar trend was observed in the United States in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis and in the post COVID-19 environment.

Adjusting the Historical ERP

The ERP is the required return for bearing the incremental risk of investing in a diversified portfolio of equities rather than investing in a risk-free asset. It can be viewed as reflecting:

- A view of the level of risk in equity markets.
- Investors’ appetite for risk (i.e., degree of risk aversion).

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74 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 10-Year Breakeven Inflation Rate [T10YIE], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10YIE.
If either, or both, of these vary over time, then it is likely that the forward-looking view of the current ERP will also change over time. In contrast, the Australian historical average ERP, including the incremental return associated with the benefits from the imputation tax credits (i.e., franking credits, later), has been relatively stable. This stable trend can be observed since at least 1990, despite the fact that equity markets have seen some periods of significant volatility and risk-free rates have declined materially during that period. The range of historical ERPs has been between 6.5% and 7.0%, with the most recent update shown at the end of this discussion.75

**Level of Risk**

This analysis starts by looking at the evolution of Australia’s equity risk since the Global Financial Crisis. The forward-looking ERP is not observable directly in the market; however, volatility measures (historical or implied) are often used as proxies for market perceptions of equity risk.

Exhibit 3B.8 illustrates historical and implied volatilities for the Australian stock market since January 2008 (daily). The historical volatility is calculated as an annualized 90-day rolling standard deviation of returns for the Australian stock market benchmark index, the S&P/ASX 200 Index. Forward volatility is represented by the S&P/ASX 200 VIX Index, which is calculated as the implied volatility of 30-day S&P/ASX 200 index options.76 The two volatility measures appear to be highly correlated, despite the higher peaks in the 90-day volatility, with the VIX index leading in several instances, which is understandable given the forward-looking nature of the implied volatility calculations.

The S&P/ASX 200 VIX Index is primarily used as an indicator of investor sentiment and market expectations. Because a volatility index at relatively high levels implies a market expectation of very large changes in the underlying stock market index due to increased risk, while a relatively low value implies a market expectation of very little change (lower risk), the S&P/ASX 200 VIX will often move inversely to the equity market.77

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75 The relative stability is a function of the weight of years: one year with a large positive or negative ERP outcome will have a smaller impact on a long-term average than on a short-term average.

76 The S&P/ASX 200 Volatility Index long-term average is calculated from inception in January 2008 to June 2020.

Exhibit 3B.8: Annualized 90-Day Rolling Historical Volatility of All Ordinaries (ASX) and S&P/ASX 200 VIX Index (January 2008 – June 2023) (Daily)

Source of underlying data: Capital IQ, Yahoo

However, the COVID-19 crisis changed market conditions considerably. The high level of uncertainty about the impact of the pandemic and the subsequent lockdown policies adopted worldwide led to investors’ exodus from risky assets (including equities) into government securities issued by countries considered “safe” from the risk of default. During March and April 2020, the level of both historical and implied volatilities jumped to levels last seen during the Global Financial Crisis. On March 18, 2020, S&P/ASX 200 VIX Index reached a local high of 53.1, but by December 31, 2021 it had declined to 10.6. From January 2022 to June 2023 the index has fluctuated between 10.4 and 23.7 and has averaged 11.9 over the month of June 2023.

Attitude Towards Risk

There is some evidence that investors have become more risk averse since the Global Financial Crisis, resulting in a higher required ERP relative to typical risk-free measures (e.g., the spot yield on 10-year CGBs).

Exhibit 3B.9 shows the spread between BBB-rated corporate bond yields and 10-year CGB yields before and after the Global Financial Crisis. The average spread before the Global Financial Crisis (i.e., from January 2005 to June 2007) was 1.1%, whereas the average spread after the Global Financial Crisis (i.e., from January 2010 onwards) was 2.5%, representing an increase of 1.4% (in absolute terms).

Source of underlying data: Reserve Bank of Australia and Bloomberg

Because corporate bonds are also financial assets with systematic risk, one might assume that the equity premium would move (at a minimum) with perceived risks embedded in the bond premium. On this basis, the current view of a forward ERP might be around 1.4% higher than the historical average. For example, using a historical ERP of 6.9% and adding the 1.4% average corporate credit spread results in an adjusted ERP of 8.3%. An average of the two indications (6.9% and 8.3%) results in a 7.6% ERP.

**Implied ERP as a Forward View**

Some researchers and regulatory agencies use a version of the Dividend Discount Model (DDM) to estimate a forward-looking measure of the expected equity market return, and then deduct the current risk-free rate to estimate an implied ERP.

There is a website that has gained some recognition in the valuation world by showing implied ERP estimates over time for a variety of countries. This site estimated an implied Australian ERP at the end of June 2023 of 3.3% (an indication significantly lower than the historical ERP), which compares with an implied ERP of approximately 5.0% in February 2020, immediately prior to the onset of the pandemic. This decline in implied ERP estimates is inconsistent with corporate bond risk premia and short-term market volatility trends.

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78 For more details about the methodology and data used in the implied Australia ERP derived using this model, please visit: http://www.market-risk-premia.com/au.html.
The range of implied ERPs for Australia is also quite wide, varying from 2.4% to 7.7% over the entire time horizon (January 1998–June 2023, monthly) for which the Australian implied ERP is calculated. The lower end of the range may represent an unreasonable proxy for a forward-looking ERP estimate. However, the general trends over time do appear, in general, to reflect substantive changes in market volatility: the implied Australian ERP estimates are consistent with other risk measures discussed earlier. For example, the highest implied ERP of 7.7% was reached in November 2008, at the height of the Global Financial Crisis. More importantly, after COVID-19 was declared a pandemic on March 11, 2020, there was noticeable surge in the implied ERP for Australia, reaching a high of 6.8% at the end of March. This was followed by a decline through the end of June 2022, which is consistent with the fall in market volatility, but this implied ERP measure has yet to reflect the increase in equity market volatility towards the end of the 2022 financial year.

The Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) estimates WACCs for setting prices in a range of monopoly businesses in New South Wales (e.g., water, electricity, gas, transportation).\(^{79}\) It estimates a high, low, and mid-point WACC for each business using current market data in one estimate and long-term averages in another. The current market estimate for the ERP is a weighted average of six Dividend Discount Models.\(^{80}\) This is a possible way to reflect a forward-based ERP estimate. The Queensland Competition Authority also uses a blend of historical estimates, forward-looking estimates, and judgement to estimate an ERP for monopoly infrastructure pricing.\(^{81}\)

In its most recent bi-annual update in August 2023, IPART provided a few different ERP indications: a current estimate of 6.9% and a longer-term 10-year estimate of 6.0%. The current ERP was based on the indications of six different models, which IPART labels and short-run ERPs.\(^{82}\)

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\(^{79}\) Note that this is not the only regional regulatory authority in Australia performing cost of capital estimates for regulated industries. Others exist and IPART is highlighted for illustration purposes. Moreover, cost of capital decisions for regulatory purposes may differ from what would be used by valuation professionals in other contexts and for other purposes.

\(^{80}\) The Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) forms a view of an appropriate ERP using a similar logic of an average of historical and current ERP measures. IPART’s estimate of the current rate is based on several forward-looking models. See IPART, (2013) “Review of WACC Methodology: Research – Final Report”, December. Frequent updates are also available on IPART’s website at https://www.ipart.nsw.gov.au/Home.


Developing a Reasonable Range for Australian ERP Estimates

To the extent that the realized (i.e., historical) ERP equates on average to expected premia in prior periods, the historical average ERP may be a useful starting point in developing a current forward-looking ERP estimate. A reason one might look to the historical ERP is that the expectations of investors will be framed from their experiences, and the average historical ERP might be expected to have an influence on investors’ expectations about the future. Hence there is usually at least some reliance on average historical ERPs when developing current forward-looking ERP estimates.

However, this does not mean that the ERP estimate should be static over time. Periods of market stability (low volatility) likely indicate that the current forward-looking ERP estimate is below the historical average, and periods of heightened volatility likely indicate that the current forward-looking ERP estimate is above the historical average.

At the end of 2019, observed volatility was not far different from historical levels of volatility. However, there is evidence of investors requiring a higher premium per unit of risk in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis relative to prior to the crisis. Therefore, a current forward-looking Australia ERP estimate as of June 2023 in the range of 6.0% to 7.0% appears reasonable, with a preference for the higher end of the range of 7.0%, largely influenced by the risk premia in the bond market.

COVID-19 upended the global economy and created an even higher level of uncertainty about short-term and medium-term economic growth prospects. Australia, like most countries in the world, adopted a lockdown policy that restricted population movement and closed businesses. The economy rebounded in 2021, but considering the headwinds inflicted by the Russia-Ukraine war and the recent inflationary pressures, the shape and the time of the recovery have become more uncertain. As such, an even higher ERP may be considered reasonable as of June 30, 2023 (relative to year-end 2019).

Curiously, the above-mentioned CAANZ survey found that 20% of respondents used an ERP in the range 5.0% to 5.9%, but the majority (59%) was in the range 6.0 to 6.9%, despite a tendency to slightly lower estimates relative to the 2021 survey. This is largely consistent with the 2023 survey by Fernandez et al with 39 respondents which reported an average of 6.2% (but a range from 3.3% to 15.0%, with a median of 6.0%).

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83 Alternatively, to the extent that prior events are not expected to reoccur, such samples may need to be adjusted to remove the effects of these nonrecurring events.

Concluding on an ERP Estimate for Australia

An estimate of an ERP in Australia is impacted by the Dividend Imputation Tax System which provides tax relief on dividends paid to Australian taxpayers out of Australian earnings, but not to overseas investors. Historical estimates of the ERP will vary as some ignore this impact while others consider them partially or fully.

Overview of the Australian Dividend Imputation Tax System

In 1987, Australia introduced an imputation tax system, with the objective of removing double taxation to shareholders from the receipt of dividend income. In the classical tax system, dividend income is taxed twice: once at the corporation level and once at the shareholder level.

Under the dividend imputation tax system, when a dividend is paid out of Australian earned corporate profits that have been taxed at the statutory corporate tax rate, the shareholder receives a cash dividend plus an imputation tax "credit". This tax credit was changed to a rebate after July 2000 enabling it to be included in tax returns to offset, or in some cases, more than offset individual income tax obligations. An outcome is that tax is effectively only levied at the personal level while debt and equity income are taxed similarly. Overseas investors are precluded from claiming the imputation tax credits. Therefore, it is often the case that not all of the overall distributed imputation credits can be utilized by a company’s shareholders. Accordingly, local resident tax-paying shareholders will value these imputation tax credits, while other investors will not.

Consequently, Australian resident taxpayers earn an additional return over and above capital gains and dividends compared with overseas investors. This extra return is not captured in published total return (accumulation) indices for the Australian stock market. As a result, traditional historical ERP computations will not capture this incremental return accruing to Australian resident tax-paying shareholders. Additional procedures are needed to estimate an ERP for these investors, so that the incremental return associated with the benefits from the imputation tax credits (a.k.a. franking credits) can be captured. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully address how dividend imputation tax systems work in practice or how to place a value on such imputation credits. Several academic papers have been written on the subject, including some focused in the Australian market.\(^85\)

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Australian Equity Risk Premium Under Three Investor Perspectives

The historical ERP in Australia has been estimated from an Australian investor perspective (in AUD) over different periods by researchers and regulatory authorities. It is not our intent to summarize or reconcile that body of work.86

Dr. Bishop estimated the historical Australian ERP for the period of 1900 to 2022 under three different investor perspectives: (i) an Australian investor (in Australian Dollars, or AUD) with access to (i.e., eligible to receive) imputation tax benefits; (ii) an investor in AUD without access to imputation tax benefits; and (iii) a U.S. investor (in U.S. Dollars, or USD) without access to imputation tax benefits.

Exhibit 3B.10: Estimated Australian ERP Under Three Investor Perspectives Based On Dr. Bishop’s Analysis, as Calculated over the Period 1900 – 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investor Type</th>
<th>Australian Investor with Access to Imputation Tax Benefits (AUD) (%)</th>
<th>Investor in AUD without Access to Imputation Tax Benefits (AUD) (%)</th>
<th>U.S. Investor Perspective without Access to Imputation Tax Benefits (USD) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geometric Average ERP</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arithmetic Average ERP</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Explanation and Source of underlying data: Imputation tax benefits were included in the total return to shareholders by adding a yield calculated as dividend yield * (company tax rate) / (1 - company tax rate) * % dividends franked * PV factor. For current purposes, the PV factor used reflected the underlying risk of the market. The PV (present value) factor captures the loss in value of $1 of imputation tax benefits distributed but not claimed until personal tax returns are filed (assumed to be a delay of 9 months). Data from 1900 to 1980 was from Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns and Yearbook 2018, as was the data underlying the changes in the real exchange rate. Subsequent return data was from the All Ordinaries Accumulation and Price Index series, with the Australian Tax Office being used for the percentage of franked dividend data for the period of 1997 and onward, while an average franking rate was applied to the prior period data (where applicable). Australian long-term government bond return data until 1986 was from Officer, R.R. (1989) “Rates of Return to Shares, Bond Yields and Inflation Rates: An Historical Perspective”, in Ball, Brown, Finn, and Officer, “Share Markets and Portfolio Theory: Readings and Australian Evidence”, second edition, University of Queensland Press; then Reserve Bank of Australia for the periods thereafter. Inflation data was from the Australian Retail Price Index until December 1948 and the Australian Consumer Price Index thereafter.

The geometric average and the arithmetic average realized ERP were both calculated relative to Australian long-term government bonds, as illustrated in Exhibit 3B.10,87, 88 Both the geometric and arithmetic average ERP indications were estimated directly from the underlying data.

The Global Financial Crisis has had a significant impact on capital markets and ERP indications. ERP is forward-looking and it will change over time to reflect the financial and economic conditions as of a certain valuation date. In a relatively recent research paper, Dr. Bishop and his co-authors proposed a method for adjusting the ERP to reflect unusual risk situations, such as the Global Financial Crisis. Based on this work, the authors would expect the ERP to vary beyond the widely accepted range of 6% to 7% in high- and low-risk market environments such as the COVID-19 pandemic. This would be applicable to all three types of investors in Australia outlined above.89

Other methods include using a DDM and historical information to make an adjustment to reflect current attitudes to risk and the level of risk.

87 All additions and subtractions were performed in geometric terms, with the exception of the arithmetic average indication (the last step in each of the columns).

88 For a detailed discussion of Dr. Bishop’s Australian ERP estimates, including a decomposition of each these estimates into its underlying elements (i.e., dividend yield, growth rate of real dividends, expansion of price-to-dividend ratio, and changes in real exchange rate), please see the Resources Library of the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module at kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator.

Appendix 3C
Additional Sources of Equity Risk Premium Data – Canada

The Cost of Capital Navigator's International Cost of Capital Module at kroll.com/cost-of-capital includes equity risk premia (ERPs) estimates for 28 economies around the world, through December 2022.¹ Appendices 3A through 3C provide additional sources of international ERP information that could be utilized to either adjust or corroborate historical measures of ERPs.

In Appendix 3C of the Valuation Handbook – International Guide to Cost of Capital – 2023 Summary Edition, we provide ERP information specifically focused on Canada. We asked Dr. Laurence Booth, who is renowned in Canada for his ERP research, to assist us in developing the forward-looking ERP and base cost of equity estimates for Canada included in Appendix 3C.²

In arriving at his ERP estimates, Professor Booth has also considered the current state of the Canadian government bond market and corresponding impact on the risk-free rate, as documented herein. As a reminder, the risk-free rate and the ERP are interrelated concepts. All ERP estimates are, by definition, developed in relation to the risk-free rate. Specifically, the ERP is the extra return investors expect as compensation for assuming the additional risk associated with an investment in a diversified portfolio of common stocks, compared to the return they would expect from an investment in risk-free securities.

Throughout this appendix, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) currency codes will be used as a convention: CAD stands for Canadian Dollars, while USD stands for U.S. Dollars.

The Current State of the Canadian Bond Market, and an Estimate of the Canadian Equity Risk Premium

The equity risk premium, or ERP, is the difference between the required return on equities and a risk-free instrument. For long-lived investments and asset allocation, the risk-free rate is normally proxied by a default-free long-term government bond. In simple terms, using portfolio theory, the ERP is determined by the relative riskiness of the two instruments (government debt vs. equities) and the level of risk aversion in the market. A default view is to assume these risks

¹ Long-horizon historical ERPs for 16 countries are calculated annually as of December 31. The remaining 12 countries rely on a Eurozone ERP.
² Dr. Laurence Booth is a Professor of Finance and the CIT Chair in Structured Finance at the Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto. His major research interests are in corporate finance and the behavior of regulated industries. He has published extensively in top academic and professional journals and is the co-author of three major textbooks: International Business, Introduction to Corporate Finance, and Corporate Finance. The latter book was the first Wiley Canada text to be edited for sale in the United States. Professor Booth is on the editorial board of five academic journals and in 2003 was awarded the Financial Post's Leader in Management Education Award.
are being driven by demand factors (i.e. investor demand for risk-free securities vs. equities). Until the 2008–2009 global financial crisis (GFC), the relative riskiness of these instruments was regarded as quite stable, so historically, academics tended to look at the long-run realized returns on equities and government bonds as indicative of the ERP. However, in practice, there is also the possibility of a relative change in the supply of equities versus bonds, particularly as governments have become more interventionist in the economy and run budget deficits (to finance spending), which may affect the ERP.

We can assess the impact of the supply of government bonds on the ERP by looking at government deficits, which in Canada is called “net lending” by Statistics Canada. Traditionally, capital has been in short supply in Canada relative to demand, since Canada in many ways was considered a periphery market. This shortage was worsened in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s when the Government of Canada crowded out private borrowers from the bond market, forcing many, including the Canadian provinces, into the U.S. market (see the middle of Exhibit 3C.1). This crowding-out, or supply-side effect was reduced only after the government budget moved from deficits to surpluses in the late 1990s. After that, the Canadian government started running persistent surpluses, which reduced both the absolute and relative supply of Government of Canada bonds (see the mid-right section of Exhibit 3C.1). Canada went back to having federal deficits in the aftermath of the 2008–2009 GFC, but returned to a balanced budget by the mid-2010s, which persisted until the COVID-19 pandemic hit.

In March 2020 when the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic, Canada issued stay-at-home orders and some businesses were forced to close. To help workers and business weather these uncertain times the Canadian federal government provided extensive financial support. This resulted in a massive government budget deficit, larger than any seen since the end of World War II, reaching over 10% of GDP at the height of the crisis (see the rightmost section of Exhibit 3C.1).3 All else equal, a significant increase in the supply of government debt instruments would lower their prices and therefore increase yields (yields move in the opposite direction of yields). However, unlike during the GFC, the Bank of Canada resorted to unconventional monetary policies by purchasing huge amounts of government debt (known as quantitative easing or QE), with the objective of lowering both long-term and short-term interest rates and injecting liquidity into the financial system, which the central thought would support the economy. These polices lasted into 2021 as the COVID-19 emergency retreated, but by 2022 the aggregate government deficit approached zero as pandemic-related spending decreased.

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Exhibit 3C.1: Federal Surplus or Deficit [-] as Percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 1952–2022

Source of underlying data: Statistics Canada. The Federal Surplus or Deficit is calculated as the ratio of Consolidated Federal Government Budget, measured as Net Lending or Borrowing by the Canadian government (CANSIM Table: 10-10-0015-01) to nominal GDP (CANSIM Table: 36-10-0104-01). Data accessed as of October 2023.¹

Exhibit 3C.2 depicts U.S. and Canadian long-term government bond yields since 1994 through 2022. There are two major insights that can be gleaned from Exhibit 3C.2: (i) the collapse in the level of sovereign yields in both the U.S. and Canada since the 1990s as inflation came down when both countries adopted a 2% inflation target, and (ii) the change in the relationship between yields in Canada versus the U.S.²,³

⁴ Net Lending or Borrowing by the Canadian Government series is annualized by taking the sum of all quarters within the year. The Canadian nominal GDP series is annualized by averaging reported annualized quarterly GDP numbers.


⁶ Technically, the Federal Reserve (Fed, the U.S. central bank) did not officially adopt an inflation target until 2012. Until then, the inflation target was used by Fed staff starting with the 1990s, but debates were ongoing on whether an official target was needed, and which number should be used as the target. In 2020, the policy was adjusted to target an average of 2.0% over time. In other words, following periods when inflation runs persistently below 2%, the Fed stated that monetary policy would likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2% for some time in order to achieve that average of 2%. For more details, see (1) Shapiro, Adam and Daniel J. Wilson, “The Evolution of the FOMC’s Explicit Inflation Target”, FRBSF Economic Letter 2019-12, April 15, 2019, available here: https://www.frbsf.org/research-and-insights/publications/economic-letter/2019/04/evolution-of-fomc-explicit-inflation-target/; and (2) Federal Open Market Committee’s “2020 Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy”, Adopted Effective January 24, 2012; as Amended Effective August 27, 2020, available here: https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-statement-on-longer-run-goals-monetary-policy-strategy.htm.


In the mid-1990s Canadian yields averaged 1.1% more than those in the U.S., primarily due to: (i) the large budget deficits in Canada and greater supply of Canadian government bonds in the market, and (ii) the international importance of the U.S. government bond market.

This started to change as Canadian government budgets became more balanced and the supply of bonds dropped (i.e., consistent with lower budget deficits). From 1997 until 2005, Canadian and U.S. government bond yields were similar, with Canadian yields sometimes slightly above and sometimes slightly below those in the U.S. From 2006 until December 2022 the Canadian long-term government bond yields have been on average 0.42% below those in the U.S. This difference in yields approached zero or reversed only during crises periods: the GFC, the 2011–2012 Euro sovereign debt crisis, and briefly at the height of COVID-19 crisis in Spring 2020, but reverted back to the same pattern since then. From March 2020 to December 2022, the yield on Canadian government bonds was on average 0.30% below that on U.S. government bonds.

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7 Canadian data based on the average yield on Government of Canada Marketable Bonds with maturities over 10 years. U.S. data based on 20-year constant maturity U.S. Treasury yields.
Lower long-term Canadian government bond yields have not translated into significantly lower borrowing costs for A-rated corporate debt issuers in Canada, primarily due to the importance of changes in the Government of Canada segment of the Canadian bond market (rather than changes in the overall market). Prior to 2002, A-rated corporate debt spreads were similar in both countries (see Exhibit 3C.3). After 2002, Canadian credit spreads have tended to be wider (i.e., larger) than those in the U.S. The only exceptions were observed during the GFC, the 2011 Euro sovereign debt crises, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

In 2022, Canadian A-rated corporate bond spreads (over Canadian government bonds) have been fairly stable and averaged 0.47% wider than those in the U.S. This compares to the 0.51% difference in spreads from 2013 through the end of 2022. This suggests that the Canadian corporate bond market has not been as affected by supply and demand changes as that seen for Canadian government bonds. Interestingly, the average difference between U.S. and Canadian government bond yields in 2022 is also exactly 0.47%, but in an opposite direction (i.e., U.S. government bond yields are higher than Canada’s).

**Exhibit 3C.3:** Canadian and U.S. A-rated Corporate Bond Spreads
January 1996–December 2022

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**Source of underlying data:** U.S. data sourced from Bank America Merrill Lynch’s U.S. A-rated Option-adjusted Spread. The Canadian data is based on the spread between DataStream series SCM1ALG for A-rated corporate issuers and SCMCLNG for government bonds.

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8 U.S. banks were far more exposed to the 2008-2009 GFC and the 2012 European debt crisis than Canadian banks.
9 Some of the increased demand for Canadian government debt has come from sovereigns holding it for balance of payment purposes, as Canada is one of the last AAA-rated issuers remaining.
At the end of 2022, Canada was still perceived as one of a very small number of safe-haven countries with a AAA sovereign credit rating, and thus an attractive destination to invest central bank reserves. This is the case, despite a downgrade by Fitch Ratings on June 24, 2020 of Canada’s rating from AAA to AA+, citing the deterioration of public finances as a result of the pandemic (this rating was reaffirmed in 2021, 2022, and 2023). However, the two other major ratings agencies (namely, S&P Global Ratings and Moody’s) did not share the same opinion and reaffirmed their top rating of AAA for Canada at the height of the pandemic as well as in 2021, 2022 and 2023.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) collects data from 149 reporters on world currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves. This data shows that the proportion of official foreign exchange reserves allocated to Canadian dollars has marginally changed over the last five years, even after an increase in debt issuance by the Canadian government and Fitch’s downgrade in 2020. The IMF started to report data on reserves holdings in Canadian dollars in the last quarter of 2012. At that point in time, Canadian securities held in official reserves amounted to USD 86 billion, or 1.43% of total worldwide allocated reserves. This amount represented 13.7% of the outstanding bills and bonds issued by the Canadian government. Since then, total official foreign exchange reserves grew considerably worldwide, while the demand for Canadian dollars also followed. On a relative basis, Canadian dollar claims continued to represent a small percentage of world foreign exchange reserves, stabilizing at around 2% for most of the period 2016–2020. At the end of the June 2023, this percentage had increased to 2.49% which represents 29.5% of outstanding bills and bonds issued by the Canadian government.

11 For more information about Fitch Rating’s most recent decisions on Canada’s sovereign rating please visit: https://www.fitchratings.com/ent/ce?code=CA&countryCode=CA&regulation=4.
For more information about S&P Global Ratings’ decision in 2022, please visit: https://disclosure.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/-/view/type/HTML/id/2831976.
15 The percentages were 1.8%, 1.9%, 2.0%, 1.8%, 1.9%, and 2.1% for end of 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020, respectively.
16 The total amount of outstanding Canadian Bonds and Bills is CAD 1,247.4 billion and the amount held in official reserves around the world is CAD 368.4 billion. Sources: Bank of Canada (https://www.bankofcanada.ca/markets/government-securities-auctions/goc-t-bills-and-bonds-outstanding/) and the IMF, respectively.
The issuance of Canadian government securities grew modestly over the last decade with the exception of 2020, leading to an increase in Canadian securities held in foreign reserves as a percentage of all outstanding Canadian government bills and bonds. As the Bank of Canada statement explained in 2015:

“*In the post-crisis [2008 Financial Crisis] period, Canada has experienced sizable foreign portfolio investment flows, particularly in Government of Canada (GoC) bonds, which has resulted in an increase in the share of GoC bonds held by foreigners. These portfolio investment inflows had a significant downward influence on interest rates in Canada*”.

The other major trend is the temporal change in the level of government interest rates in both the U.S. and Canada. For example, in May 2020 the average nominal yield on Canadian long-term government bonds (those with maturities greater than 10 years) was 0.95%, or 1.05% below the Bank of Canada’s 2.0% inflation target, which historically is abnormally low and implies a negative real interest rate. Several academics have suggested that this is part of a global trend towards declining nominal and negative real interest rates, but this trend has been exacerbated by the flight to safety during the pandemic and the implementation of massive unconventional bond buying programs by major central banks including the Bank of Canada.

With the surge in global inflation in 2022, partly due to pandemic-related supply-demand imbalances (stemming from a combination of supply chain disruptions after COVID-10 lockdowns and increased consumer demand supported by fiscal stimulus packages), and exacerbated by Russia’s war on Ukraine, central banks had to shift gears. Major central banks, like the Bank of Canada and the Federal Reserve, embarked on an aggressive interest rate hiking cycle and began unwinding their QE programs. The combination of these trends led long-term Canada bond yields to increase rapidly (see rightmost section of Exhibit 3C.2), finishing at 3.3% at the end of 2022. However, this was still significantly lower than equivalent U.S. government bond yields on the same date.

**Monetary Policy’s Effect on Rates**

Bank of Canada researchers Eric Santor and Lena Suchanek analyzed the impact of “unconventional monetary policy” by the major central banks around the world, where “unconventional” is their euphemism for massive bond-buying programs (i.e., “quantitative easing” or “QE”). These researchers estimated that as of the end of 2015:

- The Federal Reserve had bought USD 4.2 trillion in bonds, amounting to 18% of the U.S. Treasury Bond market and 28% of the agency and mortgage-backed security markets.

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18 Average yield on Canadian long-term government bonds (those with maturities greater than 10 years) was obtained from government of Canada statistics (CANSIM) Table: 10-10-0122-01.
• The Bank of England had bought 32% of the U.K. government bond market.

• The European Central Bank had bought 21% of the Eurozone government debt market.

• The Bank of Japan had bought 36% of the Japanese government bond market.

In total, these purchases amounted to almost CAD 13 trillion (or USD 10 trillion), depending on the exchange rates used. Since this study was prepared, the share of government bonds held by central banks globally has increased further, especially after the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. Total assets held by the Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of England and Bank of Japan reached a combined record high of approximately USD 26 trillion in February 2022. With some unwinding of QE polices, the combined balances sheets of these banks saw a small decline to USD 22.4 trillion by the end of June 2023. The increase in total assets held by these banks between the end of February 29, 2020 (pre-pandemic) and June 30, 2023 was approximately 46.5%.22

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Bank of Canada introduced its own QE program for the first time. It committed to temporarily buy 40% of all Canadian Treasury bills offered at auction and CAD 5 billion of Canadian federal government bonds each week, as well as corporate and provincial government bonds.23 As a result, the balance sheet of the Bank of Canada increased from CAD 154.1 billion on March 25, 2020 to a record high of CAD 575.4 billion on March 10, 2021, an increase of 273%.24

As the economy improved and the need for QE decreased, the Bank of Canada decided to start unwinding its QE measures.25 On October 27, 2021, the Bank of Canada ended the expansion of its QE program and announced a move into the reinvestment phase effective November 1, 2021.26 This meant that no new net purchases would take place and the size of its balance sheet would remain at similar levels.

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21 During 2016 and 2017, new rounds of QE were implemented by the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, and the Bank of England. For a summary discussion on this topic, refer to the Cost of Capital Navigator’s U.S. Cost of Capital Module’s “Resources Library” at kroll.com/cost-of-capital.

22 The sum of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan was USD 15.3 trillion on February 29, 2020 and stood at USD 24.4 trillion at the end of June 2023. Source of data: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis database, FRED and the Bank of England.

23 The Bank of Canada announced on March 27, 2020 the launch of a program to purchase in the secondary market a minimum of CAD 5 billion per week of Government of Canada securities across the yield curve. The program’s effective start date was April 1, 2020. See more details here: https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2020/03/operational-details-for-the-secondary-market-purchases-of-government-of-canada-securities/. In addition, on April 15, 2020, the Bank of Canada announced an increase in the amount of treasury bills it acquired at auctions to a maximum of 40%, up from 25%, as a means to support market liquidity. https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2020/04/bank-canada-announces-increase-amount-government-canada-treasury-bills/.


25 On April 21, 2021, the Bank of Canada lowered the minimum amount of federal government bonds it would purchase per week to CAD 3 billion from CAD 4 billion and discontinued its corporate and provincial bonds purchase program. This announcement made the Bank of Canada the first major central bank to decelerate the pace of its QE program. More details available here: https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2021/04/fad-press-release-2021-04-21/.

26 The Bank of Canada announced that it will keep the stock of Government Bonds of Canada “roughly” constant. The target range for total purchases would initially be between CAD 4 billion and CAD 5 billion per month and it will be adjusted as needed. Details of the announcement can be found here: https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2021/10/balance-sheet-operations-for-the-reinvestment-of-proceeds-of-maturing-government-of-canada-bonds/.
Following this period of extraordinary stimulus, the Bank of Canada increased its policy interest rate on March 2, 2022, for the first time since the outbreak of COVID-19. In addition, on April 25, 2022 the Bank of Canada announced the end of the reinvestment phase of its asset purchase program and the beginning of quantitative tightening (QT). This meant that maturing Government of Canada bonds would no longer be replaced and as a result, the size of the balance sheet would decline over time. In fact, by June 28, 2023 the balance sheet of the Bank of Canada stood at CAD 357.5 billion, a decrease of 38% from the peak reached in late February 2021. Moreover, with successive interest rate hikes, its target rate (the overnight rate) reached 4.75% by June 2023. This was a response to global inflationary pressures stemming from the pandemic that were exacerbated by the invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24, 2022.

The specific objective of this unconventional monetary policy was to support short-term liquidity and lower long-term interest rates, while still using conventional monetary policy to lower short-term interest rates. The Bank of Canada was successful in reaching its objective during the pandemic recovery period, with long-term rates going briefly below 1.0% and even now, after several interest rate hikes, long-term interest rates are relatively low compared to historical levels observed prior to the GFC.

To assess how much current government bond yields have been distorted by unconventional monetary policies across the globe, Professor Booth performed a regression analysis of the real Canadian bond yield since 1936 against six independent variables. These six independent variables are defined as follows: risk, the budget surplus/deficit, and four indicator variables that capture periods of unconventional intervention in financial markets, largely by central banks. These periods are: (i) both World War II and its aftermath ("War"); (ii) the 1970s period of the global oil crisis ("Petro"); and (iii) the period following the 2008 global financial crisis, when bond-buying programs by major central banks became a significant factor influencing global interest rates ("Crisis"), and an “extra” dummy variable for 2020 reflecting the Bank of Canada’s resort to unconventional monetary policy in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The real Canadian yield is defined here as the average yield on long-term Canadian government bonds (those with a maturity over 10 years) minus the average Consumer Price Index (CPI) rate of inflation, calculated as the average of the current, past, and forward-year rates of inflation. The results of the impact of each of these six variables on Canadian real long-term yields are shown in Exhibit 3C.4. This regression model explained approximately 87% (adjusted R-squared) of the variation in Canada’s real yields, and each of the explanatory (or independent) variables was statistically significant.

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27 Details of the announcement can be found here: https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2022/04/bank-of-canada-provides-operational-details-for-quantitative-tightening-and-announces-that-it-will-continue-to-implement-monetary-policy-using-a-floor-system/.

28 The total assets of the BOC were CAD 576.5 billion and of at the end of February 2021 and CAD 357.5 billion at the end of June 2023, respectively. Source: Bank of Canada. https://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/banking-and-financial-statistics/bank-of-canada-assets-and-liabilities-month-end-formerly-b1/.

29 The yield on the Government of Canada Benchmark Bond – Long Term reached 0.71%, its lowest level, on March 9, 2020, and was below 1% for 9.5% of the days between March 13, 2020 (when COVID-19 was declared a pandemic by the WHO) and December 31, 2020. Other long-term Canadian interest rates benchmarks have experienced below 1% levels more often. The yields on the Government of Canada Marketable Bonds – Average Yield Over 10 Years and the 10-year Government of Canada Benchmark bond were below 1% on respectively 45.2% and 94.8% of the time, between March 13, 2020 and December 31, 2020.

30 Before 1991 there was no real return bond in Canada.
Exhibit 3C.4: Factors Influencing Canadian Long-Term Real Yields and Their Impact Calculated through 2022

The two main independent variables in the regression analysis are:

- **Risk**: Bond market uncertainty (risk), which affects the *demand* for government bonds. Risk is defined as the standard deviation of the returns on long-term Canada government bonds over the preceding ten years.

- **Budget Surplus/Deficit**: Government deficit, which affects supply of government bonds. Budget Surplus/Deficit is defined as the aggregate government (net) lending as a percentage of nominal GDP. This has a negative coefficient, which means that if the government runs a surplus, the impact is negative on real rates. Conversely, when the government runs a deficit, there is an upward pressure on real rates.

All other things held the same, more uncertainty (risk) or a greater supply of government securities (i.e., more debt issuance and larger deficits) cause bond values (prices) to fall and interest rates to rise (note: bond yields move in the opposite direction of bond prices). The coefficient on the bond market risk variable in Exhibit 3C.4 indicates that for every 1% increase in volatility, real Canada yields are expected to increase by about 24 basis points. The coefficient on the budget surplus/deficit variable in Exhibit 3C.4 indicates that for every 1% increase in the budget surplus (deficit), the real Canada yield is expected to decrease (increase) by 25 basis points. Historically, a relative increase in government borrowing has driven up real interest rates.

The economic impact of these two demand and supply variables has been relatively constant since Professor Booth started this line of analysis in 1995. When these two effects are added together, he can explain the huge increase in real yields in the early 1990s. For example, in 1994 real yields exceeded 7%. According to this model, the budget deficit contributed about 1.71% (= -6.84% 1994 deficit * -0.25 coefficient) to the overall real yield (difference due to rounding), whereas bond market uncertainty contributed with another 2.64% (=11.0% bond market risk * 0.24 coefficient) increase. These factors together contributed 4.35 (=1.71% + 2.64%) to the real yield, which represented three-quarters of this model’s predicted yield.
In addition to the demand and supply variables, there are four “indicator” variables in this analysis that represent unique periods of intervention in financial markets.31 The indicator variables are summarized as follows:

- **War**: War captures the years from 1940–1951, which includes both World War II and its aftermath (the “war” years), when interest rates were controlled to finance the war and the subsequent reconstruction efforts. The coefficient indicates that government controls like those imposed during these years reduced real Canada yields by over 5.31% below where they would otherwise have been.32,33

- **Petro**: Petro captures the years 1972–1980, which were the global oil crisis years, when huge amounts of “petrodollars” were recycled from the suddenly rich Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) back to Western capital markets, thereby essentially acting as a tax to depress real yields. The coefficient indicates that this recycling and the oil crisis reduced real yields by about 3.63% below where they would otherwise have been.

- **Crisis**: Crisis captures the recent period of unconventional monetary policy from 2010 through 2021. The coefficient indicates that bond buying measures like those imposed from 2010–2021 taken primarily by central banks in the U.S., U.K., Eurozone, Japan, and more recently Canada, reduced real yields by about 2.69% below where they would otherwise have been.

- **COVID-19**: COVID-19 captures the years 2020–2022 and the fact that during the COVID pandemic, even the Bank of Canada intervened with unconventional monetary policy. As a result, as well as indirect effects from a spill-over of bond buying elsewhere, the Bank of Canada’s bond buying program reduced real yields by 6.38%.

---

31 Indicator variables are sometimes referred to as “dummy” variables. The indicator variable in this case inserts a “1” for the years when a unique period of intervention in the financial markets is present, and a “0” for the years when it is not present.

32 We normally refer to these years of financial repression as periods when governments needed to get their war debt back to normal levels.

33 This is akin to the “World War II Interest Rate Bias” years in the U.S., as discussed in the Cost of Capital Navigator’s U.S. Cost of Capital Module’s “Resources Library” at kroll.com/cost-of-capital. From 1942 through 1951, the U.S. Treasury decreed that interest rates had to be kept at artificially low levels to reduce government financing costs related to World War II. “Basic Building Blocks of the Cost of Equity Capital – Risk-free Rate & Equity Risk Premium”.
Conclusions

There is a wealth of data on rates of return. These estimates are extremely useful in constraining the exercise of judgment, but they also assume that the process generating the experienced equity risk premium is stationary, which implies that estimating over longer time horizons delivers a better estimate of the equity risk premium.\textsuperscript{34,35} However, the historical record also indicates that the average return on the government bond has not been constant and in particular imparts a noticeable bias when we average the data back versus forward; that is, we get a different interpretation based on how we order the data. For this reason, adding more data may not be as useful as understanding what has happened in the bond market.

In standard finance models the equity risk premium reflects the price of risk, as investors trade-off the higher expected return from the riskier security against its increased risk.\textsuperscript{36} It may be plausible that this price of risk should be relatively constant, since it reflects the aggregate risk aversion of the investing public. However, in such models, debt is in zero excess supply and there is no government or monetary policy. Yet, the dominant fact since the 1930s has been the growth in the size of government and regulation, and since 2008 the key players in capital markets have been the central banks.\textsuperscript{37}

Overall, Professor Booth concludes:

- The historical Canadian equity risk premium as calculated over the time horizon 1926–2022 is somewhat below 5.0% (based on arithmetic mean returns) and lower than the approximate 6.0% arithmetic value for the U.S.\textsuperscript{38,39,40}

\textsuperscript{34} The historical equity risk premium has not been constant, primarily due to changes in the bond market over time. To some extent the huge cycle in Canadian bond yields, increasing from the approximate 4% average level of 1957, after markets were liberalized, to the approximate 15% level of 1981, and back down to the approximate 4% level of 2007–2008 completed an adjustment to changes in fiscal versus monetary policy. However, since 2009 long-term Canada bond yields have dropped to the anomalous levels observed until 2021.

\textsuperscript{35} For a summary discussion of equity risk premium estimation methodologies and the changing relationship between equities and the so-called risk-free security, refer to the Cost of Capital Navigator’s U.S. Cost of Capital Module’s “Resources Library” at kroll.com/cost-of-capital. See “Basic Building Blocks of the Cost of Equity Capital – Risk-free Rate and Equity Risk Premium”. For example, the capital asset pricing model or CAPM.

\textsuperscript{36} A simple listing of the key government initiatives in the U.S. introduced by President Roosevelt’s New Deal which have never been reversed would take several pages.

\textsuperscript{37} The Canadian and U.S. equity risk premia reported in this Appendix 3C are calculated as the historical difference between the total returns of equities (“stocks”) and the total returns of the risk-free security (“long-term government bonds”). If one were to use the income returns of the risk-free security, these ERP estimates would be higher.

\textsuperscript{38} Kroll employs a multi-faceted analysis to estimate a “conditional” ERP that considers a broad range of economic information and multiple ERP estimation methodologies to arrive at its recommendation. The Kroll Recommended U.S. ERP as of December 31, 2022 was 6.0%, developed in relation to a 3.5% “normalized” risk-free rate, implying an 9.5% (3.5% + 6.0%) base cost of equity capital in the U.S. as of the end of 2022. To learn more about cost of capital issues, and to ensure that you are using the most recent Kroll Recommended ERP, visit kroll.com/cost-of-capital, and click “View historical equity risk premium recommendations”.

\textsuperscript{39} There is no “perfect” way of estimating the equity risk premium, and Kroll therefore discusses (and publishes) equity risk premia based upon multiple calculation methodologies, including “historical” equity risk premia (i) for 16 different countries (including the U.S. and Canada) in the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module at kroll.com/cost-of-capital. This methodology is in harmony with the methodology used in all yearly versions of the former Ibbotson/Morningstar International Equity Risk Premium Report (2000 –2013), and in all yearly versions of the former Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation (SBBI) Valuation Yearbook (1999–2013); Using this method, the equivalent arithmetic-average historical ERP would be 5.69% for Canada and 7.17% for the U.S. for the 1926-2022 period.
• The approximate 5.0–6.0% range of the Canadian historical equity risk premium and the historical U.S. equity risk premium is generally consistent with survey data.\textsuperscript{41}

• The drop in Canadian government bond yields (relative to U.S. government bond yields) has not translated into significantly lower borrowing costs for A-rated issuers in Canada relative to their U.S. counterparts. After 2002, except for periods of crisis, such as the 2008–2009 GFC, the 2011 Euro sovereign crises, and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in the first quarter of 2020, Canadian credit spreads have tended to be wider (i.e., larger) than those in the U.S., largely offsetting lower Canadian government bond yields.

• Using an indicator variable for the COVID-19 period, a simple regression analysis indicates that at the end of December 2022, the negative real yield on long-term Canadian Government bonds of 1.85% would have been 3.84% (-2.54%+6.38%) in the absence of the Bank of Canada’s policies.\textsuperscript{42} Using the inflation target of 2%, these rates are consistent with average nominal yields observed during 2000–2002.\textsuperscript{43}

• Estimating the market’s overall expected rate of return or equity cost by adding a realized historical equity risk premium of 5.0% to a current long-term Canada bond yield severely distorted by central bank intervention is not advisable. Instead, Professor Booth suggests that it is important to understand how central bank policies have distorted the base for the equity risk premium model, which is the long-term Canada bond yield.

In 2019, Dr. Booth published an article where he reiterated the message of this appendix.\textsuperscript{44} In this article, he argued that in the then-prevailing Canadian market conditions, using the historical Canadian ERP and Canadian spot risk free rate was inconsistent with the true level of risk in the market, since the risk-free rate was biased low as the base for any risk-return tradeoff that would exist without the presence of central bank bond buying programs. He regards long term yields below 4.0% as anomalous and recommends adjusting the risk-free rate upward to a more appropriate level.


\textsuperscript{42} When the year 2022 is not considered part of the COVID-19 (adoption of a new monetary policy regimen with higher interest rates and a shift away from QE), the implied real (nominal) rate would be 3.69% (5.69%) instead of 3.84% (5.84%).

\textsuperscript{43} The average monthly nominal yields for long-term Canadian bonds over the period 2000-2002 was 5.80%.

Final Thoughts: Kroll Analysis on Methods of Estimating a Normalized Risk-free Rate

To corroborate Professor Booth’s analysis of the Canadian government bond market and his observation that Canadian yields are currently abnormally low, Kroll conducted a separate analysis – similar to that prepared for the U.S. in a sister publication – on possible methods to normalize the risk-free rate.45

Estimating a normalized risk-free rate can be accomplished in a number of ways, including (i) simple averaging, or (ii) various “build-up” methods.

The first method of estimating a normalized risk-free rate entails calculating averages of yields to maturity on long-term government securities over various periods. This method’s implied assumption is that government bond yields revert to the mean. In Exhibit 3C.5, the solid green line is the spot yield on long-term (greater than 10-years) Canadian government bonds (December 2007–June 2023), whereas the dashed dark gray line shows a 2.2% average monthly yield of the long-term (greater than 10-years) Canadian government bond over the previous 10 years ending on June 30, 2023. Canadian government bond spot yields at the end of June 2023 (3.1%) were significantly higher than the monthly average over the last 10 years.46

Exhibit 3C.5: Spot and Average Yields on Long-Term (Greater than 10-years) Canadian Government Bonds December 2007–June 2023

Source of underlying data: Bank of Canada

For a summary discussion of equity risk premium estimation methodologies and changing relationship between equities and the so-called risk-free security, refer to the Cost of Capital Navigator’s U.S. Cost of Capital Module’s “Resources Library” at kroll.com/cost-of-capital.

Taking the average over the last 10 years is a simple way of “normalizing” the risk-free rate. An issue with using historical averages, though, is selecting an appropriate comparison period that can be used as a reasonable proxy for the future.

The second method of estimating a normalized risk-free rate entails using a simple build-up method, where the components of the risk-free rate are estimated and then added together. Conceptually, the risk-free rate can be (loosely) illustrated as the return on the following two components:\(^{47}\)

\[
\text{Risk-Free Rate} = \text{Real Rate} + \text{Expected Inflation}
\]

We assembled data from various sources for long-term Canadian government bonds, which are commonly used as inputs to cost of equity estimates, comparing the estimated normalized rates relative to the spot rates as of June 30, 2023. We present the results of this analysis in Exhibit 3C.6. Adding the estimated ranges for the “real” risk-free rate and long-term inflation expectations together produced an estimated normalized risk-free rate range of 1.6% to 4.1%, with a midpoint of 2.8% and a median of 3.3% for Canada.

For perspective, the annual consumer price inflation had averaged 1.8% in Canada over the 2011–2021 period on a rolling 12-month basis. By contrast, during 2022 inflation has reached multidecade highs, while Russia-Ukraine war exacerbated inflationary pressures, especially in energy prices and pushed long-term inflation expectations higher. In addition, the long-term inflation expectations for Canada increased considerably during 2022. The median long-term inflation expectations for Canada increased from 2.2% at the end of December 2021 to 3.0% at the end of November 2022. This significant change in outlook precipitated an important shift in the Bank of Canada’s monetary policy stance relative to December 2021. The central bank adopted a more restrictive stance by: (i) raising its policy interest rate several times and signaling more hikes to come; and (ii) ending its QE programs.

\(^{47}\) This is a simplified version of the “Fisher equation”, named after Irving Fisher. Fisher’s “The Theory of Interest” was first published by Macmillian (New York), in 1930.
### Exhibit 3C.6: Long-Term Spot and Normalized Risk-Free Rates for Canada as of June 30, 2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method 1: Long-Term Average</th>
<th>Gov’t of Canada Benchmark Bond Yields – Long-term:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Spot Rate</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Long-Term (10-year) Trailing Average Yield</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method 2: Fisher Equation</th>
<th>Estimated Long-term Real Risk-Free Rate</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.6% to 1.7%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2% to 2.4%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range of Estimates</th>
<th>Midpoint</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.6% to 4.1%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Concluded Normalized Risk-free Rate | 3.5% |

How should the analyst use this information? One can calculate the cost of equity by either starting with a normalized risk-free rate or a spot rate. However, it is critical to match the second building block, the estimated ERP, to the selected risk-free rate. There must be internal consistency between these two inputs.

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50 While the overall conclusion for the normalized risk-free rate was 3.5% in June 2023, we have subsequently updated our guidance for Canada. Effective October 18, 2022, we recommend using the spot Government of Canada Benchmark Long-Term Bond yield as the proxy for the risk-free rate if the prevailing yield as of the valuation date is higher than our normalized Canadian risk-free rate of 3.5%. For the latest recommendations on Canada, please visit: https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cost-of-capital/normalized-risk-free-rate-guidance-united-kingdom-canada.
Adjustments to the ERP or to the risk-free rate are, in principle, a response to the same underlying concerns and should result in broadly similar costs of capital. Adjusting the risk-free rate in conjunction with the ERP is only one of the alternatives available when estimating the cost of equity capital.

For example, one could use a spot yield for the risk-free rate but increase the ERP or other adjustment to account for higher (systematic) risk. If the valuation analyst chooses to use the spot yield to estimate the cost of capital during periods when those yields are less than “normal”, the valuation analyst must use an estimated ERP that is matched to (or implied by) those below-normal yields. However, we note that the most commonly used data sources for ERP estimates are long-term series measured when interest rates were largely not subject to such market intervention. Using those data series with an abnormally low spot yield creates a mismatch.

Alternatively, if the valuation analyst chooses to use a normalized risk-free rate in estimating the cost of capital, the valuation analyst must again use an estimated ERP that is matched to those normalized yields. Normalizing the risk-free rate is likely a more direct (and more easily implemented) analysis than adjusting the ERP due to a temporary reduction in the yields on risk-free securities, while longer-term trends may be more appropriately reflected.

As a final thought, if interest rates continue to move upwards to levels considered to be more normal (i.e., not kept artificially repressed through QE policies), the use of a normalized risk-free rate may cease to be as important when estimating a base cost of equity capital.
Chapter 4
Country Yield Spread Model

Introduction

The Country Yield Spread Model is a practical adaptation of the CAPM to an international setting. This model was originally developed in U.S. Dollars (USD) in 1993 by researchers at investment bank Goldman Sachs. In order to arrive at a USD-denominated cost of equity capital for each foreign country, a country risk premium (CRP) was added to the cost of equity capital derived for the domestic base country (the “home country”). In simple terms, the country risk was quantified as the spread between the foreign country’s government bond yield denominated in USD and the U.S. government bond yield of the same maturity.

The CRP results from the Country Yield Spread Model’s attempt to isolate the incremental risk premium associated with investing in another market (i.e., “foreign” country) other than the “home” country (i.e., the country in which the investor is based) as a function of the spread between the foreign country’s sovereign yields and the home country’s sovereign yields (both denominated in the home country currency).

The Country Yield Spread Model as presented herein starts by calculating observed yield spreads, but uses alternative analyses when countries do not issue publicly-traded government debt denominated in either USD or in EUR (see the section entitled “Methodology – Country Yield Spread Model”).

Brief Background on Data Sources

Until 2023, the methodology described below relied in part on the use on country risk scores published by Euromoney. Starting in 2023, country risk scores have been provided by BMI, a Fitch Solutions Company, following Euromoney’s discontinuation of its product.

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2 Throughout this book and in the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module at: kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator, “investor perspective” (i.e., the “home” country; the country in which the investor is based) is defined by the currency in which the inputs used in each respective model are expressed. The investee country (the country in which the investment resides) is referred to as the “foreign” country.

3 The Country Yield Spread Model is also referred to as the “Sovereign” Yield Spread Model.
Euromoney Country Risk Score\textsuperscript{4,5}

Euromoney Country Risk (ECR) was an online community of economic and political experts that provided real time scores in categories that related to economic, structural and political risk. The consensus expert scores, combined with scores on sovereign borrowers’ access to international capital markets, together with data from the IMF/ World Bank on debt indicators, created the ECR score for approximately 180 individual countries (updated monthly).

ECR evaluated the investment risk of a country, such as risk of default on a bond, risk of losing direct investment, risk to global business relations etc., by taking a qualitative model, which sought an expert opinion on risk variables within a country (90% weighting) and combining it with a basic quantitative value (10% weighting). The qualitative score was visible independently of the ECR score, and it reflected a snapshot of a country’s current position.

The ECR score was displayed on a 100-point scale, with 100 being nearly devoid of any risk, and 0 (zero) being completely exposed to every risk. This was the same scale previously used by Institutional Investor.

To obtain the overall Euromoney Country Risk score, a weighting was assigned to five categories. The four qualitative expert opinions were political risk (35% weighting), economic risk (35%), structural risk (10%) and access to international capital markets (10%). The quantitative value came from the sovereign debt indicators (10%).\textsuperscript{6}

Euromoney discontinued its country risk service in December 2022.\textsuperscript{7}

BMI’s Country Risk Index\textsuperscript{8}

Fitch Solutions’ BMI provides five individual risk indices, to construct an overall country risk index: Long-Term Political Risk, Short-Term Political Risk, Long-Term Economic Risk, Short-Term Economic Risk, and Operational Risk.

\textsuperscript{4} This section paraphrased from Euromoney’s website country credit ratings “Methodology” page previously found at: https://www.euromoney.com/article/b12kj56pr6gwyf/euromoney-country-risk-methodology.

\textsuperscript{5} As of December 2022, Euromoney discontinued its country risk service.

\textsuperscript{6} This methodology was implemented by Euromoney starting in September 2019. Prior to that, there were six risk factors, as follows (weights shown in parenthesis): economic risk (30%), political risk (30%), structural risk (10%), debt indicators (10%), credit ratings (10%), and access to capital (10%).

\textsuperscript{7} See Euromoney’s decision here: https://www.euromoney.com/euromoneycountryrisk.

\textsuperscript{8} Business Monitor International was originally founded in 1984 and provides data, insights, analysis and forecasts across 200+ markets and 20+ industries. Fitch Group acquired Business Monitor International in 2014. Initially the business continued to operate under the same historical name but was later integrated into the Fitch Solutions division and renamed as “BMI, a Fitch Solutions company”. More recently, the product offerings from Fitch Solutions and BMI were consolidated under the same umbrella of BMI, a Fitch Solutions company. Additional details available here: https://www.fitchsolutions.com/bmi/press-releases/fitch-solutions-announces-bmi-new-name-country-risk-industry-research-service-19-04-2023.
However, based on observation of the data and conversations with researchers at BMI, it was clear that short-term indicators were too short-term in nature and too volatile to reflect country risk over the long-term. As a result, Kroll’s models rely on the three indices that focus on a country’s medium to long-term risk expectations, with an equal weight assigned to each risk indicator: Long-Term Political Risk, Long-Term Economic Risk, and Operational Risk. The individual risk score for each index is obtained by assigning a weight a on a variety of quantitative indicators.  

BMI’s country risk index scores are displayed on a 100-point scale, with 100 being the lowest risk, and 0 (zero) being the highest risk.

**Investor Perspectives**

The CRPs derived from the Country Yield Spread Model are presented in the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module at kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator from two investor perspectives: (i) from the perspective of a U.S.-based investor and (ii) from the perspective of an investor based in Germany, who uses the Euro as their local currency. For CRPs calculated from the perspective of a German investor, the yields on German government debt instruments are used in all cases.

Each of the two investor perspectives include approximately 190 investee countries each, with a corresponding CRP listed. The CRPs are:

- Updated quarterly
- Different for each investor perspective.

This means that:

- If the valuation analyst’s cash flows projections are denominated in U.S. Dollars, the valuation analyst should use the country risk analysis denominated in U.S. Dollars.
- If the valuation analyst’s cash flows projections are denominated in Euros, the valuation analyst should use the country risk analysis denominated in Euros, if performing the analysis from a German investor perspective.

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10 It is not unusual for German securities to be used as proxies in these types of calculations. Germany is the largest economy in Europe, and in the Eurozone, therefore the yields on German government debt instruments are considered by market participants as the ‘gold standard’ for the risk-free security denominated in Euros.

11 Depending on data availability; some countries may not have adequate data available. Prior to 2023, coverage was approximately 175+ countries.

12 The Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module at kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator is updated quarterly, with data as of March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31. The Country Yield Spread Model, the Relative Volatility Model and the Erb-Harvey-Viskanta Country Credit Rating (CCR) Model are also updated quarterly, while International Equity Risk Premia are updated at year-end only. To learn more, visit kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator.
For example, a U.S.-based investor (i.e., cash flows projections are denominated in U.S. Dollars) who is valuing a business, business ownership interest, security, or intangible asset that is located in, say, India, would use the country risk premium analysis in the International Cost of Capital Module which is denominated in U.S. Dollars.

Alternatively, a German-based investor (i.e., cash flows projections are denominated in Euros) who is valuing a business, business ownership interest, security, or intangible asset that is located in, say, Brazil, would use the country risk premium analysis from the Country Yield Spread Model which is denominated in Euros. Note that an investor based in other countries within the Eurozone (e.g., Spain) investing in say, Brazil, could use the same CRP information in the Country Yield Spread Model provided that German government securities are being used as the basis for the risk-free rate when estimating the cost of equity for the subject company. This is because the analysis in the Country Yield Spread Model is all being conducted in Euros, calculated against German government debt yields.

In the following sections, the Country Yield Spread Model is described in detail.

**Country Yield Spread Model**

The Country Yield Spread Model is expressed as follows:

\[
k_{e,\text{foreign country}} = R_{f,\text{home country}} + \beta_{\text{home country}} \times ERP_{\text{home country}} + CRP
\]

Where:

\( k_{e,\text{foreign country}} \) = Cost of equity capital in the foreign country (denominated in the home country currency)

\( R_{f,\text{home country}} \) = Risk-free rate on government bonds in the home country currency.

"Home country" means either the (i) United States (if discount rate is being developed in USD) or (ii) Germany (if discount rate is being developed in Euros)

\( \beta_{\text{home country}} \) = Beta appropriate for a company located in the home country in a similar industry as the foreign country’s subject company (i.e., beta is measured using returns expressed in the home currency)

\( ERP_{\text{home country}} \) = Equity risk premium of home country

\( CRP \) = Country risk premium, in its general form, determined as the difference between the yield-to-maturity on a foreign country government bond issued in the home country’s currency and the yield-to-maturity on a home country government bond with a similar maturity
The Country Yield Spread Model has particular appeal where debt securities denominated in USD (or EUR) issued by the local country government can be observed (i.e., they are publicly traded). In that case, if the government debt instrument (of the foreign country) denominated in, say, U.S. Dollars, has a higher yield than the yield observed on U.S. government debt of the same maturity, the yield difference may be looked upon as the market’s pricing of country specific risk of default. This country-specific risk is clearly not included in the U.S.-based risk premium, so it must be added separately.\textsuperscript{13}

At first glance, the risk of government default is correlated with, and arguably a proxy for, one type of country risk. Emerging market countries tend to default on their sovereign debt when their economic conditions deteriorate, and bond betas for sovereign debt are a meaningful indicator of their relative risks.\textsuperscript{14}

However, researchers have found that sovereign yield spreads measure not just default risk, but also capture stock market risk:\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{quote}
“Sovereign ratings are used to evaluate the credit risk of the country. The rating considers, in particular, the factors that affect a country’s ability to fulfil its obligations of the issued bonds in time and in full. These are primarily financial indicators like the level of debt, deficit, debt or deficit to GDP, etc. On the other hand, bond spreads are used to measure the country risk not only on the bond market, but also on the stock market. The spreads are more sensitive to market changes and are characterized by higher volatility.”
\end{quote}

Furthermore, the level of a country’s observed yield spread depends on the level of integration of its sovereign bond market into global markets. Recent research shows that local characteristics drive sovereign bond market integration: (1) political stability; (2) credit quality; (3) macroeconomic conditions, including, inflation and real economic activity; and (4) liquidity. Integration of sovereign bond markets increases by about 10\% on average, when a country moves from the 25th to the 75th percentile in terms of higher political stability and credit quality, lower inflation and inflation risk, and lower illiquidity. The 10\% increase in integration leads to a decrease in the sovereign cost of funding of about 1\% per annum on average across the countries analyzed.\textsuperscript{16}

Exhibit 4.1 shows a sampling of observed yield spreads as of March 31, 2023.

\textsuperscript{13} An alternative way of looking at this is that the analyst would be double-counting country risk if the yield on the foreign country’s government debt were used in the Country Yield Spread Model equation (instead of the home country’s risk-free rate). This is because the “country risk premium” is assumed to be embedded in the foreign country’s sovereign yield by the model itself, when that country’s debt is not perceived to be risk-free by market participants.


Exhibit 4.1: Sample Country Yield Spreads as of March 31, 2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USD-Perspective (%)</th>
<th>EUR-Perspective (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Potential Weaknesses of the Country Yield Spread Model

There are several potential issues with the Country Yield Spread Model approach:\(^\text{17}\)

- In some cases, the local government’s credit quality may be a very poor proxy for risks affecting business cash flows.

- This approach may double-count country-level risks that are already incorporated into projections of expected cash flows.

- A method based on spot observed yield is prone to be more volatile from period to period than, for example, a country risk estimated via the Country Credit Rating Model. The point is to be aware of extremes in yields. This may cause the spread method to have extreme indications in some crisis environments.

- Debt is typically less volatile than equity, so by using debt yields as the reference point, this method inherently could underestimate equity risk.

- Depending on facts and circumstances, the yield spread method may, in fact, be less appropriate in industries that are global in nature (integrated oil, chemicals, mining and minerals, other global sectors) where country is less important than industry/sector. This would also be true of other models that are focused on capturing country risk.

\(^\text{17}\) Between quarterly updates of the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module, an additional adjustment to the provided country risk premium data is warranted for countries whose sovereign debt credit rating is upgraded or downgraded intra-year. Additional analyses may be necessary, due to the timing of the update versus recent developments in the specific country. To learn more, visit kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator.
During the financial crisis that began in 2008, observed yield spreads increased, dramatically so, for certain countries. As of September 30, 2009, yield spreads on higher credit rating countries’ debt had mostly returned to pre-crisis levels, whereas the observed yield spreads on lower credit rating countries’ debt, while subsiding from their crisis peak levels, remained somewhat high. The Euro sovereign debt crisis that started in 2010, reaching its peak in 2012, caused yield spreads in lower-rated countries to go up significantly again. A similar trend was observed with the outbreak of COVID-19 and the concurrent collapse of global oil prices. The coronavirus health crisis was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization on March 11, 2020. Many emerging and frontier markets saw their sovereign yield spreads surge after that. In particular, countries heavily dependent on oil revenues felt the double impact of COVID-19 and the plunge in oil prices, with their sovereign yield spreads surging through the end of March 2020.

Exhibit 4.2 shows the changes in observed yield spreads by debt quality (investment grade versus non-investment grade) at each quarter end from December 2007 to March 2023. Note the marked increase in risk indicated by this model in March 2020 at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

**Exhibit 4.2:** Observed Yield Spreads By S&P Country Credit Rating (Investment Grade versus Non-Investment Grade) from December 2007 through March 2023 (in USD)
Methodology – Country Yield Spread Model

The CRPs presented in the Cost of Capital Navigator's International Cost of Capital Module that are derived under the Country Yield Spread Model are based on a four-tiered algorithm (in the following order of preference):

- **Tier 1 CRPs**: Tier 1 CRPs are, by definition, 0.0%. In all cases in which a foreign country has an S&P credit rating of AAA, the country is assumed to have a CRP of 0.0%. In addition, despite having been downgraded to AA+ by S&P in 2011, our analysis treats the U.S. as if it were an AAA-rated country (see rationale behind this assumption later in this chapter).

- **Tier 2 CRPs**: Tier 2 CRPs are based on observed yield spreads. Tier 2 CRPs can be calculated when the foreign country has sovereign bonds denominated in either USD or EUR (depending on the investor perspective being analyzed). When this is true, the foreign country sovereign bond with the longest maturity is selected. The yield of an equivalent U.S. or German government security (depending on the investor perspective being analyzed) of the same (or similar) maturity is then subtracted from the yield of the foreign country sovereign bond to arrive at the CRP.

- **Tier 3 CRPs**: Tier 3 CRPs are based on a regression of S&P sovereign credit ratings and observed yield spreads. This method is employed when the foreign country does not have publicly traded sovereign bonds denominated in either USD or EUR (depending on the investor perspective being analyzed), but does have an S&P sovereign credit rating. In this method, all observed yield spreads (i.e., Tier 2 CRPs as the dependent variable; the variable being predicted) are regressed against a numerical equivalent of each of the respective country’s S&P sovereign credit rating (as the independent variable; the “predictor” variable). Then, the resulting regression equation is used to estimate a Tier 3 CRP for all foreign countries with an S&P sovereign credit rating, but no observable yields.

- **Tier 4 CRPs**: Tier 4 CRPs are based on a regression of ECR (prior to 2023) and BMI country risk scores (from 2023 onwards) and observed yield spreads. This method is employed when the foreign country does not have publicly traded sovereign bonds denominated in either USD or EUR (depending on the investor perspective being analyzed), and does not have an S&P sovereign credit rating.

In this method, all Tier 2 CRPs (as the dependent variable; the variable being predicted) are regressed against Tier 2 CRP countries’ ECR/BMI score (as the independent variable; the “predictor” variable). Then, the resulting regression equation is used to estimate a Tier 4 CRP for all foreign countries with no observable yields and no S&P sovereign credit rating.

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18 Foreign country bond is screened for the longest maturity USD (or EUR) fixed coupon bullet bond, with no callable features or make-whole provisions, and for which a U.S. or German government security of similar maturity exists.
Whether the estimated CRPs were categorized as “Tier 1”, “Tier 2”, “Tier 3”, or “Tier 4” CRPs is reported in the Resources section of the International Cost of Capital Module. Exhibit 4.3 illustrates this concept. For example, as of December 2021, Malawi’s CRP was derived in Tier 4 calculations, indicating that as of the December 2021 calculations, Malawi did not have an observable yield spread, and also did not have an S&P sovereign credit rating.

Alternatively, as of December 2022, North Macedonia’s CRP was derived in Tier 2 calculations, indicating that as of the December 2022 calculations, the North Macedonia CRP is based on observable yield spreads.

Exhibit 4.3: Country Yield Spread Model CRP Categorization by “Tier”
Investor Perspective: Germany (EUR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia (North)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Why Is the United States Being Treated as a ‘AAA’ Rated Country?

On August 5, 2011, S&P’s Ratings Services lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States to “AA+” from “AAA”. S&P indicated that lowering the U.S. rating was prompted by S&P’s view on the rising U.S. public debt burden and S&P’s perception of greater policymaking uncertainty. On the other hand, S&P stated that their opinion of the U.S. federal government's other economic, external, and monetary credit attributes, which form the basis for the sovereign rating, were broadly unchanged.

This move triggered a number of discussions around the finance community on whether or not the U.S. sovereign debt could still be considered “risk-free.” If U.S. government bond yields are no longer deemed risk-free, then issues arise regarding a key input to corporate finance and valuation models. This would also impact the current methodology we use to estimate country risk premia.

Nearly 12 years after the 2011 S&P downgrade to the U.S. credit rating, Fitch Ratings followed suit by downgrading the U.S. credit rating to “AA+” from “AAA” on August 1, 2023.  

19 “Fitch Downgrades the United States’ Long-Term Ratings to ‘AA+’ from ‘AAA’; Outlook Stable”, Fitch Ratings, August 1, 2023. Available at:
Nevertheless, we believe that for the short- and medium-term the U.S. government will continue to be perceived by market participants as risk-free. The following are some reasons supporting that belief (this is a non-exhaustive list):

- **Not all major rating agencies share the same rating opinion, but the USD spread of observed yields on other sovereigns over U.S. government yields has not turned negative:** Following S&P’s 2011 downgrade, the other two major rating agencies, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings reaffirmed the United States sovereign rating as AAA. On August 2, 2011, Moody’s confirmed the Aaa government bond rating of the United States following the raising of the statutory debt limit on August 2. Similarly, on August 16, 2011, Fitch Ratings confirmed the U.S.’s AAA credit rating after evaluating Congress’s agreement to raise the U. S. ’s debt ceiling. These decisions were reaffirmed several times since then by both Moody’s and Fitch Ratings until early 2023. At that point, the narrative changed.

The political division in the U. S. was seen at its worst during the debt ceiling debate in early 2023. An agreement in Congress to raise the U. S. debt ceiling was reached back in June 2023, but this did not prevent Fitch Ratings from lowering the U. S. sovereign debt rating to “AA+” from its coveted “AAA” rating in August, citing the lack of governance, expected fiscal deterioration, and increased debt burden. More recently, as negotiations in U. S. Congress threatened a government shutdown, Moody’s threatened to also lower its ‘Aaa’ rating for the U. S. While a shutdown was avoided, Moody’s—the last major agency still assigning the top rating to the U. S. debt—could still follow suit and downgrade the U. S. rating in the coming months. In its latest update, Moody’s changed its outlook on the U. S. rating to ‘negative’, citing a large debt burden without a fiscal consolidation plan in sight, particularly in light of the political polarization within U. S. Congress. Nevertheless, Moody’s still stated the top rating was being affirmed because, among other reasons:

“[T]he unique and central roles of the US dollar and Treasury bond market in the global financial system provide extraordinary funding capacity and significantly reduce the risk of a sudden spiraling of funding costs, which is particularly relevant in the context of high debt levels and weakening debt affordability.” [Emphasis Added]

In fact, based on our experience and observation of global sovereign debt markets, U. S. government debt securities continue to exhibit lower yields to maturity, compared to other government debt instruments issued in USD and with similar characteristics and maturities.

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22 Trends over time in observed yield spreads against the U.S. are available in at kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator. Subscription required.
• **Flight-to-quality**: The week following S&P's downgrade in 2011, signs of a global economic slowdown resurfaced. Financial markets reacted by moving away from risky securities, such as equities and high yield debt, into U.S. government debt securities, in search for a safe haven. As a result, the yields on U.S. Treasuries (which have an inverse relationship to price) declined significantly and continued to do so through August 2011. While U.S. government bond yields are now above their record lows reached in 2020, interest rates still remain at what are arguably historically low levels, relative to prior to the global financial crisis of 2008-2009.\(^\text{23}\)

• **Reserve Currency Status and Lack of alternatives**: U.S. Treasury's market liquidity is unparalleled to any other government security. According to Fitch Ratings, daily trading volumes in 2011 of U.S. Treasuries ($580 billion) were almost 10 times higher than that of U.K. gilts ($34 billion) and German bunds ($28 billion) combined. In a report,\(^\text{24}\) Fitch Ratings indicated that this deep market liquidity enables holders to convert U.S. Treasury securities into Dollars with negligible transaction costs, irrespective of market conditions. Fitch also stated that the size of the U.S. Treasury securities market at that time ($9.3 trillion) was roughly five times the size of French ($1.9 trillion), U.K. ($1.8 trillion), and German ($1.6 trillion) government bond markets.

The U.S. dollar is still considered the reserve currency for the global economy, with the U.S. government debt still the most liquid market in the world and perceived as the building block for the global risk-free rate. In 2023, an analysis from the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and others stated that:\(^\text{25}\)

"The Treasury market remains the deepest and most liquid market in the world and a central component of the financial system."

U.S. Treasury yields have been extremely volatile since late 2022, as investors try to guess the interest rate path that the Federal Reserve will take to reach its 2% inflation target. However, the U.S. Treasury market has remained broadly functional. In the same report, authorities stated that they are trying to improve the structure and resilience in the market for U.S. Treasuries, but noted that:

"The Treasury markets displayed resilience in 2023 despite experiencing notable volatility both early in the year, as banking stresses led to a dramatic repricing of term risk-free rates, and in the fall, as long-term interest rates increased." [Emphasis Added]

\(^{23}\) For a detailed discussion about the U.S. equity risk premium (ERP) and U.S. risk-free rates, as well as other geographies, visit Kroll’s Cost of Capital Resource Center, located at: [https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cost-of-capital](https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cost-of-capital).


In the following section, three examples for estimating cost of equity capital are presented using Country Yield Spread Model CRPs:26

- **Example 4-1:** Estimating base country-level cost of equity capital assuming an investment in the foreign country’s “market” as a whole (i.e., an assumed beta of 1.0), using published values.

- **Example 4-2:** Estimating base country-level cost of equity capital assuming an investment in the foreign country’s “market” as a whole (i.e., an assumed beta of 1.0), using the valuation analyst's own estimate of his/her home country’s base country-level cost of equity capital.

- **Example 4-3:** Estimating cost of equity capital for use in evaluating a subject business, asset, or project.

**Using Country Yield Spread Model CRPs to Estimate Base Country-level Cost of Equity Capital**

The CRPs derived from the Country Yield Spread Model can be used by the analyst to calculate base country-level cost of equity capital estimates for any of the over 175 countries listed in the International Cost of Capital Module from the perspective of (i) a U.S.-based investor and (ii) an investor based in Germany.27

By “base country-level cost of equity capital estimate” we mean an estimate of cost of equity capital in foreign Country Y from the perspective of home Country X; this can be thought of as the sum of the risk-free rate plus the equity risk premium in the foreign country, but denominated in the home country’s currency.

Note that a base country-level cost of equity capital estimated in this fashion assumes an investment in the “market” of the foreign country as a whole, and does not include any adjustment for company/industry risk.

This is equivalent to substituting a beta of 1.0 (i.e., the market’s beta) into the Country Yield Spread Model formula:

26 For additional examples estimating cost of equity capital, please refer to the complementary CFA Institute webinar entitled “Quantifying Country Risk Premiums”, presented on December 6, 2016 by James P. Harrington and Carla S. Nunes, CFA. This webcast can be accessed here: https://rpc.cfainstitute.org/research/multimedia/2016/quantifying-country-risk-premiums.

27 Note that an investor based in other countries within the Eurozone (e.g., Spain) investing in say, Brazil, could use the same CRP information, provided that German government securities are being used as the proxy for the risk-free security when estimating the cost of equity for the subject company. This is because the analysis is all being conducted in Euros, calculated against German government debt yields.
The analyst can develop a base country-level cost of equity capital estimate for a foreign country derived by (i) using home country base country-level cost of equity capital estimates published herein, or (ii) the analyst’s own custom estimate of the home country base country-level cost of equity capital.

**Example 4-1:** Estimating base country-level cost of equity capital from the perspective of an investor based in Germany investing in Brazil's “market” as a whole (i.e., an assumed beta of 1.0), using published values, as of March 2020.

Estimating cost of equity in this example is a four step process:

**Step 1:** In the International Cost of Capital Module, select Germany as your “Investor Perspective” country.

**Step 2:** Identify the base country-level cost of equity capital for an investor based in Germany investing in Germany as a whole as of March 2020 (as calculated within the context of the Erb-Harvey-Viskanta Country Credit Rating Model, presented in the Resources section of the International Cost of Capital Module). As of March 2020, the base country-level cost of equity capital for an investor based in Germany investing in Germany as a whole is 6.4%.

**Step 3:** Identify the Country Yield Spread Model CRP as of March 2020 from the perspective of a German investor, investing in Brazil. As of March 2020, the CRP was 3.5%.

**Step 4:** Add the CRP from Step 3 to the base country-level cost of equity capital for an investor based in Germany investing in the German market as a whole identified in Step 2 (6.4% + 3.5%). The result (9.9%) is the base country-level cost of equity capital estimate for an investor based in Germany investing in the Brazilian market as a whole as of March 2020.

The base country-level cost of equity capital estimates are presented in the “Base Cost of Equity Over Time” for each of 56 different investor perspectives, based on the Erb-Harvey-Viskanta Country Credit Rating Model. Base country-level cost of equity capital estimates are not presented within the International Cost of Capital Module itself, but are available to subscribers in the Cost of Capital Navigator’s Resources Library.
Example 4-2: Calculate the base country-level cost of equity capital estimate for an investor based in the U.S. investing in the Brazilian market as a whole (i.e., can assume beta of 1.0), as of March 2020, using the valuation analyst’s own estimate of his/her home country’s base country level cost of equity capital.

Financial professionals often come to different conclusions as far as cost of capital (and the inputs for its components) is concerned. For example, as of March 31, 2020 Kroll’s internal estimate of base country-level cost of equity capital for a U.S. investor investing in the U.S. market as a whole is 9.0% (based on a normalized risk-free rate of 3.0% and a conditional ERP of 6.0%). Using this custom estimate, base country-level cost of equity capital for an investor based in the U.S. investing in Brazil as of March 2020 is a three-step process:

**Step 1:** In this example, the valuation analyst’s own custom estimate of base country level cost of equity capital for an investor based in the U.S., investing in the U.S., is 9.0%.

**Step 2:** Identify the Country Yield Spread Model CRP as of March 2020 from the perspective of an investor based in the U.S., investing in Brazil. As of March 2020, the CRP was 4.6%.

**Step 3:** Add the CRP from Step 2 to the base country-level cost of equity capital for an investor based in the U.S. investing in the U.S. market as a whole identified in Step 1 (9.0% + 4.6%). The result (13.6%) is the base country-level cost of equity capital estimate for an investor based in the U.S. investing in the Brazilian market as a whole as of March 2020.

Again, the base country-level cost of equity capital estimates in Example 4-1 and Example 4-2 assumes an investment in the foreign country’s market as a whole (i.e., a beta of 1.0) and do not include any adjustment for company/industry risk.

**Using Country Yield Spread Model CRPs to Estimate Cost of Equity Capital for Use in Evaluating a Subject Business, Asset, or Project**

The ability to estimate base country-level cost of equity capital from the perspective of an investor in Country X into Country Y’s market as a whole (as was done in Examples 4-1 and 4-2) is very valuable information that can be used for benchmarking and support purposes. Most of the time, however, valuation analysts are developing discount rates for use in evaluating a subject business, asset, or project.

For example, valuation analysts are often confronted with the following problem: “I know how to value a company in the United States, but this one is in Country ABC, a developing economy.

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29 For more information on the equity risk premium, risk-free rates, the size effect, and other valuation issues, visit: kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator. Kroll regularly reviews fluctuations in global economic and financial market conditions that warrant a periodic reassessment of the ERP. To ensure you are always using the most recent recommendation, check kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator.
What should I use for a discount rate?” Can the CRP be used as an input in developing cost of equity capital estimates for, say, a company that operates in GICS 3030 (household & personal products) in a different country? Yes, but it is important to understand the assumptions one is making when doing this.

Using the household & personal products company as an example, an analyst typically would develop discount rates for this company as if it were located in the “home” country, and then add a CRP to account for the differences in risk between the home country, and the country in which the household & personal products company is actually located (i.e., the investee or “foreign” country).

The implied assumption in this analysis is that what it means to be a household & personal products company in the home country means the same thing as being a household & personal products company in the foreign country. Some questions that the analyst may wish to consider:

- Are the risks of being a household & personal products company in the foreign country the same as the risks of being a household & personal products company in the home country?

- Does a household & personal products company in the foreign country have the same beta ($\beta$) as a household & personal products company in the home country?30

- Does the household & personal products company in the foreign country operate in a different industry environment from a household & personal products company in the home country?

- Did the analyst apply any additional adjustments when the discount rate was developed for the household & personal products company as if it were located in the home country? For example, was a size premium applied? “Large company” and “small company” can mean very different things from country to country. For example, a smaller-sized company in the U.S. or Germany may be a “large” company in Estonia or Norway.

Valuation analysis is an inherently comparative process, so questions like these are no different from the type of questions that are asked in any valuation analysis. For example, a subject company might be compared to a set of companies (i.e., peer group, or comparables) that possess characteristics that are arguably similar to the characteristics of the subject company. To the degree that the subject company and the peer group do have differences, further adjustment(s) may be required.

30 Beta ($\beta$) is a measure of systematic risk used as an input in some methods of estimating cost of equity capital (e.g., the CAPM requires a beta).
The process for using the information in the International Cost of Capital Module for estimating cost of equity capital for a subject business, asset, or project, is quite similar to developing base country-level cost of equity capital (as was done in Examples 4-1 and 4-2). The difference is that additional adjustments may be necessary, as outlined earlier.

In the case of our household & personal products company located in the foreign country, the “peer group” is household & personal products companies in the home country, and to the extent that a household & personal products company located in the foreign country is different (other than location), further adjustments may be required. Again, the CRP attempts to isolate the incremental risk premium associated with investing in another market as a whole, without regard to differing industry risks or other risks that may be particular to that type of business in the foreign country.

**Example 4-3:** Estimate cost of equity capital for a company in Belgium that operates in GICS 3030 (household & personal products) as of March 2020, from the perspective of an investor based in the U.S.

Estimating cost of equity in this example is a three-step process:

**Step 1:** Calculate a cost of equity capital estimate for a household & personal products company located in the U.S. For the purposes of this example, assume 8.0%.

**Step 2:** Identify the Country Yield Spread Model CRP as of March 2020 from the perspective of an investor based in the U.S., investing in Belgium. As of March 2020, the CRP was 0.3%.

**Step 3:** Add the CRP identified in Step 2 to the cost of equity capital estimate for a household & personal products company in the U.S. estimated in Step 1 (8.0% + 0.3%). The result (8.3%) is the cost of equity capital estimate for an investor based in the U.S. investing in a household & personal products company located in Belgium, prior to any adjustments due to intrinsic differences in the household & personal products industry environment (or other risks) between the U.S. and Belgium.

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31 An excellent source of international industry statistics (including cost of equity capital estimates and peer group betas for use in CAPM estimates) is the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module. The International Cost of Capital Module includes industry-level analyses for: (i) the World, (ii) the European Union, (iii) the Eurozone, and (iv) the United Kingdom in three currencies: (i) the euro (€ or EUR), (ii) the British pound (£ or GBP), and (iii) the U.S. dollar ($) or USD). Includes industry-level cost of equity, debt, and WACC estimates, performance statistics, valuation multiples, levered and unlevered betas, capital structure, profitability ratios, equity returns, aggregate forward-looking earnings-per share (EPS) growth rates, and additional statistics. To learn more, visit kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator.
Chapter 5
Relative Volatility Model

Relative Volatility Model

In the Relative Volatility Model (originally developed for segmented capital markets), the traditional beta is replaced by a modified beta.\(^1\) The modified beta is a result of multiplying the selected subject company beta by the ratio of the volatility of the foreign equity market to the volatility of the home market’s benchmark market index. An alternative version, which we present herein (and which produces the same net result), is to adjust the home country’s market equity risk premium by this relative volatility (RV) factor.

The RV factor attempts to isolate the incremental risk premium associated with investing in the foreign country as a function of the relative volatility of the foreign country’s equity market and the home country’s equity market.

The Relative Volatility Model can be expressed as follows:\(^2\)

\[
k_{e,foreign\ country} = R_{f,home\ country} + \beta_{home\ country} \times ERP_{home\ country} \times Relative\ Volatility
\]

Where:
- \(k_{e,foreign\ country}\) = Cost of equity capital in the foreign country (denominated in the home country currency)
- \(R_{f,home\ country}\) = Risk-free rate on government bonds in the home country currency.
  "Home country" means either the (i) United States (if discount rate is being developed in USD) or (ii) Germany (if discount rate is being developed in Euros)
- \(\beta_{home\ country}\) = Beta appropriate for a company located in the home country in a similar industry as the foreign country’s subject company (i.e., beta is measured using returns expressed in the home currency)

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\(^1\) “Segmentation” in this context refers to markets (i.e., economies) that are not fully integrated into world markets (i.e., to some degree isolated from world markets). Markets may be segmented due to a host of issues, such as regulation that restricts foreign investment, taxation differences, legal factors, information, trading costs, and physical barriers, among others.

\(^2\) Versions of this model have been published by MIT professor Donald Lessard (see Donald Lessard, “Incorporating Country Risk in the Valuation of Offshore Projects”, *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance* (Fall 1996): 9(3), 52–63) as well as by analysts at Goldman Sachs and Bank of America, Stephen Godfrey and Ramon Espinosa, “A Practical Approach to Calculating Costs of Equity for Investments in Emerging Markets”, *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance* (Fall 1996): 80–89.
This approach has appeal in cases where the stock market in the foreign country is relatively diversified. If the foreign country’s stock market has greater volatility than the U.S. stock market (or the German stock market, depending on the investor perspective being employed), that greater volatility may be evidence of differences in country-level market risk and, therefore, may indicate that the cost of equity capital estimate should incorporate a country risk premium. The adjustment shown re-scales a home country equity risk premium to foreign country volatility.

**Potential Weaknesses of the Relative Volatility Model**

This approach has two primary potential issues:

- The observed difference in volatilities may reflect mostly a difference in the composition of the subject country’s economy and particular concentration in certain industries (e.g., lots of natural resources but not many service businesses). This is not a country effect but an industry effect. It is incorrect to apply it to other industries.

- This adjustment is troublesome when the investor (e.g., a multi-national firm) clearly has access to global markets.

Again, some countries do not have local stock markets, or their stock markets are so thin (small volumes of trading moves the market up or down with wide swings) that observed variance in returns may not be representative of the true risk from that country. For certain “frontier” countries, the opposite occurs: the local stock markets have very little trading volume, but prices move very little. This means that the equity market volatility is much lower than would be expected for a liquid stock market of a mature market, resulting in a RV factor close to, or even lower than, 1.0. In such cases, relying on the Relative Volatility Model would potentially result in a significantly underestimated cost of equity capital.

**Investor Perspectives**

The RV factors derived from Relative Volatility Model are presented in the International Cost of Capital Module from two investor perspectives: (i) from the perspective of a U.S.-based investor, wherein the RV factor is calculated as the standard deviation of the equity returns of the foreign country (the “investee” country; the country in which the investment is located) divided by the

\[
ERP_{\text{home county}} = \text{Equity risk premium of home country}
\]

\[
\text{Relative Volatility} = \text{In its general form, determined as the ratio of the annualized monthly standard deviation of the foreign country equity returns (denominated in home country currency) relative to the annualized monthly standard deviation of the home country equity returns (denominated in home country currency)}
\]

\[
\text{ERP}_{\text{home county}} = \text{Equity risk premium of home country}
\]

\[
\text{Relative Volatility} = \text{In its general form, determined as the ratio of the annualized monthly standard deviation of the foreign country equity returns (denominated in home country currency) relative to the annualized monthly standard deviation of the home country equity returns (denominated in home country currency)}
\]

This approach has appeal in cases where the stock market in the foreign country is relatively diversified. If the foreign country’s stock market has greater volatility than the U.S. stock market (or the German stock market, depending on the investor perspective being employed), that greater volatility may be evidence of differences in country-level market risk and, therefore, may indicate that the cost of equity capital estimate should incorporate a country risk premium. The adjustment shown re-scales a home country equity risk premium to foreign country volatility.

Potential Weaknesses of the Relative Volatility Model

This approach has two primary potential issues:

- The observed difference in volatilities may reflect mostly a difference in the composition of the subject country’s economy and particular concentration in certain industries (e.g., lots of natural resources but not many service businesses). This is not a country effect but an industry effect. It is incorrect to apply it to other industries.

- This adjustment is troublesome when the investor (e.g., a multi-national firm) clearly has access to global markets.

Again, some countries do not have local stock markets, or their stock markets are so thin (small volumes of trading moves the market up or down with wide swings) that observed variance in returns may not be representative of the true risk from that country. For certain “frontier” countries, the opposite occurs: the local stock markets have very little trading volume, but prices move very little. This means that the equity market volatility is much lower than would be expected for a liquid stock market of a mature market, resulting in a RV factor close to, or even lower than, 1.0. In such cases, relying on the Relative Volatility Model would potentially result in a significantly underestimated cost of equity capital.

Investor Perspectives

The RV factors derived from Relative Volatility Model are presented in the International Cost of Capital Module from two investor perspectives: (i) from the perspective of a U.S.-based investor, wherein the RV factor is calculated as the standard deviation of the equity returns of the foreign country (the “investee” country; the country in which the investment is located) divided by the
standard deviation of the equity returns of the U.S., and (ii) from the perspective of a German investor in which EUR is the local currency, wherein the RV factor is calculated as the standard deviation of the equity returns of the foreign country divided by the standard deviation of the equity returns of Germany.³

Each of the two investor perspectives include over 70 investee countries each, with a corresponding RV factor listed. The RV factors are:

- Updated quarterly.⁴
- Different for each investor perspective.

This means that:

- If the valuation analyst’s cash flow projections are denominated in U.S. Dollars, the valuation analyst should use the country risk analysis denominated in U.S. Dollars.

- If the valuation analyst’s cash flow projections are denominated in Euros, the valuation analyst should use the country risk analysis denominated in Euros, if performing the analysis from a German investor perspective.

For example, a U.S.-based investor (i.e., cash flow projections are denominated in U.S. Dollars) who is valuing a business, business ownership interest, security, or intangible asset that is located in, say, India, would use country risk analysis which is denominated in *U.S. Dollars.*

Alternatively, a Germany-based investor (i.e., cash flow projections are denominated in Euros) who is valuing a business, business ownership interest, security, or intangible asset that is located in, say, Brazil, would use country risk analysis which is denominated in *Euros.* Note that an investor based in other countries within the Eurozone (e.g., Spain) investing in Brazil, could use the same RV factor information, provided that a German risk-free rate and equity risk premium (ERP) are being used as inputs when estimating the cost of equity for the subject company. This is because the analysis is all being conducted in *Euros,* calculated against Germany’s equity market volatility.

³ It is not unusual for German securities to be used as proxies in these types of calculations. For example, the yields on German government debt instruments are considered by market participants as the ‘gold standard’ for the risk-free security denominated in Euros. Germany is the largest economy in Europe.

⁴ The Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module provides measures of relative country risk (updated quarterly since March 2014) for over 175 countries from the perspective of investors in over 50 countries based upon (i) the Country Yield Spread Model, (ii) the Relative Volatility Model and (iii) the Erb-Harvey-Viskanta Country Credit Rating (CCR) Model. Additional data includes equity risk premia (ERPs) for 28 countries, risk-free rates and industry betas for developed markets, long-term inflation expectations, and tax rates. To learn more and to subscribe, visit kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator.
Methodology – Relative Volatility Model

MSCI Global Equity Indices are used in calculating the Relative Volatility Model.\(^5\)\(^,\)\(^6\)

In all cases presented herein, annualized monthly standard deviation of equity returns is calculated using the following formula:

\[
\text{Annualized Monthly Standard Deviation} = \sqrt{n \sigma_n^2 + (1 + \mu_n)^2} - (1 + \mu_n)^{2n}
\]

Where:

\[\sigma_n\] = Standard deviation of \(n\)-period returns
\[\mu_n\] = Average of \(n\)-period returns
\[n\] = Number of periods in one year (i.e., monthly returns, \(n = 12\))

The RV factors are calculated in the following fashion:

**Step 1:** In all cases in which a foreign country has an S&P credit rating of AAA, the country is assumed to have an RV factor of 1.0. The United States is treated as an AAA-rated country (see rationale in Chapter 4).

**Step 2:** Trailing 60-months of equity returns (denominated in either USD or EUR, depending on the investor perspective), are used to calculate annualized monthly standard deviations for each of the MSCI equity indices (in turn).\(^7\)

**Step 3:** The annualized monthly standard deviation result from Step 2 (based upon equity returns denominated in either USD or EUR, depending on the investor perspective) for each of the MSCI equity indices is divided (in turn) by the annualized monthly standard deviation from Step 2 for the U.S. or Germany (depending on the investor perspective). The resulting ratio is the RV factor.

For example, the annualized monthly standard deviation of equity returns (in USD) for the 60-month period ending March 2020 for Slovenia was 19.4%, and the annualized monthly standard deviation of equity returns (in USD) for the 60-month period ending March 2020 for the U.S. was 13.8%. The resulting RV factor is 1.4 (19.4% ÷ 13.8%). Similarly, the annualized monthly standard deviation of equity returns (in USD) for the 60-month period ending March 2020 for Slovenia was 19.4%, and the annualized monthly standard deviation of equity returns (in USD) for the 60-month period ending March 2020 for the U.S. was 13.8%. The resulting RV factor is 1.4 (19.4% ÷ 13.8%).

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5 The MSCI series used are GR series (except for Botswana, Ghana, and Jamaica). “GR” indicates that total return is calculated reinvesting gross dividends. The MSCI series used for Botswana, Ghana, and Jamaica are based on NR series. “NR” indicates the net total return is calculated applying a withholding tax rate on dividends. Use of net returns does not materially impact the RV results.

6 MSCI is a leading provider of investment decision support tools to clients worldwide. MSCI provides indices, portfolio risk and performance analytics, and ESG data and research. To learn more about MSCI, visit [www.msci.com](http://www.msci.com).

7 “March 2020” is used in this discussion for illustrative purposes only. The Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module includes relative volatility factors from March 2014 to present (updated quarterly). For more information visit [kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator](http://kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator).
deviation of equity returns (in EUR) for the 60-month period ending March 2020 for Greece was 33.8%, and the annualized monthly standard deviation of equity returns (in EUR) for the 60-month period ending March 2020 for Germany was 16.6%. The RV factor is 2.0 (33.8% ÷ 16.6%).

In the following section, two examples for estimating cost of equity capital are presented using Relative Volatility Model RV factors:8

- **Example 5-1:** Using Relative Volatility Model RV factors to estimate base country-level cost of equity capital assuming an investment in the foreign country’s market as a whole (i.e., an assumed beta of 1.0).

- **Example 5-2:** Using Relative Volatility Model RV factors to estimate cost of equity capital for use in evaluating a subject business, asset, or project.

**Using Relative Volatility Model RV Factors to Estimate Base Country-level Cost of Equity Capital**

The RV factors derived from the Relative Volatility Model are presented in the International Cost of Capital Module from two investor perspectives: (i) from the perspective of a U.S.-based investor for which USD is the local currency, and (ii) from the perspective of a German investor for which EUR is the local currency. The RV factors can be used by the analyst to calculate base country-level cost of equity capital estimates for the countries listed in the International Cost of Capital Module.

By “base country-level cost of equity capital estimate” we mean an estimate of cost of equity capital in foreign Country Y from the perspective of home Country X; base country-level cost of equity in this sense can be thought of as the sum of the risk-free rate plus the equity risk premium in the foreign country (in terms of the home country’s currency).

Note that a base country-level cost of equity capital estimated in this fashion assumes an investment in the “market” of a foreign country as a whole, and does not include any adjustment for company/industry risk.

**Example 5-1:** Calculate the base country-level cost of equity capital estimate for an investor based in the U.S. investing in the Indian market as a whole, as of March 2020.

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8 For additional examples estimating cost of equity capital, please refer to the complementary CFA Institute webinar entitled “Quantifying Country Risk Premiums,” presented on December 6, 2016 by James P. Harrington and Carla S. Nunes, CFA (both of Kroll). This webcast can be accessed here: https://rpc.cfainstitute.org/research/multimedia/2016/quantifying-country-risk-premiums.
Because we are calculating a base level cost of equity capital estimate for an investment in the Indian market as a whole, this is equivalent to substituting a beta of 1.0 (i.e., the market’s beta) into the Relative Volatility Model formula:

\[
k_{e,\text{foreign country}} = R_{f,\text{home country}} + \beta_{\text{home country}} \times ERP_{\text{home country}} \times \text{Relative Volatility}
\]

Three additional inputs are needed to calculate the base country-level cost of equity capital estimate: (i) the home country’s risk-free rate, (ii) the home country’s equity risk premium (ERP), and (iii) an RV factor from the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module.

The analyst can select a risk-free rate and ERP of his or her own choosing. Financial professionals often come to different conclusions as far as cost of capital and its components (e.g., risk-free rates, betas, equity risk premia) is concerned. There are a number of sources for risk-free rates and ERP estimates.

In the U.S., for example, a long-term government bond yield can be used as a proxy for the long-term risk-free rate. This is typically the practice in other countries as well: a long-term sovereign is selected as a proxy for the long-term risk-free rate.

As far as selection of an appropriate ERP, financial analysts and academics oftentimes have very different opinions of what the long-term ERP is at any given time. In the Cost of Capital Navigator, for example, several U.S. ERP estimates are reported, including the “historical” ERP (as estimated over the time horizon 1926–present), the “supply-side” ERP, “implied” ERP estimates, ERP estimates developed by surveying academics and financial professionals, and the Kroll recommended U.S. ERP.

In the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module’s “Resources” section there are several estimates provided, including International Equity Risk Premia (ERPs), and historical ERP estimates for a variety of world economies. The ERPs in the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module provide the same type of “historical” ERP calculations as were previously provided in the (now discontinued) Morningstar/ Ibbotson International Equity Risk Premium Report.

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9 The U.S. Cost of Capital Module includes three U.S. valuation data sets: (i) the critical data (U.S. ERPs, size premia, industry risk premia) previously published in the (now discontinued) Valuation Handbook: U.S. Guide to Cost of Capital as well as the Morningstar/Ibbotson® SBBI® Valuation Yearbook, (ii) the U.S. risk premia and size premia data previously published in the Kroll Risk Premium Report, and (iii) unlevered and levered betas, valuation multiples, industry-level cost of equity estimates and more from the former U.S. Industry Benchmarking Module. For more information, visit: kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator.

10 The ERPs for the 16 countries are calculated annually as of December 31.

11 Additional sources of international ERP estimates are provided in the Resources Library of the Cost of Capital Navigator's International Cost of Capital Module at kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator.
For this example, we will use the Kroll recommended U.S. ERP as of March 31, 2020 (6.0%), coupled with a normalized risk-free rate of 3.0%\(^{12,13}\) to calculate a base country-level cost of equity capital estimate for an investor based in the U.S. investing in India as of March 2020.

Estimating cost of equity in this example is a four-step process:

**Step 1:** The analyst selects the appropriate long-term risk-free rate \((R_f)\) for the home country (the U.S. in this example) as of March 2020. For the purposes of this example, we have assumed a normalized long-term risk-free rate of 3.0%.

**Step 2:** The analyst selects the appropriate long term equity risk premium (ERP) for the home country (the U.S. in this example) as of March 2020. For the purposes of this example, we have assumed a long-term ERP of 6.0%.

**Step 3:** In the International Cost of Capital Module, identify the Relative Volatility model’s RV factor as of March 2020 from the perspective of an investor based in the U.S., investing in India. As of March 2020, the RV was 1.4.

**Step 4:** Multiply the assumed beta (in this case the assumed beta is 1.0, the beta of the “market”), the ERP identified in Step 2, and the RV factor identified in Step 3 together \((1.0 \times 6.0\% \times 1.4)\); the result is 8.4%. Add this number to the risk-free rate identified in Step 1 \((3.0\% + 8.4\%)\). The resulting 11.4% is the country-level cost of equity capital estimate for an investor based in the U.S. investing in the Indian market as a whole as of March 2020.

Using Relative Volatility Model RV Factors to Estimate Cost of Equity Capital for Use in Evaluating a Subject Business, Asset, or Project

The ability to estimate base country-level cost of equity capital from the perspective of an investor in a home country into a foreign country’s market as a whole (as was done in Example 5-1) is very valuable information that can be used for benchmarking and support purposes. Most of the time, however, valuation analysts are developing discount rates for use in evaluating a subject business, asset, or project.

For example, valuation analysts are often confronted with the following problem: “I know how to value a company in the United States, but this one is in Country ABC, a developing economy. What should I use for a discount rate?” Can an RV factor be used as an input in developing cost of equity capital estimates for, say, a company that operates in GICS 3030 (household & personal products) in a different country? Yes, but it is important to understand the assumptions one is making when doing this.

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\(^{12}\) The analyses presented here assume that the assets being valued are long-lived assets, and therefore a long-term risk-free rate and long-term ERP are appropriate.

\(^{13}\) In this example, the normalized long-term risk-free rate and long-term ERP estimates are Kroll’s outlook as of December 18, 2019 for the U.S. This implies a base cost of equity capital in the U.S. market as a whole of 9.0% \((3.0\% + 6.0\%). Kroll regularly reviews fluctuations in global economic and financial market conditions that warrant a periodic reassessment of the ERP. To ensure you are always using the most recent recommendation, check [https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cost-of-capital](https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cost-of-capital) and click “Click here for the latest recommended U.S. guidance.”
Using the aforementioned household & personal products company as an example, an analyst typically would develop discount rates for the household & personal products company as if it were located in the “home” country, and then use an RV factor to account for the differences in risk between the “home” country, and the “foreign” country in which the household & personal products company is actually located (i.e., the investee country, or “foreign” country).

The implied assumption in this analysis is that what it means to be a household & personal products company in the home country means the same thing as being a household & personal products company in the foreign country. Some questions that the analyst may wish to consider:

- Are the risks of being a household & personal products company in the foreign country the same as the risks of being a household & personal products company in the home country?
- Does a household & personal products company in the foreign country have the same beta (β) as a household & personal products company in the home country?\(^\text{14}\)
- Does the household & personal products company in the foreign country operate in a different industry environment from a household & personal products company in the home country?
- Did the analyst apply any additional adjustments when the discount rate was developed for the household & personal products company as if it were located in the home country? For example, was a size premium applied? “Large company” and “small company” can mean very different things from country to country. For example, a smaller-sized company in the U.S. or Germany may be a “large” company in Estonia or Norway.

Valuation analysis is an inherently comparative process, so questions like these are no different from the type of questions that are asked in any valuation analysis. For example, a subject company might be compared to a set of companies (i.e., peer group, or comparables) that possess characteristics that are arguably similar to the characteristics of the subject company. To the extent that the subject company and the peer group do have differences, further adjustment(s) may be required.

The process for using the RV factor information in the International Cost of Capital Module for estimating the cost of equity capital for a subject business, asset, or project, is quite similar to developing the base country-level cost of equity capital (see example 5-1). The difference is that additional adjustments may be necessary, as outlined earlier.

\(^{14}\) Beta (β) is a measure of systematic risk used as an input in some methods of estimating cost of equity capital (e.g., the CAPM requires a beta).
In the case of our household & personal products company located in the foreign country, the “peer group” is household & personal products companies in the home country, and to the extent that household & personal products companies located in the investee country are different (other than location), further adjustments may be required.

**Example 5-2:** Estimate cost of equity capital for a company in Austria that operates in GICS 3030 (household & personal products) as of March 2020, for an investor based in France, taking a German investor perspective (France’s local currency is also the Euro).\(^{15}\)

Within the context of the Relative Volatility Model, the only difference in estimating cost of equity capital for use in evaluating a business, asset, or project in a foreign country (as is being done in this example) and estimating cost of equity capital for an investment in a foreign market as a whole (as was done in the previous example) is the beta estimate. In the previous examples, the “market’s” beta of 1.0 was used; in this example, the analyst must supply a beta for a household & personal products company located in the home country. In this example we will assume a beta of 1.2:\(^{16}\)

\[
k_{e,\text{foreign country}} = R_{f,\text{home country}} + \beta_{\text{home country}} \times ERP_{\text{home country}} \times \text{Relative Volatility}
\]

\[
k_{e,\text{foreign country}} = R_{f,\text{home country}} + 1.2 \times ERP_{\text{home country}} \times \text{Relative Volatility}
\]

Three additional inputs are needed to calculate the base country-level cost of equity capital estimate: (i) the home country’s risk-free rate, (ii) the home country’s ERP, and (iii) an RV factor. Estimating cost of equity in this example is a four-step process:

**Step 1:** The analyst selects the appropriate long-term risk-free rate \((R_f)\) for the home country (France, in this example, taking a German investor perspective) as of March 2020. For the purposes of this example, we assume a German risk-free rate of 2.0%\(^{17}\).

\(^{15}\) It is important to understand that all Relative Volatility Model RV factors “from the perspective of an investor based in Germany” are calculated relative to the annualized monthly standard deviation of the German equity market (Germany is the largest economy in Europe). It is not unusual for German benchmarks to be used as inputs in valuation analyses in Europe. For example, the yields on German government debt instruments are often used as the risk-free security (when the analysis cash flows are denominated in Euros).

\(^{16}\) An excellent source of international industry statistics (including cost of equity capital estimates and peer group betas for use in CAPM estimates) is the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module. The International Cost of Capital Module includes industry-level analyses for: (i) the World, (ii) the European Union, (iii) the Eurozone, and (iv) the United Kingdom in three currencies: (i) the euro (€ or EUR), (ii) the British pound (£ or GBP), and (iii) the U.S. dollar ($ or USD). Includes industry-level cost of equity, debt, and WACC estimates, performance statistics, valuation multiples, levered and unlevered betas, capital structure, profitability ratios, equity returns, aggregate forward-looking earnings-per share (EPS) growth rates, and additional statistics. To learn more, visit kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator.

\(^{17}\) In the Eurozone, the yields on German government debt instruments are often used as the risk-free security (when the analysis cash flows are denominated in Euros).
Step 2: The analyst selects the appropriate long-term ERP for the home country (France in this example, taking German investor perspective) as of March 2020. For the purposes of this example, we assume a German long-term ERP of 5.16% in Euro terms.\textsuperscript{18}

Step 3: In the International Cost of Capital Module, identify the Relative Volatility model's RV factor as of March 2020 from the perspective of a German investor investing in Austria. As of March 2020, the RV factor was 1.4.

Step 4: Multiply the assumed beta (1.2), the ERP identified in Step 2, and the RV factor identified in Step 3 together (1.2 x 5.16% x 1.4). The result is (8.7%). Add this number to the risk-free rate identified in Step 1 (2.0% + 8.7%). The result (10.7%) is the cost of equity capital estimate for an investor based in France (taking a German investor perspective) investing in an household & personal products company located in Austria, prior to any adjustments due to intrinsic differences in the household & personal products industry environment (or other risks) between France and Austria.

\textsuperscript{18} The historical ERP for Germany as measured over the time horizon 1970–2019 is 5.16%, in local terms (€ EUR). Kroll calculates historical ERP estimates for world economies (annually, through December 31) in the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module at kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator.
Chapter 6  
Erb-Harvey-Viskanta Country Credit Rating Model

The Erb-Harvey-Viskanta Country Credit Rating Model (“CCR Model”) is one of the more widely known methods to estimate cost of equity capital in an international setting.1 Whereas the application of a single-country version of the CAPM or a Relative Volatility Model requires that a country have equity returns data, the CCR Model allows for the estimation of cost of equity capital for countries that have a country credit risk rating – even if they do not have a long history of equity returns available (or even if they have no equity returns history at all).

This model is based on the assumption that countries with lower creditworthiness, which is translated into lower credit ratings, are associated with higher costs of equity capital, and vice versa.

The valuation data calculated using the CCR Model and reported in the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module at kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator is calculated using:

- The same (or similar) data sources that were used to calculate the base country-level cost of equity estimates previously published in the now discontinued Morningstar/Ibbotson International Cost of Capital Report, and the International Cost of Capital Perspectives Report.

- The same (or similar) methodologies that were used to calculate the base country-level cost of equity estimates previously published in the now discontinued Morningstar/Ibbotson International Cost of Capital Report, and the International Cost of Capital Perspectives Report.

The Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module includes (although on a significantly larger scale) the international cost of capital data that was calculated using the CCR Model previously published in the (now discontinued) Valuation Handbook – International Guide to Cost of Capital, Morningstar/Ibbotson International Cost of Capital Report, and the International Cost of Capital Perspectives Report.

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We say “on a significantly larger scale” because the (former) Morningstar/Ibbotson international reports used the CCR Model to estimate base country-level cost of equity capital for over 180 countries from the “perspective” of investors (through the lens of the currency changes) based in (i) the U.S. and (ii) six additional countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the U.K.).

In the CCR Model analyses presented in the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module base country-level cost of equity estimates are calculated for over 190 countries and converted into country risk premium indications from the “perspective” of investors (again through the lens of the currency used) based in (i) the U.S. and (ii) 55 additional countries.

In the International Cost of Capital Module the country risk premium indications are calculated quarterly, from March 2014 to present.

**A Notable Difference with Previous Reports: Country Risk Premia (CRPs)**

In the previous Morningstar/Ibbotson international reports, base country-level cost of equity capital estimates were published. In the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module, country risk premia (CRPs) are the primary data presented. Through consultation with various stakeholders using this type of data, it is clear that users are typically more interested in CRP information that they can incorporate into their own custom cost of equity estimates, in lieu of data presenting base country-level cost of equity capital estimates.

The CRP attempts to isolate the incremental risk premium associated with investing in a “foreign” country (i.e., the investee country; the country in which the investment is located) other than the “home” country (i.e., the country in which the investor is based).

Calculation of the CRP is straightforward: the base country-level cost of equity capital estimate for a home-country-based investor investing in the *home country* (in the home country currency) is subtracted from the base country-level cost of equity capital estimate for a home-country-based investor investing in the *foreign country* (in the home country currency). The difference is the CRP.

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2 This is done with the reasonable assumption that just as the regression results using returns in USD can be interpreted as being from the “perspective” of a U.S.-based investor, the regression results using returns transformed into currency X can be interpreted as being from the perspective of an investor based in country X. Prior to 2023, coverage was approximately 175+ countries.

3 Source of currency conversion data: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

4 Investee countries that have expected inflation rates that are very different from the perspective country’s expected inflation rates may yield results that significantly under-/over-estimate expected return, and may require additional adjustments (i.e., the base country-level cost of equity capital should exceed the projected inflation, if the analysis is being conducted in nominal terms).

5 The Country Yield Spread Model, the Relative Volatility Model, and the Erb-Harvey-Viskanta Country Credit Rating (CCR) Model are updated quarterly; international equity risk premia (ERPs) are updated annually at year-end.
Brief Background on Data Sources

Until 2016, the methodology described below relied on the use on country risk scores published by Institutional Investor. From 2017 to 2022, Euromoney was used as the source for country risk scores, following Euromoney’s acquisition of Institutional Investor and the discontinuation of the latter’s product. Starting in 2023, country risk scores have been provided by BMI, a Fitch Solutions Company, following Euromoney’s discontinuation of its country risk product.

A Change in 2017

Country Credit Ratings (CCRs) are an important input used to produce the country risk premia (CRPs) in the Erb-Harvey-Viskanta Country Credit Rating Model. In February 2017, Institutional Investor LLC communicated to Kroll that it would no longer conduct and publish the results of its semi-annual “Country Credit Survey” from which CCRs were obtained. September 2016 was the final publication date of Institutional Investor CCRs.

Starting with the 2017 Valuation Handbook – International Guide to Cost of Capital:

1. The source of new country credit ratings (post September 2016 until December 2022) used to produce the CRPs in the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module is Institutional Investor’s parent company, Euromoney Institutional Investor PLC, which has recently been rebranded as Delinian group.

Specifically, the previously published Institutional Investor country credit ratings (through September 2016) will continue to be used in the regression analyses used to produce the CRPs in the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module, and from October 2016 forward through December 2022 Euromoney’s country risk scores will be used.

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6 Institutional Investor LLC is a leading business-to-business publisher, focused on international finance. Institutional Investor LLC is a division of Euromoney Institutional Investor PLC. To learn more, visit www.institutionalinvestor.com.

7 Institutional Investor CCRs were published from September 1979 through September 2016 on a semi-annual basis (September, March), with one exception: Institutional Investor did not publish March 2010 CCRs.


9 Euromoney Institutional Investor PLC was a global, multi-brand information business which provides critical data, price reporting, insight, analysis and must-attend events to financial services, commodities, telecoms and legal markets. Until recently, Euromoney Institutional Investor was listed on the London Stock Exchange and was a member of the FTSE 250 share index. In January 2023, Euromoney Institutional Investor was acquired by funds managed by Astorg and Epiris and the group was separated into two separate businesses, with Fastmarkets becoming a stand-alone entity and the remainder staying with Euromoney. Following the acquisition, Euromoney Institutional Investor was rebranded as Delinian, with sub-brands like Institutional Investor and Euromoney now being part of the Delinian group. The Euromoney magazine is still in publication. To learn more about Euromoney, visit: www.euromoneyplc.com/. For more information about the acquisition and subsequent rebranding of the group, see: www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/euromoney-institutional-investor-plc-the-group-or-euromoney-rebrands-as-delinian-limited-delinian-301727172.html.
Note: For simplicity, these inputs (the Institutional Investor country credit ratings and the Euromoney country risk scores) are referred to collectively herein as “country credit ratings”, or “CCRs”, and the model’s name is unchanged and will continue to be referred to as the “Erb-Harvey-Viskanta Country Credit Rating Model”, or “CCR Model”.

2. The model has moved to a 30-year rolling regression, rather than using data back to September 1979. This reflects the trend observed in recent decades by individual countries’ economies toward a greater integration with the global economy and global financial markets (i.e., “globalization”); moving this analysis to a 30-year rolling regression ensures that only (relatively) more recent information about the stage of development of each country’s economy is impacting the results.

3. The model was enhanced to make the following assumptions:
   
a) If both the “home” country (i.e., the country in which the investor is based) and the “foreign” country (i.e., the investee country; the country in which the investment resides) have an S&P sovereign credit rating of AAA, the concluded country risk premium (CRP) is 0.0%. The United States is treated as an AAA-rated country for purposes of implementing this model (see rationale in Chapter 4).

b) If the “home” country has an S&P sovereign credit rating of AAA and the “foreign” country has an S&P credit rating below AAA (i.e., a worse credit rating), and has a calculated CRP of less than 0.0% (i.e., a negative implied premium), the CRP assigned is 0.0% (and vice-versa).

The first change was out of necessity: a new source of country credit ratings was needed to replace the discontinued series. The source that was identified as being the best fit for a substitute is produced by Institutional Investor’s own parent company (Euromoney Institutional Investor PLC, now rebranded as Delinian group).

The second change (use of a 30-year rolling regression) was a methodological change that was designed with the goal of better reflecting the ongoing change and evolving integration of global markets. These changes may entail significant changes to some countries’ relative risk relative to what has been reported in prior years.

The third change (3a) harmonized the Country Credit Rating Model, the Country Yield Spread Model, and the Relative Volatility Model (this assumption was already in place in the latter two models).

The fourth change (3b) was put in effect starting in 2017 for (i) the Country Credit Rating Model and (ii) the Country Yield Spread Model, but not in the Relative Volatility Model.\(^{10}\)

\(^{10}\) Change 3b may be instituted in the Relative Volatility Model in the future, pending further study.
A Change in 2023

In early January 2023, Euromoney communicated to Kroll that it would no longer publish its monthly country risk scores, with the service being terminated on January 2, 2023. The last data available was through December 2022.

Out of necessity, we were once again forced to find a new source of country credit ratings. The source that was identified as being the best fit for a substitute is a product produced by Fitch Solutions. Accordingly, the source of country risk scores was changed from Euromoney Country Risk to BMI, a Fitch Solutions Company beginning in 2023.

The CCR model is based on a 30-year rolling regression (see section below for more detail). Starting in March 2023, the new source of CCRs (post-December 2022) used to produce the CRPs in the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module is BMI, a Fitch Solutions Company. Between October 2016 and December 2022, Euromoney’s country risk scores are used (see section below for more detail). For September 2016 and prior periods, Institutional Investor country credit ratings are used.

Note: Again, for simplicity, these inputs (the Institutional Investor country credit ratings, the Euromoney country risk scores, and the BMI country risk index) are referred to collectively herein as “country credit ratings”, or “CCRs”, and the model’s name is unchanged and will continue to be referred to as the “Erb-Harvey-Viskanta Country Credit Rating Model”, or “CCR Model”.

In the following section, a brief overview of Euromoney’s country risk scores is first provided (including the transition from Institutional Investor), followed by a brief overview of BMI’s country risk indices.

About Euromoney “Country Risk Scores”11

Euromoney Country Risk (ECR) was an online community of economic and political experts that provided real time scores in categories that relate to economic, structural and political risk. The consensus expert scores, combined with scores on sovereign borrowers’ access to international capital markets, together with data from the IMF/ World Bank on debt indicators, created the Euromoney Country Risk score for over 175 individual countries (discontinued as of December 2022).

ECR evaluated the investment risk of a country, such as risk of default on a bond, risk of losing direct investment, risk to global business relations etc., by taking a qualitative model, which sought an expert opinion on risk variables within a country (90% weighting) and combining it with a basic quantitative value (10% weighting). The qualitative score was visible independently of the ECR score, and it reflected a snapshot of a country’s current position.

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11 This section paraphrased from Euromoney’s website country credit ratings “Methodology” page previously found at: www.euromoney.com/article/b12kj56pr6gwyf/euromoney-country-risk-methodology.
The ECR score was displayed on a 100-point scale, with 100 being nearly devoid of any risk, and 0 (zero) being completely exposed to every risk. This is the same scale previously used by Institutional Investor.

To obtain the overall Euromoney Country Risk score, a weighting was assigned to five categories. The four qualitative expert opinions were political risk (35% weighting), economic risk (35%), structural risk (10%) and access to international capital markets (10%). The quantitative value comes from the sovereign debt indicators (10%).

Because the CCR Model version presented herein still relies on Institutional Investor country credit ratings for periods prior to October 2016, a transition between Institutional Investor and Euromoney was necessary. Specifically, because Institutional Investor scores were on published on a semi-annual basis, whereas Euromoney was published monthly, all periods needed to be on the same basis. To accomplish that for periods prior to October 2016, "monthly" CCR values are calculated with a simple interpolation between each country’s semi-annual Institutional Investor CCRs. For example, if the published March 20XX CCR is 76 and the published September 20XX CCR is 70, then one would subtract \((76 - 70) ÷ 6 = 1\) from each intra-semi-annual period to calculate CCRs for months April through August 20XX.

**About Fitch BMI “Country Risk Index”**

Fitch Solutions’ BMI provides five individual risk indices, to construct an overall country risk index: Long-Term Political Risk, Short-Term Political Risk, Long-Term Economic Risk, Short-Term Economic Risk, and Operational Risk.

However, based on observation of the data and conversations with researchers at BMI, it was clear that short-term indicators were too short-term in nature and too volatile to reflect country risk over the long-term. As a result, Kroll’s models rely on the three indices that focus on a country’s medium to long-term risk expectations, with an equal weight assigned to each risk indicator: Long-Term Political Risk, Long-Term Economic Risk, and Operational Risk. The individual risk score for each index is obtained by assigning a weight \(a\) on a variety of quantitative indicators.

---

12 This methodology was implemented by Euromoney starting in September 2019. Prior to that, there were six risk factors, as follows (weights shown in parenthesis): economic risk (30%), political risk (30%), structural risk (10%), debt indicators (10%), credit ratings (10%), and access to capital (10%).

13 In this example, March, April, May, June, July, August, and September 20XX CCRs would be 76, 75, 74, 73, 72, 71, and 70, respectively.


BMI’s country risk index scores are displayed on a 100-point scale, with 100 being the lowest risk, and 0 (zero) being the highest risk.

While BMI’s rating scale is the same as Euromoney’s and Institutional Investor’s, BMI’s distribution of country risk scores is more concentrated (i.e. more clustered around the middle of the rating scale). In order to make the series backwards compatible between sources, some additional smoothing adjustments were performed.¹⁶

**Equity Returns**

A total of 72 markets’ MSCI Global Equity Indices are used in calculating the CCR Model analyses presented in the International Cost of Capital Module as summarized in Exhibit 6.¹⁷,¹⁸

---

¹⁶ Specifically, to ensure a smooth transition between ECR scores and BMI scores, and to maximize the integrity of the regression employed in the CCR Model, the ECR scores were scaled via min-max scaling to the range of the average minimum and maximum BMI scores for 2022.

¹⁷ The MSCI series used are GR series. “GR” indicates that *total return* is calculated reinvesting gross dividends.

¹⁸ MSCI is a leading provider of investment decision support tools to clients worldwide. MSCI provides indices, portfolio risk and performance analytics, and ESG data and research. To learn more about MSCI, visit [www.msci.com](http://www.msci.com).
**Exhibit 6.1**: MSCI Global Equity Market Indices Used in Calculating the CCR Model Analyses Presented in the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Poland</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>Korea (South)</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>China (Mainland)</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Spain</td>
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<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Mauritius</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Hong Kong SAR</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Countries/markets and associated returns are defined and published by MSCI.
The CCR Model

The Erb-Harvey-Viskanta Country Credit Rating Model can be expressed as:

\[
k_{e,local} = \alpha + \beta \times \text{Natural Log}(CCR_{local}) + \varepsilon
\]

Where:
- \(k_{e,local}\) = Cost of equity capital in local country
- \(\alpha\) = Regression constant
- \(\beta\) = Regression coefficient
- \(CCR_{local}\) = Country credit rating of local country
- \(\varepsilon\) = Regression error term

This model was originally developed in 1996 by academics Claude Erb, Campbell Harvey, and Tadas Viskanta. The objective of the research was to develop a country risk model that could be used to establish hurdle rates for segmented markets. The research showed that while models such as the World (Global) CAPM worked reasonably well for developed markets, they did a poor job in explaining returns for emerging markets. In subsequent work, Professor Harvey recommended the use of either a CAPM or a multi-factor model in developed, liquid markets. In emerging markets, Professor Harvey indicated that he would often examine the indications of a number of models, including, but not limited to, the Erb-Harvey-Viskanta CCR model and average the corresponding results.¹⁹

The Erb-Harvey-Viskanta Country Credit Rating Model regresses all available CCRs (as of the month of calculation) for all countries in a given period \(t\) against all the available (equivalent) equity returns (for all countries that have returns) in the next period \(t + 1\).

For example, to estimate country-level cost of equity from a U.S. investor’s perspective as of March 2020, all available countries’ CCRs from March 1990 through February 2020 are matched with each of the 72 countries’ respective monthly equity returns (in USD) from April 1990 through March 2020. This results in over 20,000 matched pairs of CCRs in period \(t\) and returns in period \(t + 1\). A pooled regression analysis is then performed, with the natural log of all CCRs as the independent variable (the “predictor” variable), and all equity returns as the dependent variable (what is being “predicted”).

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¹⁹ Campbell R. Harvey, "12 Ways to Calculate the International Cost of Capital" (Durham, NC: Duke University), National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, USA 02138.
Then, the March 2020 CCR for each of the over 170 countries for which Euromoney Institutional Investor PLC has a rating (as of March 2020, in this example) is then used (in conjunction with the intercept and coefficient generated by the regression) to predict the next 1-month period’s return for each of the countries. This result is then multiplied by 12 to annualize the “monthly” estimate.

For example, as of March 2020 the CCR for Peru was 59.6 (on a 100-point scale). And, as of March 2020 the intercept and coefficient generated by regressing all available CCRs in time $t$ against all available monthly returns (in USD, for the 72 countries that have returns) in time $t + 1$ are 0.0437 and -0.0088 respectively.\(^{20}\)

The country-level cost of equity estimate for Peru (from the perspective of an investor based in the U.S.) as of March 2020 (9.27%) is therefore calculated as follows:

$$
COE_{Peru} = (\text{Intercept}_{U.S., \text{March 2020}} + (\text{Coefficient}_{U.S., \text{March 2020}} \times \text{Natural Log (CCR \text{ Peru}_{March2020}))}) \times 12
$$

$$
COE_{Peru} = (0.0437 + (-0.0088 \times \text{Natural Log (59.6)})) \times 12 = 0.092743 = 9.27\%
$$

**Potential Weaknesses of the Country Credit Rating Model**

The Country Credit Rating (CCR) Model has several potential weaknesses:

- The CCR model is complex, and requires access to quality stock market return data from a large number of countries.

- There tends to be more stock market data and country credit rating data available, and over longer periods, for countries that are more developed. This disproportionate data availability may skew the results.

- The results of the CCR model are sensitive to the period chosen over which the regression is performed, due to the changing relationship between developed and lesser-developed countries over time. Starting in 2017, the model version presented herein moved to a 30-year rolling regression, rather than using data back to September 1979. This likely better captures the trend observed in recent decades by individual countries’ economies toward a greater integration with the global economy and global financial markets (i.e., “globalization”); moving this analysis to a 30-year rolling regression ensures that only (relatively) more recent information about the stage of development of each country’s economy impacts the results.

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\(^{20}\) The negative coefficient implies that as credit ratings increase (better credit), country-level cost of equity estimates decrease, and vice versa.
• Both the Institutional Investor and Euromoney country credit ratings used as inputs in the CCR Model are (at least in part) based on qualitative factors that are subject to judgement (e.g., surveys of professionals, weights assigned to each risk factor, etc.).

**Different Investor Perspectives**

In the previous example, the 72 MSCI equity return indices used in the regressions were expressed in U.S. Dollar (USD) terms, and the results can thus be interpreted as “from the perspective of a U.S. investor” investing in (in this case) Peru. Alternatively, transforming the 72 MSCI equity return indices (as a group) into Canadian Dollar (CAD) terms or Japanese Yen (JPY) terms and then recalculating the regressions would produce results that can be interpreted as “from the perspective” of investors in Canada and Japan, respectively. As such, investor perspective (i.e., the country in which the investor is based) is defined herein by the currency in which the equity returns used in the regression analyses are expressed in.

Unexpected changes in the value of one currency versus another can have significant effects on the “money in pocket” of an investor. For example, in 2004 a local investor in the German stock market would have realized an increase of approximately 8% in his or her equity investments. However, a U.S.-based investor investing in the German stock market would have realized an increase of approximately 17% in his or her investments that year. The reason is simple: the Euro appreciated significantly against the U.S. Dollar in 2004, so the U.S. investor could buy more Dollars per Euro at the end of 2004 when repatriating the Euro investment back home. This change in the value of the two currencies in relation to each other enhanced the U.S.-based investor’s return by approximately 9% (17% – 8%).\(^{21,22}\)

In Exhibit 6.2, the 72 MSCI equity return indices used in the analyses herein were translated into (as a group, and in turn) U.S. Dollars (USD), British Pounds (GBP), German Euros (EUR), Brazilian Reals (BRL), and Japanese yen (JPY). CCR Model regression analyses were then performed in each currency (in turn), and a base country-level cost of equity capital estimate for investors based in the U.S., the U.K., Germany, Brazil, and Japan was then developed for each investing in Belgium, China, India, Kuwait, Mexico, South Africa, Slovenia, and Uruguay. As can be seen, the effect of currency fluctuations can have significant impact on expected return.

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\(^{21}\) Source of underlying data: equity returns: MSCI German Gross Return (GR) Index as published in Morningstar Direct; exchange rates: Morningstar, Inc. Used with permission. All rights reserved.

\(^{22}\) Unexpected changes in the relative value of currencies can work in the opposite direction also: In the following year (2005), the Euro significantly declined in value versus the U.S. Dollar. In this case, the “local” German investor would have realized a return of approximately 27%, whereas the U.S.-based investor would have realized a return of only 11%, that is, his or her Euros would have bought fewer U.S. Dollars per Euro at the end of 2005 than they could have at the beginning of 2005.
Exhibit 6.2: Using the CCR Model to Estimate Cost of Equity Capital from Differing Investor Perspectives into Different Countries/Markets (March 2022)

In the CCR Model analyses presented in the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module, 56 different investor perspectives are presented, as summarized in Exhibit 6.3.\textsuperscript{23,24}

\begin{itemize}
\item Investing in Belgium
\item Investing in China (Mainland)
\item Investing in India
\item Investing in Kuwait
\item Investing in Mexico
\item Investing in South Africa
\item Investing in Slovenia
\item Investing in Uruguay
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{23} Of the 56 investor perspectives, 19 of these investor perspective countries are members of the Eurozone, in which the local currency is the Euro (€). In the (former) Ibbotson Associates/Morningstar \textit{International Cost of Capital Perspectives Report}, the Erb Harvey- Viskanta Country Credit Rating Model was used to estimate country-level cost of equity capital from the “perspective” of investors based in any one of six different countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the U.K.). In the analyses presented herein, the number of investor perspectives has been expanded to 56 investor perspectives.

Exhibit 6.3: Country/Market Investor Perspectives Presented Herein (total 56), calculated Using the CCR Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investor Perspective</th>
<th>Currency</th>
<th>Investor Perspective</th>
<th>Currency</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Argentine Peso (ARS)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Malaysian Ringgit (MYR)</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>Canadian Dollar (CAD)</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Euro (EUR)</td>
</tr>
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<td>New Zealand Dollar (NZD)</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>Norwegian Krone (NOK)</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Philippine Peso (PHP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Euro (EUR)</td>
<td>Poland</td>
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<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>Yen (JPY)</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>Kuwaiti Dinar (KWD)</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Peso Uruguayo (UYU)</td>
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</table>

Global Cost of Equity Capital – High-level Comparisons

The CCR Model allows for the comparison of cost of equity capital estimates for any combination of available countries. We now present several examples of base country-level cost of equity capital estimated by (i) level of economic development, (ii) country, (iii) financial crisis impact, (iv) S&P sovereign credit rating, and (v) geographic region.
Cost of Equity Capital by Level of Economic Development

MSCI classifies the countries for which it has indices into various groupings, including level of economic development. This grouping categorizes countries as (i) developed markets, (ii) emerging markets, and (iii) frontier markets.\(^{25}\)

In Exhibit 6.4, the CCR model is used to calculate a base country-level cost of equity capital from the perspective of a U.K.-based investor investing in (i) the U.K., (ii) developed markets, (iii) emerging markets, and (iv) frontier markets, as of March 2020.\(^{26}\)

**Exhibit 6.4:** Base Country-level Cost of Equity Capital Estimates for the U.K., MSCI Developed Markets, MSCI Emerging Markets, and MSCI Frontier Markets, from the Perspective of a U.K.-based Investor (as of March 2020)

The relationships between the values are intuitively pleasing: the estimated cost of equity capital *increases* as we move from *more* developed economies to *less* developed economies. This makes sense – less-developed economies tend to have greater financial, economic, and political risks than more-developed economies do.

\(^{25}\) The MSCI Market Classification Framework consists of the following three criteria: economic development, size and liquidity, and market accessibility. Developed market countries are countries with the most developed economies. Emerging market countries have economies that are less developed than developed market economies, but whose markets have greater liquidity than frontier market economies, while exhibiting significant openness to capital inflows/outflows and openness to foreign ownership. Frontier market countries have economies that are less developed than both developed and emerging market economies, while exhibiting lower market size and liquidity, as well as more restricted market accessibility. To learn more about the MSCI Market Classification Framework, visit: [https://www.msci.com/market-classification](https://www.msci.com/market-classification).

\(^{26}\) “From the perspective of a U.K.-based investor” means the returns for the 72 MSCI equity returns series used in the regression calculations used to perform this analysis were expressed in British Pounds (GBP).
Cost of Equity Capital by Country

In another example, Exhibit 6.5 lists the base country-level cost of equity capital for the largest 10 countries ranked by 2022 gross domestic product (GDP) as calculated using the CCR Model, this time from the perspective of a China-based investor. Germany, which was the fourth-largest economy, is tied for the lowest cost of equity capital estimate (about 8.6%) with the United States, the largest economy, of March 2022. Alternatively, India, which was the fifth-largest economy, has the second highest cost of equity capital estimate (a little over 12.8%) in the group.

Exhibit 6.5: Cost of Equity Capital Estimates for the 10 Largest Countries by GDP from the Perspective of a China-based Investor (as of March 2022)

Source of underlying data: Institutional Investor's Country Credit Ratings; Euromoney Institutional Investor; equity (stock) indices from MSCI Global Equity Indices, in Morningstar, Inc. Used with permission. All rights reserved. GDP estimates are from the World Economic Outlook Database from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For additional information, please visit: www.imf.org/en/Publications/SPROLLS/world-economic-outlook-databases. All estimates are expressed in terms of Yuan Renminbi (CNY). All calculations by Kroll.

Cost of Equity Capital by Financial Crisis Impact

Weakening of European economies was a topic of interest in the aftermath the 2008 global financial crisis, particularly after the onset of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Today, the issues are still often discussed within the framework of the “healthier” core economies (e.g., Germany, U.K., France) compared to “less healthy” periphery economies (e.g., Greece, Portugal, Spain).
In Exhibit 6.6, the CCR Model is used to calculate a base country-level cost of equity capital (again from the perspective of a U.S.-based investor) for each of the six “healthier” and “less healthy” countries listed earlier. Then, the median value of the two groupings (“healthier” and “less healthy”) over the period January 2007–March 2020 was plotted.

The model’s output seems reasonable over this time period – the less healthy group is riskier than the healthier group over the entire 159-month period, and the gap widens after the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent impact of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.

For example, by mid-2011 many analysts expected Greece to default on its government debt, despite the two bailout packages Greece was forced to accept in May 2010 and July 2011. Although not in such precarious conditions as Greece, Portugal was also forced into a bailout package in April 2011. Markets reacted negatively to the second EU-approved Greek bailout of July 2011 and the crisis spread to Spain and Italy, countries considered “too big to fail”. In late summer 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) was forced to reenact its government bonds purchase program and to provide additional liquidity to banks. In September 2012, the ECB also announced a new quantitative easing (QE) program to purchase certain sovereign debt securities in secondary markets, which resulted in peripheral sovereign yields declining significantly.

However, lackluster growth trends, coupled with deflation fears, induced the ECB to cut its benchmark rate to a new record low in early June 2014, while also announcing an unprecedented measure to charge negative interest rates on deposits held at the central bank. The loss in economic momentum, coupled with early third-quarter indicators falling short of expectations, prompted the ECB to again cut its benchmark rate to 0.05% in September 2014. The ECB also confirmed the start of an asset-backed securities purchase program and unveiled a new Euro-denominated covered bond purchase program. The continued threat of deflation led the ECB to announce a larger scale sovereign debt buying program in January 2015, which consists of €60 billion monthly asset purchases starting in March 2015, with a target end date of September 2016. In the midst of these events, a new government in Greece was elected in January 2014, bringing fears of a Greek exit from the Eurozone back to the forefront. These events impacted the CCRs for these countries, which translated into a higher cost of equity as implied by the CCR Model.

As time elapsed, the spread between the base cost of equity capital of the “less healthy” and “healthier” European countries (as defined here) seemingly returned to a pre-crisis level of approximately 200 basis points.
Exhibit 6.6: Median Calibrated Cost of Equity Capital Estimates for Healthier European Economies (Germany, U.K., France) versus Less Healthy European Economies (Greece, Portugal, Spain) From the Perspective of a U.S.-based Investor (Monthly, January 2007–March 2020)

Source of underlying data: Institutional Investor's Country Credit Ratings; Euromoney Institutional Investor; equity (stock) indices from MSCI Global Equity Indices, Morningstar, Inc. Used with permission. All rights reserved. CCR-based estimates of cost of equity capital are calibrated in this exhibit to Kroll published "base" U.S. cost of equity capital estimates. All estimates are expressed in terms of U.S. Dollars. All calculations by Kroll.

Cost of Equity Capital by S&P Sovereign Credit Rating

The CCR Model can also be used to compare the estimated cost of equity capital through the lens of credit rating agencies’ debt ratings of countries.

In Exhibit 6.7, the CCR Model is used to estimate base country-level cost of equity capital (this time, from the perspective of a China-based investor) for countries with a Standard & Poor’s (S&P) sovereign credit rating of AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, and B--SD (SD stands for “Selective Default”) as of March 2020; the median and average cost of equity capital estimates for countries in each rating group is then calculated. These groupings’ median and average are then compared to the model’s base country-level cost of equity capital estimate for a China-based investor investing in China. For purposes of this analysis, we have treated the U.S. as if it were rated AAA by S&P (see rationale in Chapter 4).
Exhibit 6.7: Median and Average Cost of Equity Capital Estimates from the Perspective of a China based Investor for Groupings of Countries with Various S&P Credit Ratings; Compared to China’s Estimated Cost of Equity Capital (as of March 2020)

Source of underlying data: Institutional Investor's Country Credit Ratings; Euromoney Institutional Investor; equity (stock) indices from MSCI Global Equity Indices, Morningstar, Inc. Used with permission. All rights reserved. S&P credit ratings from Standard & Poor's Global Credit Portal. All estimates are expressed in terms of Yuan Renminbi (CNY). All calculations by Kroll.

Again, the relationships between the values make sense – countries with lower S&P credit grades tend to have higher cost of equity capital.

Cost of Equity Capital by Geographic Region

The CCR Model can also be used to compare the estimated cost of equity capital across geographic regions.

In Exhibit 6.8, the model was used to estimate base country level cost of equity capital as of March 2020, from the perspective of a U.S.-based investor considering an investment in Brazil. This estimate is then compared to the median and average base country-level cost of equity estimate for countries in the Latin America geographic region (as a group). The base country-level cost of equity capital for Brazil in U.S. dollars (a little over 10.5) is significantly lower than the median (i.e., typical) and average cost of equity capital for the region (over 12%).

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Exhibit 6.8: Cost of Equity Capital for Countries in the Latin America Geographic Region, from the Perspective of a U.S.-based Investor (as of March 2020)

Source of underlying data: Regional classification based on Euromoney's Country Risk definitions; equity (stock) indices from MSCI Global Equity Indices, Morningstar, Inc. Used with permission. All rights reserved. All estimates are expressed in terms of U.S. Dollars. All calculations by Kroll.

Presentation of Cost of Capital Data

In the previous Ibbotson Associates/Morningstar international reports, base country-level cost of equity capital estimates were published. In the Cost of Capital Navigator's International Cost of Capital Module at kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator, however, country risk premia (CRPs) are the primary data presented.28

The CRP data presented in the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module can be used to estimate base country-level cost of equity capital estimates for over 190 countries, from the perspective of 56 investor perspectives (a U.S.-based investor, plus investors based in any one of 55 additional countries).

Country Risk Premia (CRP) Defined

The CRP attempts to isolate the incremental risk premium associated with investing in a “foreign” country (i.e., the investee country; the country in which the investment is located) compared to the risk of investing in the “home” country (i.e., the country in which the investor is based).

28 “Base country-level cost of equity capital” estimates are also presented from the perspective of an investor based in Country X investing in Country X (e.g., a German-based Euro investor, an Australia-based Australian Dollar investor, etc.).
The publication of CRPs makes using the information published therein easier to use. Because the CRP is designed to isolate the incremental risks of investing in one country versus investing in another country (all other things held the same), the analyst can simply add the CRP to his or her own cost of equity estimate (see examples later in this section).

The International Cost of Capital Module includes 56 investor perspectives. In each of those 56 investor perspectives, over 190 investee countries are available to choose from, with a corresponding CRP. The CRPs are:

- Updated quarterly
- Different for each investor perspective

The CRPs presented in the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module are designed to be a gauge of the relative risks between investing in the “home” country and the “foreign” country, as determined within the framework of the Erb-Harvey-Viskanta Country Credit Rating Model, as calculated herein. This difference in relative risk is assumed to be a linear function, and remains the same regardless of the base country-level cost of equity capital for an investor investing in his or her home country selected by the analyst, whether that selection is (i) the published value, or (ii) a custom value calculated by the analyst. Examples for both of these scenarios are provided later in this section.

**How CRPs Are Calculated**

Calculation of the CRP is straightforward: the base country-level cost of equity capital estimate for a home-country-based investor investing in the home country is subtracted from the base country-level cost of equity capital estimate for a home-country-based investor investing in the foreign country. The difference is the CRP.

For example, the base country-level cost of equity capital as of March 2020 as estimated in the analyses herein using the CCR Model for a U.K.-based investor investing in the U.K. is 9.5% (in other words, 9.5% is the country-level discount rate for U.K. based British Pound (GBP) investors).

Alternatively, the base country-level cost of equity capital as of March 2020 for a U.K.-based investor investing in Russia is 13.1% (in other words, 13.1% is the country-level discount rate for U.K.-based investors in a Russia-based investment, denominated in GBP).\(^29\) The CRP is calculated as follows:

\(^29\) It is assumed that upon making the investment the investor must translate GBP into RUB, and upon repatriating returns must translate RUB back into GBP. In the implementation of the CCR Model presented herein, it is assumed that returns must ultimately be repatriated.
**CRP** = (Base country-level cost of equity capital estimate for a home-country-based investor investing in the foreign country) – (Base country-level cost of equity capital estimate for a home-country-based investor investing in the home country)

2.6% = 13.1% – 9.5%

A “base country-level cost of equity capital estimate” is the risk of investing in a country’s market as a whole (i.e., an assumed beta of 1.0). The CRP therefore represents the *incremental* risk of investing in the foreign country’s market as a whole, as opposed to investing in the home country’s market as a whole.

In the following section, three examples are presented for estimating cost of equity capital using the CRPs derived using the Erb-Harvey-Viskanta Country Credit Rating Model:

- Estimating base country-level cost of equity capital assuming an investment in the foreign country’s market as a whole (i.e., an assumed beta of 1.0), using published values.

- Estimating base country-level cost of equity capital assuming an investment in the foreign country’s market as a whole (i.e., an assumed beta of 1.0), using the valuation analyst’s own estimate of his/her home country’s base country-level cost of equity capital.

- Using CRPs to estimate cost of equity capital for use in evaluating a business, asset, or project.

**Using CCR Model CRPs to Estimate Base Country-level Cost of Equity Capital**

In Resources section of Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module at kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator the base country-level cost of equity capital estimate from the point of an investor based in each respective country (i.e., “home” country), investing in the home country as a whole is presented.

For example, as calculated within the context of the CCR Model, the base country-level cost of equity capital for Brazil is 15.4% as of March 2020 of a Brazilian-based investor perspective in the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module. This represents the base country-level cost of equity capital for an investor based in Brazil, investing in Brazil. Alternatively, the base country-level cost of equity capital for Germany is 6.4%. This represents the base country-level cost of equity capital for an investor based in Germany, investing in Germany.

Investor “perspective” (i.e., the country in which the investor is based) is defined herein by the currency in which the equity returns used in the regression analyses are expressed in. An investor “based in Brazil” is therefore an investor who is estimating cost of capital with inputs (cash flows, etc.) that are expressed in the “local” currency of Brazil, the Real (BRL). Alternatively, an investor “based in Germany” is therefore an investor who is estimating cost of capital with inputs (cash flows, etc.) that are expressed in the “local” currency of Germany, the Euro (EUR).
Note that the base country-level cost of equity capital estimates reported in the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module Resources section assume an investment in the “market” of the home country as a whole (i.e., a beta of 1.0), and do not include any adjustment for company/industry risk. These values can be thought of as the sum of the risk-free rate plus the equity risk premium in each perspective country, expressed in the perspective country’s local currency, as calculated within the context of the Erb-Harvey-Viskanta CCR model as presented herein. These values do not represent CRPs.

The base country-level cost of equity capital estimates are presented primarily for benchmarking purposes. They can also be used (in conjunction with the CRPs reported herein) to estimate base country-level cost of equity capital estimates from the perspective of an investor (based in any one of the 56 perspective countries) investing in any one of the over 190 investee countries markets as a whole, as outlined in Examples 6-1 and 6-2.30

Example 6-1: Calculate the base country-level cost of equity capital estimate for an investor based in Brazil, investing in the U.S. market as a whole, as of March 2020, using the published estimate of Brazil’s base country-level cost of equity capital.

Estimating the base country-level cost of equity capital estimate for an investor based in Brazil investing in the U.S. market as a whole as of March 2020 is a four-step process:

**Step 1:** In the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module, locate the Base Cost of Equity Capital by Country in the Resources section

**Step 2:** Identify the base country-level cost of equity capital for an investor based in Brazil, investing in Brazil. We have previously determined that this is 15.4% as of March 2020.

**Step 3:** Identify the CRP as of March 2020 for the United States in the Brazilian-based investor perspective by (i) either starting an estimate or (ii) selecting the “Country Risk Template + Estimate WACC in Multiple Countries” option in the Resources section.31 This value is –3.2% (which in this case is not a premium, but a discount instead; in either case the value is added in Step 4).

**Step 4:** Add the CRP identified in Step 3 to the base country-level cost of equity capital for an investor based in Brazil, investing in the Brazil market as a whole, as identified in Step 2 (15.4% + (–3.2%)). The result (12.2%) is the base country-level cost of equity capital estimate for an investor based in Brazil investing in the United States market as a whole as of March 2020.

30 For additional examples estimating cost of equity capital, please refer to the complementary CFA Institute webinar entitled “Quantifying Country Risk Premiums”, presented on December 6, 2016 by James P. Harrington and Carla S. Nunes, CFA. This webcast can be accessed here: https://rpc.cfainstitute.org/research/multimedia/2016/quantifying-country-risk-premiums.

31 Individual CRPs and other risk premia for any valid investee country/investor country combination are accessible to all subscribers of the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module regardless of subscriber level (Basic, Pro, or Enterprise subscription levels). However, Pro and Enterprise level subscribers have additional access to full tables of the universe of calculable CRPs for each of the 56 investor perspectives by valuation date in the Resources section.
Example 6-2: Calculate the base country-level cost of equity capital estimate for an investor based in Brazil, investing in the U.S. market as a whole, as of March 2020, using the valuation analyst’s own estimate of Brazil’s base country-level cost of equity capital.

Financial professionals often come to different conclusions as far as cost of capital (and the inputs used for its components) is concerned. If, for example, the analyst wishes to use a different base country-level cost of equity capital as of March 2020 for an investor based in Brazil investing in Brazil, say 14.5% (instead of 15.4%, the published value used in the previous example), the same process is followed, but with the analyst’s own custom estimate (14.5%) substituted:

Step 1: In Example 6-1, we first identified the base country-level cost of equity capital estimate for an investor based in Brazil, investing in Brazil. We determined that as of March 2020 this estimate is 15.4%. However, in this example we are using the valuation analyst’s own estimate of base country-level cost of equity capital for an investor based in Brazil, investing in Brazil, which is 14.5%.

Step 2: Identify the CRP as of March 2020 for the United States in the Brazilian-based investor perspective by either (i) starting an estimate or (ii) selecting the “Country Risk Template + Estimate WACC in Multiple Countries” option in the Resources section. This value is −3.2% (which in this case is not a premium, but a discount instead; in either case the value is added in Step 4).

Step 3: Add the CRP identified in Step 2 to the base country-level cost of equity capital for an investor based in Brazil, investing in the Brazil market as a whole, as identified in Step 2 (in this example we are using the analyst’s own estimate (14.5%) instead of the published estimate from the Cost of Capital Navigator). The resulting 11.3% (14.5% + (−3.2%)) is the base country-level cost of equity capital estimate for an investor based in Brazil investing in the United States market as a whole as of March 2020.

Again, the base country level cost of equity capital estimates assume an investment in the “market” of the home country as a whole (i.e., a beta of 1.0), and do not include any adjustment for company/industry risk. Adding the appropriate CRP for an investor based in the “home” country investing in the “foreign” country will thus also be an estimate of the base cost of equity capital for investing in the foreign country’s market as a whole, from the perspective of an investor based in the home country.

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32 Individual CRPs and other risk premia for any valid investee country/investor country combination are accessible to all subscribers of the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module regardless of subscriber level (Basic, Pro, or Enterprise subscription levels). However, Pro and Enterprise level subscribers have additional access to full tables of the universe of calculable CRPs for each of the 56 investor perspectives by valuation date in the Resources section.
Using CCR Model CRPs to Estimate Cost of Equity Capital for Use in Evaluating a Subject Business, Asset, or Project

The ability to estimate base country-level cost of equity capital from the perspective of an investor in the “home” country into the “foreign” country’s market as a whole (as was done in Examples 6-1 and 6-2) is very valuable information that can be used for benchmarking and support purposes. Most of the time, however, valuation analysts are developing discount rates for use in evaluating a subject business, asset, or project.

For example, valuation analysts are often confronted with the following problem: “I know how to value a company in the United States, but this one is in Country ABC, a developing economy. What should I use for a discount rate?” Can the CRP be used as an input in developing cost of equity capital estimates for, say, a company that operates in GICS 3030 (household & personal products) in a different country? Yes, but it is important to understand the assumptions one is making when doing this.

Using the aforementioned household & personal products company as an example, an analyst typically would develop discount rates for this company as if it were located in the “home” country, and then add a country risk premium (CRP) to account for the differences in risk between the home country, and the country in which the household & personal products company is actually located (i.e., the investee or “foreign” country).

The implied assumption in this analysis is that what it means to be a household & personal products company in the home country means the same thing as being a household & personal products company in the foreign country. Some questions that the analyst may wish to consider:

- Are the risks of being a household & personal products company in the foreign country the same as the risks of being a household & personal products company in the home country?

- Does a household & personal products company in the foreign country have the same beta (β) as a household & personal products company in the home country?33

- Does the household & personal products company in the foreign country operate in a different industry environment from a household & personal products company in the home country?

33 Beta (β) is a measure of systematic risk used as an input in some methods of estimating cost of equity capital (e.g., the CAPM requires a beta).
• Did the analyst apply any additional adjustments when the discount rate was developed for the household & personal products company as if it were located in the home country? For example, was a size premium applied? “Large company” and “small company” can mean very different things from country to country. For example, a smaller-sized company in the U.S. or Germany may be a “large” company in Estonia or Norway.

Valuation analysis is an inherently comparative process, so questions like these are no different from the type of questions that are asked in any valuation analysis. For example, a subject company might be compared to a set of companies (i.e., peer group, or comparables) that possess characteristics that are arguably similar to the characteristics of the subject company. To the degree that the subject company and the peer group do have differences, further adjustment(s) may be required.

The process for using CRPs from the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module for estimating cost of equity capital for a subject business, asset, or project, is quite similar to developing base country-level cost of equity capital (as was done in the previous examples). The difference is that additional adjustments may be necessary, as outlined earlier.

In the case of our household & personal products company located in the foreign country, the “peer group” is household & personal products companies in the home country, and to the extent that a household & personal products company located in the foreign country is different (other than location), further adjustments may be required. Again, the CRP attempts to isolate the incremental risk premium associated with investing in another market as a whole, without regard to differing industry risks or other risks that may be particular to that type of business in the foreign country.

Example 6-3: Estimate cost of equity capital for a company in India that operates in GICS 3030 (household & personal products) as of March 2020, from the perspective of an investor based in the U.S.

Estimating cost of equity in this example is a three-step process:

Step 1: Calculate cost of equity capital estimate for household & personal products company located in the U.S. For the purposes of this example, assume 8.0%.34

Step 2: Identify the country risk premium (CRP) as of March 2020 for India, from the perspective of a U.S.-based investor. This value is 3.5%.

34 An excellent source of international industry statistics (including cost of equity capital estimates and peer group betas for use in CAPM estimates) is the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Industry Benchmarking Module. Learn more at kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator.
Step 3: Add the CRP identified in Step 2 to the cost of equity capital estimate for a household & personal products company in the U.S. estimated in Step 1 (8.0% + 3.5%). The result (11.5%) is the cost of equity capital estimate for an investor based in the U.S. investing in a household & personal products company located in India, *prior* to any adjustments due to intrinsic differences in the household & personal products industry environment (or other risks) between the U.S. and India.
Chapter 7
Firm Size and the Cost of Equity Capital in Europe

Chapter 7 is a brief synopsis of a Research Note authored by Professor Erik Peek of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University (RSM). The Research Note examines the relationships between firm size and the cost of equity capital in European equity markets. While a statistically significant “size effect” was detected in Europe, this effect was (i) limited to only the smallest of companies, and (ii) was not uniformly detected in all countries examined.

In the analyses presented herein, Professor Peek updated his analysis through the end of 2022. Starting with the year-end 2020 analysis, the results summarized in Europe Size Study under International Supplementary Data in the Resources Library of the Cost of Capital Navigator are now in 10 portfolios versus 16 portfolios in previous updates.

Differences in Returns Between Large and Small Companies in Europe

Numerous studies have examined U.S. equity returns and found that stocks of companies whose market capitalization is small (i.e., “small-cap” stocks) tend to earn greater returns, on average, than stocks of companies whose market capitalization is large (i.e., “large-cap” stocks), suggesting that small firms have a greater cost of equity capital. In fact, these studies show that depending on sample selection procedures, research period, and sorting methodology, the estimated monthly return difference between small-cap and large-cap stocks may range from approximately 0.4% to almost 2.5%.

Researchers have posited many explanations for the size effect, including (i) firm size proxies for differences in liquidity, or for other priced (yet unobservable) risk factors, or (ii) investor preferences or recognition depend on firm size.

To potentially assist investors to estimate the cost of equity in non-U.S. markets, some researchers have investigated the size effect in samples of non-U.S. stocks. Many of these studies, especially those focusing on a single country, may have been inhibited by a lack of data. Another potential issue has been the historic lack of integration among some or all of the stock markets in the sample, particularly with studies examining various groups of countries during the

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1. The full Research Note “A Study of Differences in Returns Between Large and Small Companies in Europe”, is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2499205. The Research Note was published as part of the ongoing research that Kroll performs and sponsors in the area cost of capital and other valuation issues. Professor Erik Peek is at Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University (RSM), Netherlands. We thank Professor Peek for his expertise in exploring this important topic.

1970s and 1980s. Moreover, it is entirely conceivable that the risk differences between small- and large-cap stocks in a segregated locality could differ significantly from the risk differences between small and large-cap stocks in an internationally diversified portfolio. This may occur, for example, if a lack of diversification opportunities in segregated markets makes investors averse to small-cap stocks’ greater idiosyncratic risk.

In Professor Peek’s research, the existence of the size effect outside the U.S. is reassessed using a large sample of Western European stocks over the period 1990–2022, a time in which the European economies and stock exchanges were largely and increasingly integrated. The size effect is examined in a “pooled” sample in which all European exchanges are treated as a single integrated market, and also examined by splitting the sample into potentially more homogeneous geographic regions.

**Countries Included**

The original Research Note (and the updated analysis herein) focused on a set of 17 Western European countries (and stock exchanges) that have exhibited a large degree of integration during the past two decades. These countries are summarized in Exhibit 7.1.

**Exhibit 7.1: Countries Included**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Austria</th>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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**Data Sources**

The sample of companies used to perform the analysis presented comes from the intersection of Refinitiv’s Datastream database (from which market and return data were gathered) and Refinitiv’s (formerly Thomson Financial) Worldscope database (from which fundamental or accounting-based data was gathered).

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4 Returns are expressed in Euros. For years prior to introduction of the Euro, the returns are expressed in Deutsche Mark. Company types included: non-start-up, financially healthy companies – the typical company in most investment portfolios (i.e., “Low-Financial -Risk” companies). Company types excluded: financial service companies, financially-distressed companies, companies having illiquid stock, companies in the early stages of their life cycle (see the original Research Note for details about the company set selection methodology employed).
Regional Differences

Prior country-specific studies on the firm size effect have produced mixed evidence, leading some researchers and practitioners to conclude that the effect does not exist in some non-U.S. countries.\(^5\)

To shed some light on the significance of the size effect across economic regions and their potential origin, the sample was split into groups of geographically proximate and economically integrated countries and the differences between returns for portfolios comprised of the largest and smallest companies were analyzed, with the data being subdivided into quartiles.\(^6\)

Exhibit 7.2 displays the average portfolio return spreads between the bottom quartile portfolio (comprised of the smallest companies as measured by market capitalization) and the top quartile portfolio (comprised of the largest companies as measured by market capitalization) for the following four regions:

- Europe (as defined by the 17 countries listed in Exhibit 7.1)
- Continental Europe (i.e., the countries included in the Europe sample, excluding Ireland and U.K.)
- Ireland and United Kingdom (£ Investor)
- Ireland and United Kingdom (€ Investor)

The regional return spreads are presented in order of significance, measured as the (one-sided) probability that the differential (i.e., the size premium) is equal to or less than zero. The reader is cautioned to interpret the observed regional differences with care (especially because splitting up the sample unavoidably affects statistical power). On the whole, Exhibit 7.2 suggests that the size premium is positive in every economic region considered.

\(^5\) For example, some studies of the German equity market conclude that in recent decades stock returns of small German firms have not significantly exceeded stock returns of large German firms (see e.g., Schulz, 2009). With their view seemingly supported by these findings, the German Institute of Public Auditors (‘Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer’) recommends in its (nationally authoritative) Principles for the Performance of Business Valuations not to add size premia to cost of capital estimates.

\(^6\) Firm-size breakpoints were first determined in the full European sample, and then these same breakpoints were used to construct portfolios in the regional samples (thus ensuring that size portfolios are consistently defined across samples).
Exhibit 7.2: Average Annual Return Spreads between Top and Bottom Market Capitalization Quartiles by Region (December 2022)

Exhibit 7.3 displays the average portfolio return spreads between the bottom quartile portfolio (comprised of the small countries as measured by size factor) and the top quartile portfolio (comprised of the largest countries as measured by size factor) for the same four regions listed above and in Exhibit 7.2.⁷

Once again, the reader is cautioned to interpret the observed regional differences with care, since splitting up the sample unavoidably affects statistical power. On the whole, Exhibit 7.3 suggests that the size premium is positive in every economic region considered; however, the economic and statistical significance of the return spreads varies. This is consistent with the original Research Note findings that the size effect varies across countries and regions within Europe. In this most recent update, however, Exhibits 7.2 and 7.3 suggest that regional differences are small and insignificant. The comparison with prior versions of the study would suggest that previously observed regional differences have disappeared or were driven by small sample sizes.

⁷ The size factor is an aggregation of the other six measures of size analyzed in the Research Note: market capitalization, book equity, market value of invested capital, total assets, sales, and number of employees.
Exhibit 7.3: Average Annual Return Spreads between Top and Bottom Size Factor Quartiles by Region (December 2022)

Two Types of Risk Premia Examined

The data exhibits in Professor Peek’s Research Note summarize (and may aid in the examination of) the relationships between firm size and the cost of equity capital in European equity markets. These exhibits present different types of size-related risk premia data, including (i) “risk premia over the risk-free rate”, and (ii) “risk premia over CAPM”.

The main difference between “risk premia over the risk-free rate” and “risk premia over CAPM” is how size-related risks are being measured, which in turn determines the cost of equity capital models (i.e., build-up method or CAPM) in which they could be used.

Both the risk premia over the risk-free rate and the size premia herein were developed using six different measures of firm size, plus a seventh size measure that is a combination of the six different measures of size.8

For further detail, refer to “European Size Study” under European Size Premium in the Resources Library of the Cost of Capital Navigator’s International Cost of Capital Module.

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8 The six measures of size analyzed in the Research Note are: market capitalization, book equity, market value of invested capital, total assets, sales, and number of employees. The seventh measure, the aggregation of the other six measures was determined as follows: Size Factor = −2.5525 + 0.0796 × ln(Market capitalization) + 0.0831 × ln(Market Value of invested capital) + 0.0843 × ln(Book equity) + 0.0818 × ln(Total assets) + 0.0713 × ln(Sales) + 0.0765 × ln(Employees).
Risk Premia Over the Risk-free Rate

“Risk premia over the risk-free rate” (i.e., excess returns) are a measure of the combined effect of market risk and size risk. These premia could be used within the context of a build-up method of estimating the cost of equity capital. These premia are simply added to a risk-free rate to determine a cost of equity capital estimate.

For example, a basic build-up model of cost of equity capital estimation could be written as:⁹

\[ E(R_i) = R_f + RP_{m+s} \]

Where:

- \( E(R_i) \) = Expected rate of return on security \( i \)
- \( R_f \) = Risk-free rate
- \( RP_{m+s} \) = Market risk plus a risk premium for size

The risk premia over the risk-free rate were developed using six different measures of firm size, plus a seventh size measure that is a combination of the six different measures of size:

- Market Capitalization
- Book Equity
- Market Value of Invested Capital
- Total Assets
- Sales
- Number of Employees
- A seventh size measure that is a combination of the six different measures of size.

---

⁹ The simple build-up equation shown represents cost of equity capital prior to any additional adjustments attributable to the specific company that the individual analyst may deem appropriate.
Exhibit 7.4 suggests that “risk premia over the risk-free rate” generally increase as size decreases (and vice versa), albeit non-monotonically. Exhibit 7.4 also suggests that the firm “size effect” on the cost of equity may be present in the European sample, although it seems to be fairly concentrated in the smallest companies.

**Exhibit 7.4:** Composite Average of Arithmetic Average “Risk Premium Over the Risk-free Rate” (December 2022)

For detailed tables with premia and statistics about the 10 portfolios in Exhibit 7.4 for each of the seven size measures, refer to “European Size Study” under European Size Premium in the Resources Library of the Cost of Capital Navigator.

We recommend that analysts consider using the smoothed average risk premia in estimating the cost of equity capital when using the build-up method. We also recommend that analysts consider the range of results from using the data for all seven measures of size before concluding on a cost of equity capital.

We also recommend that the analyst examine the relationships described in “European Size Study” under International Supplementary Data in the Resources Library section of the Cost of Capital Navigator that summarizes fundamental risk measures (based on accounting data) of the companies comprising each size ranked portfolio:

- Average operating margin
- Standard deviation of operating margin
- Average Altman Z-score

Note, as size decreases, average operating margins also tend to decrease, standard deviation of operating margins tend to increase, and Altman Z-scores tend to increase.
If the risk characteristics of the subject company differ from the average of companies comprising the size ranked portfolios, use a risk premium that differs from the average published in the Resources Library of the Cost of Capital Navigator.

For example, if the average operating margin is greater and the average variability of operating margin of the subject company is less than that of the companies comprising the size ranked portfolios, the appropriate risk premium is likely less than that published in Europe Size Study under International Supplementary Data in the Resources Library section of the Cost of Capital Navigator. That is, the risk of the subject company more closely resembles that of a larger company and the risk premium should likely be more like that of larger companies with comparable average operating margins and comparable standard deviations of operating margin.

**Premia Over CAPM (Size Premia)**

Risk premia over CAPM (i.e., size premia) were also developed for each of the seven different measures of firm size. These premia could be applied when estimating the cost of equity capital using a modified CAPM.\(^\text{11}\)

The following is an example of the “Modified” CAPM:\(^\text{12,13}\)

\[
E(R_i) = R_f + (\beta \times RP_m) + RP_s
\]

Where:
- \(E(R_i)\) = Expected rate of return on security \(i\)
- \(R_f\) = Risk-free rate
- \(\beta\) = Beta estimate for security \(i\)
- \(RP_m\) = Market risk premium, or ERP
- \(RP_s\) = Risk premium for size

Like the previously discussed “risk premia over the risk-free rate”, the risk premia over CAPM were also developed using six different measures of firm size, plus a seventh size measure that is a combination of the six different measures of size:

- Market Capitalization

---

\(^{11}\) The “textbook” CAPM is defined as \(E(R_i) = R_f + (\beta \times RP_m)\). A “modified” CAPM typically entails adding additional risk premium adjustments (in this case, the additional adjustment is for “size”). The individual analyst may conclude that additional risk factors are appropriate.

\(^{12}\) This information is extracted from the International Supplementary Data in the Resources Library section of the Cost of Capital Navigator.

\(^{13}\) The modified CAPM equation shown represents cost of equity capital after a “size” adjustment and prior to any additional adjustments attributable to the specific company that the individual analyst may deem appropriate.
- Book Equity
- Market Value of Invested Capital
- Total Assets
- Sales
- Number of Employees
- A seventh size measure that is a combination of the six different measures of size.

In Exhibit 7.5, the simple average of all arithmetic average “risk premia over CAPM” for all seven measures of firm size from the Research Note are shown. Exhibit 7.5 suggests that “risk premia over CAPM” generally increase as size decreases (and vice versa), albeit non-monotonically. Again, this suggests that the firm “size effect” on the cost of equity may be present in the European sample, although it seems to be fairly concentrated in the smallest companies.

**Exhibit 7.5**: Composite Average of Arithmetic Average “Risk Premium Over CAPM” (i.e., Size Premia) (December 2022)

For detailed tables with premia and statistics about the 10 portfolios in Exhibit 7.5 for each of the seven size measures, refer to “European Size Study” under European Size Premium in the Resources Library of the Cost of Capital Navigator.

We recommend that analysts consider using the smoothed average premia over CAPM in estimating the cost of equity capital when using the modified CAPM. We also recommend that analysts consider the range of results from using the data for all seven measures of size before concluding on a cost of equity capital.
For detailed tables with premia and statistics about the 10 portfolios in Exhibit 7.5 for each of the seven size measures, refer to “European Size Study” under European Size Premium in the Resources Library of the Cost of Capital Navigator.

We recommend that analysts consider using the smoothed average premia over CAPM in estimating the cost of equity capital when using the modified CAPM. We also recommend that analysts consider the range of results from using the data for all seven measures of size before concluding on a cost of equity capital.

We also recommend that the analyst examine the relationships in the Resources Library of the Cost of Capital Navigator that summarizes fundamental risk measures (based on accounting data) of the companies comprising each size ranked portfolio:

- Average operating margin
- Standard deviation of operating margin
- Average Altman Z-score

Note, as size decreases, unlevered beta estimates tend to increase, average operating margins tend to decrease, standard deviation of operating margin tend to increase, and Altman Z-scores tend to increase.

If the risk characteristics of the subject company differ from the average of companies comprising the size ranked portfolios, use a risk premium over CAPM that differs from the average published in “European Size Study” under International Supplementary Data in the Resources Library section of the Cost of Capital Navigator.

For example, if the average operating margin is greater and the average variability of operating margin of the subject company is less than that of the companies comprising the size ranked portfolios, the appropriate risk premium over CAPM is likely less than that published in the International Supplementary Data. That is, the risk of the subject company more closely resembles that of a larger company and the risk premium over CAPM should likely be more like that of larger companies with comparable average operating margins and comparable standard deviations of operating margin.

In addition, the data provides the analyst with the possibility of adjusting the unlevered beta (removing financial risk differences) estimates for a non-public company developed from guideline public companies. For example, if the average operating margin and the average variability of operating margin of the subject company are less than that of the guideline public companies being used to estimate the unlevered beta, one can use the data displayed to estimate an adjusted (lower) unlevered beta.
Effects On Size Premia when Using OLS Betas and Sum Betas

Smaller companies generally trade less frequently and exhibit more of a lagged price reaction (relative to the market) than do larger companies. One of the ways of capturing this lag movement is called a “sum” beta. Sum betas are designed to compensate for the less frequent trading of smaller company stocks. All of the size premia in the Research Note (and the updated analysis herein) are calculated using sum betas, which appear to correct for the lesser OLS beta estimates of smaller companies.

In Exhibit 7.6, OLS betas and sum betas are calculated for the portfolios comprised of low financial risk companies, ranked by their size factor, as examined in the Research Note (updated through 2022). Sum betas tend to be larger than the OLS betas. The OLS betas and sum betas for the portfolios comprised of larger companies are approximately the same. The net result of the larger sum betas is smaller size premia.

For example, portfolio 1 (comprised of the largest companies) in Exhibit 7.6 has an OLS beta of 0.93, and a sum beta of 0.94. Alternatively, portfolio 10 (comprised of the smallest companies) has an OLS beta of 0.77, and a sum beta of 1.12. All things held the same, the larger sum beta of decile 10 results in a smaller size premia than would be calculated using its OLS beta counterpart.

---


15 “Low-financial-risk” companies were the primary set of companies examined in the Research Note. A set of companies identified as “high-financial-risk” were also examined separately.

16 The size factor is an aggregation of the other six measures of size analyzed in the Research Note: market capitalization, book equity, market value of invested capital, total assets, sales, and number of employees.
### Exhibit 7.6: Comparison of OLS Betas and Sum Betas by Equal-Weighted Market Capitalization Portfolio as Calculated Over the Time Horizon 1990–2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size portfolio</th>
<th>Market Capitalization Upper bound in 2022</th>
<th>N in 2022</th>
<th>Portfolio OLS Beta</th>
<th>Portfolio Sum Beta</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (big)</td>
<td>396,750</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>15,234</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5,534</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,723</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,392</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 (small)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size portfolio</th>
<th>Market Capitalization Upper bound in 2022</th>
<th>N in 2022</th>
<th>Portfolio OLS Beta</th>
<th>Portfolio Sum Beta</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Cap 3 - 5</td>
<td>5,534</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Cap 6 - 8</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro-Cap 9-10</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One can see in Exhibit 7.7 that using the sum beta method also results in greater betas for smaller companies across regions included in the Research Note (and the updated analysis herein). \(^\text{17}\)

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\(^\text{17}\) Like Exhibit 7.6, Exhibit 7.7 is also comprised of the “low-financial-risk” set of companies examined in the Research Note.
Exhibit 7.7: Comparison of OLS Betas and Sum Betas for Different Regions (December 2022)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>All Companies</th>
<th>Over € 1 Billion</th>
<th>Under € 100 Million</th>
<th>N in 2022</th>
<th>Portfolio OLS Beta</th>
<th>Portfolio Sum Beta</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1,654</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>753</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>279</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continental Europe</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>591</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>233</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom &amp; Ireland (€ investor)</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>162</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom &amp; Ireland (£ investor)</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>151</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In applying CAPM, one should be internally consistent between how the beta was estimated and how the size premium was calculated. Using a sum beta times the ERP estimate and adding a sum beta based size premium would arguably result in a better reflection of the cost of equity faced by a small company.

Having said that, regardless of which type of beta calculation method is ultimately employed (OLS vs. sum beta), one should match the source of the size premium (i.e., how it was computed), with the type of beta estimate chosen for the subject company. In other words, one should use a size premium derived using OLS betas in conjunction with a subject company beta estimated through OLS; similarly, one should use a size premium derived using sum betas when a sum beta was selected for the subject company. Therefore, if one is utilizing this study's results, one should properly estimate beta using the sum beta method.

Conclusion

This chapter summarizes the findings of Professor Erik Peek’s Research Note (and the updated analysis herein), which examines whether the realized share price returns of small European firms have exceeded those of large firms over the period 1990–2022. Using various measures of firm size, the Research Note finds that small company shares have likely outperformed large company shares, on average, suggesting that investors perceive small European firms as riskier, and thus demand a “size” premium to compensate for this additional risk. The evidence also indicates that
the relationship between firm size and returns is strongly non-linear, and that the size premium is significant only for the smallest companies.

While the observed "size effect" is statistically significant only for those portfolios comprised of the smallest firms during the 1990–2022 period, this does not necessarily infer that the size effect is not present for larger companies in Europe. Studies of the size effect in countries with longer data availability, such as the United States, show that the size effect fluctuates over time. Given the short period of the current analysis of European markets (33 years, due to data constraints), a longer-term relationship could not be studied.

Research shows that other factors interact with size and conceal its relationship with returns. Research covering a large number of countries and industries has shown that size persists after controlling for quality of earnings.\(^{18}\) In another paper, the authors found that after adjusting for profitability shocks, the relationship between size and cross-section of expected returns persists even after the early 1980s, a period that some authors associate with a disappearing size factor.\(^ {19}\)

Breaking the European sample into regional and country subsamples, the Research Note’s findings suggest that the relationship between firm size and returns varies across regions, although in this most recent update, the observed differences across regions are smaller than they were in previous updates. In particular, Professor Peek finds in his original Research Note that the firm size effect may be strongest in the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries in the sample.

Again, while the size premium shown in the Research Note (and the updated analysis herein) is not significant in some European regions, the reader need not automatically conclude from it that firm size does not matter for cost of capital estimation in some countries. Splitting up the sample unavoidably affects the statistical power of the study’s tests and tends to reduce statistical significance in at least some of the subsamples, by default. Leaving aside statistical significance, Professor Peek’s research suggest that the average return spread between small and large firms is positive in each of the examined regional subsamples, and that size and liquidity distributions likely differ across regions. As Professor Peek posits, such differences may potentially explain why the size effect appears strong in some regions but weaker in others.


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